



# STUDY PROJECT

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GERMAN UNIFICATION:  
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

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GERMAN UNIFICATION: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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1 July 1990



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# ABSTRACT

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A divided Germany has been the centerpiece of European security relations for the past 45 years. With Europe in turmoil over the implosion of the Soviet Union, the revolutions rushing through Eastern Europe, and impending European economic integration, the current security architecture is teetering. This study, ~~written by a student at the NATO Defense College~~, begins with a brief explanation of the theory of alliances and why nation states seek them. The chapter ends with a brief look into the post World War II division of Europe and Germany, and ends with a short discourse on the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The following chapter examines the impact of German unification on existing multinational forums, stressing NATO. Also presented is how the other Europeans view unification and what the security ramifications are on the Germans themselves. The conclusion presents several options for the future security architecture of Europe. In addition to the tradition research methodologies, interviews of key European civilian and military leaders were employed and are included in the paper. *Keywords:*

*Western Security (Int'l Security);  
Germany (East and West);  
Europe. 1990.*

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# GERMAN UNIFICATION: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

NATO Defense College  
Rome, Italy  
1 July 1990

When I began this study project in February, I had just completed the five and one half month program of study at the NATO Defense College. Fifty-five military officers and civilian government officials from 14 of the NATO countries spent their time studying international politics and security issues, listening to experts expound on the tumultuous events that had occurred in 1989, and exchanging personal views on what issues faced the security experts in the years ahead. For an American, this opportunity - to hear differing views from professions from the leading European nations - was the high point of a very personally and professionally enriching experience.

We visited ten NATO capitals and listened to the leaders of the free world tell us their visions for the future. We had the opportunity to ask in depth, off the record questions. Many of the answers became food for thought.

I was an American military officer who had spent six years in Germany: the last three in the divided city of Berlin. As a amateur student of European political history who prides himself in keeping informed on what's going on the world, several thoughts began to trouble me.

First, being a good American, I had been ingrained with the inviolable concept that all peoples had the right to determine their own destiny - in short, the right of self-determination. This was one of the founding principles my nation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Helsinki Accords. Promises of unification were made to Germany by her NATO allies when she joined the Alliance in 1955. And yet, "the division of Germany had become the center piece of the postwar European security order."<sup>1</sup> Helmut Schmidt once said:

I do not foresee under what auspices and conditions the Germans will get together again, but they will.... (It is) not something which anybody thinks of as being right around the corner. (But) it's a real desire in the soul of German nation....It would be wrong for any nation to believe that the nation state is normal for every nation but not for the Germans.<sup>2</sup>

Next, it became clear that no one person or group of people was in charge of the torrent of change that would result from the revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe like a fire storm.<sup>3</sup> "One order was in collapse, and as yet no coherent alternative had been drafted."<sup>4</sup> As a military officer who is accustomed to dealing with things in a orderly and systematic way; it was more than a little frightening to come to the reluctant conclusion that no one had a viable game plan for the future. I remember clearly the day I was having coffee with a German classmate and we both came to the same pompous conclusion: the Berlin Wall will never come down. The date of that coffee break was 8 November 1989; the day before the Wall

was breached! The unthinkable had happened. No one was ready - in the East or the West - to take charge of events. I remember that memorable June 7, 1987 when my wife and I stood at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and heard President Reagan challenge Mr. Gorbachev to "Open that gate. Tear down that wall." None of us thought it would ever happen. It is more than a little ironic that when the decision was made to breach the wall, the East Germans did not even bother to inform the Soviets. Times are changing.

Another thought that came readily to mind was that Europe had a number of multinational forums in place - NATO, the EC, the WEU, the EUROGROUP, the Council of Europe, and CSCE to name just a few. What future roles would these forums play and were they working at cross purposes?

When I chose this topic, I fully intended on presenting a strawman architecture for the future security order of Europe. I came to the conclusion that Europe needed a neat and tidy arrangement and; humbly, I was the one who was going to present it. Now after a years' study, I am not too sure that; with a little fine tuning and realigning of priorities, that what we have "ain't so bad."

Not being an expert in the field of world politics and international security, I developed a research methodology that would; hopefully, provide me with the needed background and expert opinions that would make my task easier. I set out reading everything I could get my hands on relating to the

background and history of the "German Question." Having lived in Berlin, I was well aware of the emotion wrapped up in this issue. But I was not ready for the onslaught of emotion from respected members of academia in their articles and books.

I then set out to interview experts in the field of international relations and security to obtain their studied opinions. The NATO Defense College is very fortunate to attract quality guest speakers who are leading academics, government officials, and key military leaders from across the European and North American continents. I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to listen to their lectures and to interview a number of them.

After interviewing the academic experts, I decided to interview military and civilian leaders "in the field" who were working on a daily basis with the aura of German unification hanging over their head. I travelled to the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe in Vienna where I was fortunate to attend several of the negotiation sessions. I also interviewed several U.S., Canadian, and East German military officers.

My last stop was at NATO headquarters where I interviewed several officers who are charged with the development of the strategic long range plans for NATO. They are the ones who have been asked to review all of NATO's strategy documents and develop logical plans for the future of the Alliance, a challenging task.

In subsequent chapters, I will discuss the European security implications as a result of German Unification. It is extremely difficult to treat this subject in isolation as it is entwined with so many of the events happening in Europe today - arms control negotiations, the restructuring of a resurgent Eastern Europe, instabilities in the Soviet Union, the move towards European integration, and the hard look being made at US involvement in European security affairs and the clamor by some for a retrenchment for NATO. Resolution of the German Question did not cause these events but certainly is characteristic of these wonderfully exciting times in Europe; albeit a very destabilizing and unpredictable time.

I claim no pride of authorship for most of the ideas presented. They belong to others who were kind enough to share them with me. Some will be very emotional; like the young Berliner who was born after the Wall was in place and who, just three weeks after the breaching of the Wall, said to me:

I'm not so sure I like it. I need the Wall. It's always been there.

Or the radical thinkers who clamor for the removal of all nuclear weapons and foreign troops from German soil. Or the now passe idea that only a neutral Germany would be acceptable to the Soviets. I will attempt to present these divergent views in an analytical way, providing criticisms on each idea. In the final chapter, I will present some thoughts about future security options for Europe.

Three administrative comments are in order. First; to the well informed military reader, some of my comments may seem basic or even been overcome by new or planned developments. I chose to restrict my research to unclassified open source material and unclassified interviews. Second, much of what I write will be well known to the readers who live and work in the NATO habitat. But, in addition to my NATO readers, a major target audience for this paper is the faculty and student body of the U.S. Army War College, the institution that provided the resources and opportunity to undertake this endeavor. My final audience are the officers who have not had the opportunity to work in our NATO environment. This paper is designed to be a primer for them. My last administrative comment is that I wrote each chapter to stand alone with the idea in mind to make the study project more readable. Foot notes are at the end of each chapter and I designed the foot notes so the first time used in each chapter, they are portrayed as if it was the first time use in the paper.

I will end this chapter with a disclaimer. Events have been so fast moving that much of what I wrote three months ago has been rewritten recently. Fighting an academic deadline and in an attempt to maintain some degree of sanity, I reluctantly came to the conclusion that I would not consider events occurring after 30 June 1990. It is not by accident that I picked this date. German monetary union occurs today. NATO leaders will be meeting in London next week to discuss the

future of the Alliance. And next Monday, the Communist Party Congress begins in Moscow. Who knows "what's next?"

## ENDNOTES

Gerhard Wettig. "The Political Implications of Change in Eastern Europe." Aussen Politik: German Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 41, 2/90, p. 115.

<sup>2</sup>Quote from Helmut Schmidt in an article entitled "Schmidt's Calculabilities." The Economist, 6 October 1978, p. 47. Quoted in an unpublished Master of Arts Thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School by Lynette Manning Tatsch, "The German Reunification Issue: A Soviet Perspective," September 1981, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Much has written on this point. For example, see Ibid and my interview with Major General Saint John, Appendix V to this paper.

<sup>4</sup>Jacques Rupnik, "Out of the Ice and into the Fire." The European Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1990, p. 50.

## CHAPTER II

### THE THEORY OF ALLIANCES AND THE CREATION OF NATO

Stephen M. Walt, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, has devoted most of his academic life to the study of the nature and origins of alliances. He writes that

more than anything else, the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union has been a competition for allies. Constrained from a direct test of strength by the danger of nuclear war..., the United States and the Soviet Union have devoted their efforts to recruiting a variety of allies and client states.<sup>1</sup>

He goes on to make the point that these alliances were intended primarily to enhance members' security and that the resulting arrangements have been remarkably stable until recently. NATO just celebrated its 40th birthday and the Soviet counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, is nearly as old. Additionally, the alignment of the strongest states into opposing blocs gave predictability to the central strategic competition and the alliances have made war between the great powers less likely.<sup>2</sup> "The balance of terror did keep Europe peaceful, though there have been 125 wars elsewhere since World War II."<sup>3</sup>

Over the years much has been written about the utility of alliances and many leading experts in the security field argue that the world is changing and alliances are no longer relevant. Almost from its inception, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), as been repeatedly criticized as a mere front for American hegemony in Europe.<sup>4</sup> Today with the lessening of the Soviet threat, the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, and the ending of the division of Germany, critics once again raise their cry to sound the death knoll for NATO. What is the future for multinational alliances as the dynamics of our world change? The dominance of the Soviet Union as a super power has been greatly diminished with internal problems far overshadowing any actions to dominate other nations. Communism as a concept has been totally rejected and its' credibility has been shattered. The predominance of the United States as the world's undisputed economic giant is less now than it has been in the past 40 years. The recent summits between the leaders of the two super powers portend a new relationship between them.

In this chapter, I will examine the theory of what brings nation states together and particularly the events that led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the formation of the two German nations.

Webster's defines alliance as "an association to further the common interests of the members."<sup>5</sup> So by definition, alliances infer that nations relinquish some of their individual options and sovereignty in return for the receipt of some common interest. "No matter how powerful a country is, alliances constrain their members as well as give them more influence."<sup>6</sup> In the case of NATO, this meant mutual defense and the

prevention of war with the perceived Soviet threat. The theory is very simple: in this turbulent world where no supreme authority exists to arbitrate among nations, states facing a common threat will band together with others to amass sufficient power to deter or defeat an enemy. A corollary to this theory is called the balance-of-power concept: weaker states ally against the stronger to prevent domination from stronger nations. In other words, strong states provoke others to ally against them, solely because their superior capabilities present a danger to weaker allies.<sup>7</sup>

Although the balance-of-power theory has been in vogue for some years, the realities of history do not give credence to it as an item of dogma. Why have many smaller nations chosen to ally themselves with one of the super powers against the other? The answer lies in the fact that states normally ally themselves with others to balance against threats and that military power is only one consideration. Historical experience, geographic proximity, military capabilities, and perceived intentions are all factors that entered into the equation. So it is probably more appropriate to call the balance-of-power theory "balance-of-threat" theory in the process of formation of alliances.<sup>8</sup>

Another interesting hypothesis is that nations tend to ally themselves with what is perceived to be the strongest state. The United States espoused this theory for years, believing that if the US showed a lack of resolve, our allies would look

elsewhere for security alliances. Stephen Walt, quotes John Kennedy, who said: "if the United States were to falter, the whole world would inevitably move towards the Communist bloc."<sup>9</sup>

Another consideration that binds nations together is the influence of ideology. The United States and her NATO allies formed their alliance on common values and beliefs and

To safeguard freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.<sup>10</sup>

The NATO allies favored liberal democracies while the Soviet Union was seen to attract leftist or Marxist regimes.

Geography also plays a very key role in determining security relationships. The Soviet Union's size and proximity to Western Europe were paramount concerns to the democracies of the entire continent. The Soviet Union has 14 countries on her borders while the United States is isolated by two vast oceans.<sup>11</sup>

Let us now turn our attention to the events that led to the formation of NATO and some important insights that may have become dimmed by the passage of 45 years.

The seeds of the Cold War were sown at the conference tables of the wartime allies who were planning the postwar security arrangements for Europe. Reams have been written by historians and theorists on the fascinating events of this period.<sup>12</sup> I will not presume to elaborate here in any great detail. Suffice it to say that

Since 1870. the major powers have been able to agree on a concerted action only against (emphasis added) Germany: they have never been able to agree on how to work with Germany.<sup>13</sup>

No provision for the governing of the German nation could be delineated at the wartime conferences held by the leaders of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Only vague references were made to "demilitarization, denazification, and four power cooperation - and that was all."<sup>14</sup> "At their last summit, held in Potsdam during the summer of 1945, the Allied leaders agreed that 'for the time being, no central German government shall be established.'" <sup>15</sup> No one dreamed that the division of Germany would last 45 years. This paper will not delve into the wartime agreements. But it is worth remembering that

with their conflicting aims, the allies made it clear that the future of Germany was to be a function of their own policies and their relations. That is why German Reunification has never come about.<sup>16</sup>

In 1945, the victorious allies entered into the occupation of Germany with clearly punitive intentions. The following guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the US Forces of Occupation, stressed as the objective to

prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world...by the elimination of ... militarism in all their forms,...the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany's capacity to make war.<sup>17</sup>

Subsequent benevolent allied policy may have been tempered by humanitarian feelings for a need for economic revival but the main concern was a genuine fear of Soviet intentions towards all of Germany and the spread of communism on the entire continent. The Soviets by their actions in Germany lost a golden opportunity to include all of Germany's economic potential into their sphere of political influence. America, as had been her tradition, quickly demobilized and fully intended to leave Germany after a brief period of occupation. Had the Soviets been less heavy handed and more patient, world history could have been changed to show a different Germany than we have today - one under the domination of the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup>

The Communist revolutions in Eastern Europe and the failure to withdraw Soviet troops or begin serious demobilization brought a rethinking of the non Soviet World War II allies. By 1946, the US Secretary of State outlined a totally new policy towards Germany. The US began it's vaunted Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe in 1947. A little known fact is that the US offered the same economic opportunity to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Stalin refused, saying that the Marxist way would lead to the salvation of Eastern Europe.<sup>13</sup> How ironic history can be.

Throughout 1946 and 1947, the question of the German settlement was discussed exhaustively among the allies but disagreement on major issues persisted. The allies could not

agree on economic policies or on what form of government the new Germany should have. On 20 March 1948, the Soviet delegation walked out permanently from the Allied Control Council which was the four power organ set up to administer Germany as a whole.<sup>20</sup>

When the Soviets blockaded Berlin in 1948, Stalin's intentions were laid bare. The success of the Berlin Airlift aptly demonstrated Allied determination not to allow Mr. Stalin to have his way in Germany.

Against this back drop of super power confrontation and instability, the Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in May 1949 "as a result of the combination of the occupation zones of the United States, France, and Britain. Five months later, the Soviet Union followed suit by turning it's occupation zone into the German Democratic Republic."<sup>21</sup> The constitutional process in the Federal Republic was set in motion with the convening of the Parliamentary Council headed by Konrad Adenauer; a man of vision who probably has had more impact on Germany than either Bismarck or Hitler. After some initial concerns that the new constitution would not work, history has shown it to be a imminently workable document. Chancellor Adenauer, who stayed in power from 1949 to 1963, "provided the kind of continuity and integrity needed to gain the confidence of the other countries (of Europe)."<sup>22</sup>

As the super powers were rattling their sabres, the governments of western Europe became very alarmed that they

would become embroiled in a conflict over which they would have no input to decisions. Many people, particularly Europeans, forget that NATO was born at the behest and request of Western Europeans. The involvement of the United States was only possible by overcoming a historical isolationist bias that goes back to our first President, George Washington, who in his farewell address, admonished the country's leaders to "avoid entangling alliances." As the former Prime Minister of Belgium said at the NATO Symposium on 9 April 1990 in Rome: "security alliances are unpopular. With one exception, the history of security alliances has not brought peace and stability to our world."<sup>23</sup> Fortunately for NATO, the memory of World War II was fresh in the American memory and Mr. Stalin played the antagonist role extremely well. Even then, it was only through very delicate political maneuvering that the American congress saw itself capable of supporting the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance.

In March 1948, the Western European nations signed the Brussels Treaty among themselves<sup>24</sup> and with the United States and Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.<sup>25</sup>

Ironically, it was the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 that steeled Western resolve and gave NATO the impetus to survive. In December 1950, the North Atlantic Council accepted the principle of a German contribution to the common defense of the west. This marked Germany's march towards NATO.<sup>26</sup>

The collectivization of agriculture and the raising of production quotas led to strikes and demonstrations in East Berlin that brought brutal Soviet repression in June 1953. Throughout the early 1950's repeated attempts at dialogue with the Soviets to resolve the German issue met with negative results. Concurrently, in Western Europe, attempts at greater unity collapsed when the French initiative to establish a multinational military in the form of the European Defense Community was defeated in the French parliament in August 1954.

On 5 May 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO. On 14 May 1955, a mutual security treaty was concluded in Warsaw between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup> Thusly, the status quo was created pitting NATO against the Warsaw Pact that was to last until those tumultuous days of 1989.

#### ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, Summer 1989, p.1.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 2.
- <sup>3</sup> Flora Lewis, "Politicians Must Ensure No Repeat of War in Europe," Stars and Stripes, 19 April 1990, p. 10.
- <sup>4</sup> Criticisms of NATO can be tracked to the early 1950's. For some examples see Elliot Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis in the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter 1982/1983); Melvyn Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West, 1986; Earl Ravenal's, "NATO: The Tides of Discontent," Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 23, Institute of International Studies, 1985; and, David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, 1987. For a Gaullist French view, see Joseph Fitchett, "France in the 90's: Has the Time Arrived to Shatter the Gaullist Icon?", International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1990, p. 6.
- <sup>5</sup> Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, p. 30.
- <sup>6</sup> Interview with Schuyler Forester, LTC, U. S. Air Force, Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna, Austria on 27 April 1990. See appendix VII for narrative.
- <sup>7</sup> Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 1987, Chapter 2.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>9</sup> Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?" p. 5.
- <sup>10</sup> This quote is from the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, and can be found in Stanley R. Sloan's NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain, Appendix B, p. 199.
- <sup>11</sup> Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?" p. 7.
- <sup>12</sup> For those interested, see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.
- <sup>13</sup> Philip Windsor, German Unification, 1969, p. 13.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 14.
- <sup>15</sup> Mary H. Cooper, "A Primer on German Unification,"

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Congressional Quarterly's Editorial Research Reports, Vol. 2, No. 23, 22 December 1989, p. 718.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Text contained in Germany 1947 - 1949, the Story in Documents, Department of State Publication 3356, 1950, p. 22. Quoted in Martin J. Hillenbrand, Germany in an Era of Transition, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1983, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> Windsor, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, "Coping with Victory," The Atlantic, Vol. 265, No. 5, p. 57.

<sup>20</sup> Berlin and the Problem of German Reunification, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "Germany: The Character Issue," The Atlantic, Vol. 265, No. 5, p. 57.

<sup>23</sup> Mr. Leo Tindeman's opening address at the NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990, Rome, Italy.

<sup>24</sup> Signed by the foreign ministers of Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and later, as revised to set up the Western European Union, by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

<sup>25</sup> Berlin and the Problem of German Reunification, p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> John A. Reed, Jr., Germany and NATO, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1987, p. xxiii.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE SETTING

A French political scientist, Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, wrote

Germany's position in the middle of Europe is not just a problem for the Germans; it is a continual problem for Europe....Giving rise to pressures and counter pressures, longings, threats, anxieties, conflicts, and wars.<sup>1</sup>

Germany's geographic position has been one of the dominant determinants of her history and for historical fears of her neighbors. Like it or not, Germany's location marks her for attention. Our century is marked with tragedies of two devastating world wars. Historians are quick to point that German desire for territory was one of the leading causes for these wars.

When the revolutions of 1989 were set in motion, Europe was marked with institutional frameworks in place, common ideas that had distinctly nationalistic flavors but generally were in agreement. What happened in 1989 forces a reexamination of international relationships, economic policies, security ideals, and what Europe of the year 2000 will look like and behave. At the heart of this turmoil lies Germany.

In this chapter I will briefly outline what Europe looked like at the beginning of the year 1989.

The cornerstone of international relations was the ongoing conflict between the super powers. Each had set in place a

system of security alliances that were aimed at countering the perceived threat of the other. This conflict was characterized by a very expensive arms race between the two opposing camps. Possession of nuclear weapons made war unthinkable.

The most significant geopolitical development of the late 1980's was a reformulation of Soviet security interests. Europe and Germany, having been divided for the past four decades because of Soviet insistence that the security of the U.S.S.R. called not only for the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union but also ideological integrity in a communist system of states ....For whatever reason...the Soviet Union cut the link between ideological conformity and national security in the late 1980's.<sup>2</sup>

This decoupling brought significant change to the way the Soviets did business on the international scene. The first major change was the reorientation of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*.

His willingness to seek an end of the Cold War, his ability to set free more than 120 million Eastern Europeans - all exceeded our wildest hopes for the end of the twentieth century.<sup>3</sup>

Evidence of this new way of thinking was the public announcement that Moscow no longer perceived NATO as a military threat and that the Soviet Union was changing their military strategy to one of "reasonable sufficiency". These changed aims have yet to be fully implemented but pose interesting challenges for NATO planners.<sup>4</sup>

Arms control negotiations have become major instruments of foreign policy and the 35 nation Conference on Security and

Cooperation have come to center stage. The proliferation of other multinational forums have supplanted traditional European bilateral security arrangements. The European Community and the Western European Union have had new life breathed into them by the formal recognition of the importance of these forums by strong support and backing of the United States."

Democratic revolutions dominated affairs in Eastern Europe as the new governments struggle to make long needed economic and political reforms. At the heart of these revolutions was "the desire for political democracy, market economies, and at good relations with, but no longer subordination to the Soviet Union."

Mikhail Gorbachev has set in motion reforms that are designed to reconstruct a crippled economy. Only time will tell if what he has done will be "too little or too late." But with all the discussions of world harmony and cooperation, it must not be overlooked that the Soviet Union retains a very large military capability. And as Professor Jonathan Eyal of Oxford put it

An empire that knows its dying and cannot do anything about it, is a very dangerous animal indeed."

Economic affairs have come to dominate relations between countries. The role of the United States as the strongest

economic power has been reduced by the economic miracles that occurred in Japan and Western Europe; particularly, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

European integration took on new meaning with the passage of the Single European Act in 1986. It provided for the elimination of most of the formal trade, financial, and professional barriers by the end of 1992.<sup>9</sup> These steps are intended to add a new dynamic to European economic growth.<sup>10</sup> "A revived WEU, Franco-German cooperation, Franco-British cooperation, renewed attention to formerly obscure institutions like the IEPG, EPC and the Eurogroup...all seem to point to the most serious European interest in working towards a genuine defense identity since 1954."<sup>11</sup>

The newly opened markets of Eastern Europe have brought a stream of investment capital from the Western nations, particularly West German monies. In a critical editorial, A. M. Rosenthal in the New York Times wrote:

It is Christmas in the springtime. Quite sensibly, the Germans are setting about unwrapping the packages.... Germans intend to get as much profit as they can from the collapse of communism in the East.<sup>12</sup>

In regard to German economic relations with the Soviet Union, Rosenthal writes:

Looking farther east, as it has never ceased to do, Germany is already planning to be the major supplier, customer and creditor of the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup>

In closing this chapter, it is wise to remember:

These developments are welcome everywhere, yet at the same time, there is a widespread awareness of the great risks they bear....The balance of power in Europe and the entire international system could be seriously disturbed.<sup>14</sup>

Michael Sturmer put it this way:

The changed relationship between East and West can be summarized in one sentence: menace is on the decrease, but danger is on the increase.<sup>15</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "The Changing Nature of the German Question," in The Two German States and European Security, The Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup>Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, Vol. 69, No. 2, p. 46. Bertram is Diplomatic Correspondent of the German Weekly Die Zeit. From 1974 to 1982 he was the Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

<sup>3</sup>Address by Ambassador Smith, Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO, to Course 75, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy, 9 February 1990.

<sup>4</sup>For a critical review of this new policy, see William E. Odom's "Unreasonable Sufficiency - Assessing the New Soviet Strategy," Occasional Paper Number 45, Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1990.

<sup>5</sup>See James A. Baker's address to the Berlin Press Club in Berlin, 12 December 1989, "A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era, US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Current Policy Number 1233.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>For a very interesting assessment of Gorbachev's future, see William Pfaff, "Gorbachev at the Brink of a Familiar Chasm," International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1990, p. 4. An opposing view is found in Richard Parker, "Inside the 'Collapsing' Soviet Economy," The Atlantic, Vol. 265, No. 6, June 1990, p. 68. Parker argues persuasively with a great volume of statistics that portray the Soviet economy is in not too bad shape and that the reforms that have been set in motion are, in fact, fixing many of the ills of the Soviet economy.

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<sup>8</sup>Interview of Professor Jonathan Eyal, Rome, Italy, 4 April 1990. See Appendix IV for complete narrative.

<sup>9</sup>William E. Griffith, "After the Revolution: The New Politico-Economic Environment of East-West Relations." This was a paper that was presented at the NATO Symposium, Rome, Italy, 9-10 April 1990,

<sup>10</sup>Bernard K. Gordon, "Economic Change and Alliance Breakdown," Adelphi Papers 237, Spring 1989, p. 53.

<sup>11</sup>Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The European Pillar: The American View," The Brookings Institute, 1989.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>A. M. Rosenthal, "German Ascendance: It's Too Late to Stop It," International Herald Tribune, 14 May 1990, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>Margarita Mathiopoulos, "Uniting Europe, Germany and Berlin," The European Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1990, p. 106. Professor Mathiopoulos, former Associate Director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, teaches at the Free University of Berlin.

<sup>3</sup>Michael Sturmer, "Inter-Germany Common Domestic Policy," The European Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1990, p. 137. Sturmer is the Director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Munich, and a columnist for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and The Wall Street Journal. A Professor of History, he has taught in Germany, France and Canada.

## CHAPTER IV

### GERMANY UNIFICATION - EUROPEAN VIEWS

European peoples, if they want to define effectively and positively their future role in Europe, have to be reconciled with their past. Only memory and the knowledge of the past can make them look ahead to a balanced rebirth. In Europe, at least, the past has a future.<sup>1</sup>

German unification is of utmost concern to the other nations of Europe. Former East German leader, Hans Modrow, said it this way:

The decision on a unified Germany...has not only a national, but at the same time, a European dimension ....It is of fundamental significance for the destiny of the whole of Europe how the process of uniting Germany will be reconciled with the requirements of a European security structure.<sup>2</sup>

Michael Howard, in his brilliant 1990 Alastair Buchan Lecture to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote:

The wishes of the German people will be paramount....But their allies and their neighbours and their former adversaries have a deep and legitimate interest in the outcome...and a right to forcefully express their views.<sup>3</sup>

James A. Baker, US Secretary of State said:

There are certain responsibilities reserved under the Allied powers that have to be considered when you deal with the question of German reunification....It seems to me...that we can have influence on the process.<sup>4</sup>

In this chapter, we will examine some of the unification issues from the perspective of other European nations. This will

not be done in any great depth but is designed to sensitize the reader to the complexities and emotion involved in the subject at hand.

We begin this discussion by briefly looking at the largest military power in Europe, the Soviet Union, and examining some of the Soviet security concerns that are impacted by German unification.

For the Soviet Union, the German Question - the question of Germany's place and role in Europe - has been the paramount problem of European politics in the postwar period. Soviet concerns are understandable, given the geography and history of the USSR.<sup>7</sup>

A critical look at reality readily demonstrates why the Soviets are so very concerned with the 'German Question.' Much discussed historical fears are the result of two devastating world wars in this century which they did not start; World War II costing 26 million Russian lives. These historical roots will not be discussed in this paper. I will focus on security factors that impact on the concerns of the Soviet Union.

While the Soviets did not seek the current division of Germany, the division served Soviet interests. Not only did it prevent the emergence of a strong, unified German state which would dominate Europe, it imposed major constraints on both German states.

Today, as in the past, one (Soviet) goal has remained constant: to prevent a strong united Germany not under Soviet influence.<sup>8</sup>

The German Democratic Republic is currently the home for almost 400,000 troops giving the Soviet Union a forward operating base designed to prevent ever having to fight another war on Russian soil. The GDR was the linchpin of the Soviet security system in Eastern Europe. Among the Warsaw Pact countries, the GDR had the most modern and reliable armed forces, and spent the highest percentage of its GNP on defense (nearly 8 percent). Economically, it is the Soviet Union's most important trading partner in the Eastern bloc and a key source of badly needed high technology.<sup>7</sup>

Simultaneously, the Federal Republic of Germany has been the centerpiece of Soviet policy in Western Europe. Bonn is the strongest economic power in Europe; it has the largest European army in NATO and is the

linchpin of the Western alliance and the strongest US ally in Europe. Any weakening of Germany's ties to NATO and the United States would weaken the cohesion of the alliance itself."<sup>8</sup>

Economic factors play a large role in the Soviet relationship with Bonn. West Germany is Moscow's largest Western trading partner and an important source of high technology. If Soviet economic reform is to work, they will need considerable help from the West. West Germans have been, by far, the most active in providing investment credits, joint economic ventures, and providing assistance. Hamburg's Der Spiegel reports that the West German government is ready to supply aid 'within a reasonable amount' and that the Soviets are

seeking \$20 billion in aid to allow a united Germany to remain in NATO.' Some see this as a "buy out."<sup>10</sup>

Moscow's chief goal appears to be to lengthen the distance between Bonn and Washington and lessen German reliance on US leadership. This distancing appears to have been the prime motive of the latest Soviet offer at the Two Plus Four talks where a unified Germany could join NATO after a five year period.<sup>11</sup>

To say that German unification puts stress on Mr. Gorbachev is an understatement.

He is engaged in the most difficult and dangerous military maneuver of all: a strategic retreat of a vast, overextended occupation force. Like Napoleon pulling back from Moscow, the Soviets must extricate 400,000 men from the deepening quagmire of East Germany.<sup>12</sup>

The principle the Soviets want to establish is that they will not be made to suffer militarily or economically as they surrender the only clear accomplishment since the 1917 revolution: the victory of the Red Army over Hitler's forces.<sup>13</sup>

Put another way, a high Soviet Foreign Ministry official was quoted in Time:

having East Germany leave the Warsaw Pact - that's one thing. It means we lost the Cold War....But having our enemies of the '40's join our enemies of the '50's, '60's, and '70's in an alliance whose whole reason for being is anti-Soviet - that makes us feel like we lost World War II.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of France, Britain, and the other NATO allies, other factors prevail. When discussing the issue of German unification, Professor Jonathan Eyal from the Royal United

Services Institute, Whitehall, has a very interesting theory concerning why the French and British are concerned with German unification. His premise is that postwar Europe is a fiction and that fiction was that Britain, France, and Germany were broadly comparable in size, power, and force. Eyal points out that the fiction could be maintained as long as Germany was divided. He said

For the first time Germany's might is not only real but also apparent (emphasis added)...Germany will be calling the tune on the European continent. This will irk a lot of people.<sup>15</sup>

He goes on to portend instability for the Continent and a weakening of NATO:

the time for fiction is gone. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark - even Italy - will have to get used to the fact that the plain truth is that they are inferior in size and in the amount of say that they will have in their own affairs. The pooling of sovereignty within the European Community among the rush for new structures is precisely an attempt to maintain the fiction by saying 'we're all in this together even though you're bigger and stronger than we are.' That's the game and I think it's more of a psychological reaction than a very well thought out response.<sup>16</sup>

The Two Plus Four format for discussions on the external aspects of German unification was devised primarily through the lead of the United States in cooperation with the other three leading World War II victorious allies and the two German states. It was then presented to the NATO allies as a fait

accomplish. When asked if he envisaged more of these kinds of unilateral actions in the future, Doctor Eyal was brutally frank:

I think we will. It was a breakthrough in American conduct of foreign policy. They had decided, despite all their reservations, that the other European states are far too divided at the moment to devise a German solution....It was clear that unification could not be postponed and it was so obvious that both Britain and France were so paralyzed in a time boggle that they could not get out of it. (Baker) discarded the fiction that 'we are all equal in this.' He moved with the people that really mattered in order to get results .... It had to be done now. Not as Mrs Thatcher said until last December 'I don't think I need to face the German question for 15 years.'<sup>17</sup>

Mrs Thatcher has, in her inimical way, been the bluntest in airing her concerns about German unification. She says publicly things like "a unified Germany would be dominant in numbers and political and economic power...and I think many people in Europe are a little apprehensive about a unified Germany."<sup>18</sup> Many say that what Mrs Thatcher has said publicly is what many of the other leaders think privately.<sup>19</sup> Quoted in Time, Adrian Hyde-Price, research fellow at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs noted: "she says what everyone thinks so they let her do most of the running."<sup>20</sup>

One of the most interesting Franco-British-German items that has come to the fore on the issue of unification is that concerning European integration. Thatcher has long opposed it while the French and Germans have been pushing hard for integration. "Thatcher has long opposed the creation of a

European central bank and greater political union...for fear that these measures would erode Britain's sovereignty to the advantage of...West Germany."<sup>21</sup> "The French are essentially committed to alliance with West Germany and the common leadership of the Community. Under Mrs. Thatcher, the British seem to be trying to prevent this unity."<sup>22</sup> Frederick Painton writes in Time:

Ironically, the apprehension that a united Germany could become the dominant member of in the EC...pushed Thatcher closer to her European partners. At work, no doubt was the old balance-of-power reflex that had made Britain and France allies in two world wars against the Germans.<sup>23</sup>

The same article goes on to quote an Italian diplomat:

Ganging up on an Alliance partner (Germany)? That's exactly what it's supposed to be. 'After all,' said Hyde-Price, 'Bonn is bursting with success and self confidence.'"<sup>24</sup>

In summing up the British attitude, in discussing her conduct at a recent NATO meeting, the New York Times noted that Prime Minister Thatcher had

shown a respect for West German positions on political and strategic issues that simply did not exist a year ago.... But a year ago nobody seriously anticipated the possibility of German reunification.<sup>25</sup>

Professor Robert Kennedy, Professor of International Relations, Georgia Institute of Technology and former Deputy Commandant of the NATO Defense College, talked openly about the French attitude saying:

I think the French are scared to death that Germany will become the premier economic power in Europe. They are concerned, once again, that France will not be delivered to their rightful place in the sun as the leader of Europe....For a period, France had seen a Europe without the United States meant French supremacy which; culturally, they think they deserve. I think they are scared to death of a reunified Germany in a Europe without NATO. For the first time, I think they are beginning to realize that their interests are better served with the US in Europe than with the US out of Europe.<sup>26</sup>

It's fascinating to ponder how the dynamics of European politics change based on perceived needs of nations and the timing of world events. Until the East Germans began their mass migration that fueled the unification fires, French President Mitterand had said "if the Germans want to be a single nation...this must be founded on the will of the German nation, and nobody can oppose it."<sup>27</sup> That was as long as no one really thought unification lay in the near term. Mary Cooper wrote:

As the popular revolution in East Germany surged.... traditional French fears of its old adversary to the east have resurfaced with official statements on the reunification issue. Mitterand emphasized his country's right to have a direct say in any plan for German unification....He then warned that German reunification could upset the balance of power in Europe. A unified Germany, by its sheer size and economic clout, would easily demote France to a position of junior partner in the leadership of the EC.<sup>28</sup>

In regards to NATO, Joseph Fitchett writes:

Today, Mr. Mitterand is convinced that France is liable to be dwarfed by a reunited Germany. In public, he has started paying lip service to the need to maintain NATO and the trans-Atlantic defense guarantee.<sup>29</sup>

Professor Kennedy said it another way:

I would not be a bit surprised that if France thought they could keep Germany in the Alliance, they would offer to rejoin the integrated military structure.<sup>30</sup>

The New York Times wrote:

President Mitterand declared again last month that France wouldn't go back (to the integrated military structure). But a difference has crept in - 'so long as the military structure remains what it is today,' as Prime Minister Michel Rocard noted afterward.<sup>31</sup>

The esteemed German historian, Michael Sturmer said it in even stronger terms:

The European Community that de Gaulle almost brought to paralysis by refusing entry to Britain is now the most important framework for Paris to keep the future united Germany on the track of Europeanism. And if NATO did not already exist, it would have to be invented by the French if only to absorb Germany's energies, reassure France and allay her unspoken fears (emphasis added).<sup>32</sup>

Dominique Moisi said:

Suddenly the Germans are behaving more like Germans. Germany is on the verge of regaining its national identity, while France is even more unsure of its economic capabilities. Economic strength is what history now favors, and there France stands in Germany's shadow.<sup>33</sup>

An unnamed US diplomat was quoted as saying:

French fears stem less from Germany's augmented status than from France's reduced role.... Now that the Germans are asserting themselves, and the French are seeing the collapse of a long cherished view of themselves. Britain and France are exhibiting withdrawal symptoms as the postwar era draws to a close, reflecting a new sense of uncertainty about their future roles rather than real fear of a united Germany.<sup>34</sup>

Eastern European nations are also very concerned with the security implications of German unification. The most vocal has

been Poland and I will address only her concerns as they typify the East Europeans. World War II began with the German invasion of Poland. Some Polish historians point to this aggression as just another example of more than one thousand years of conflict involving German drives eastward. The suffering of the Polish people in World War II, in proportion to population, was higher than any other European nation. Over six million Poles died. Only one-tenth of that number were killed in combat. The remainder, including 2.7 million Polish Jews, died in Nazi concentration camps.<sup>35</sup>

Because of the enormous losses..., the memory of the German occupation has become a lasting element of the contemporary Polish national consciousness.<sup>36</sup>

One of the major stumbling blocks on the road to German unification was the question of borders. After the six years of Nazi occupation, Poland lost the territories of Lvov and Vilna in eastern Poland to the Soviet Union. In return, Poland received the pre-1937 German provinces of Silesia and Pomerania. Poland now fears a united Germany may try to regain this territory. Both Germanies have reassured the Poles that there was no German desire to redraw the borders of Central Europe. Fredrick Painton writes:

Yet the Poles fear that the two treaties recognizing the 1945 borders - one with East Germany in 1950, the other with West Germany in 1970 - could be legally discarded by a unified Germany that might not then be willing to confirm the frontiers.<sup>37</sup>

Poland's Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in an interview in Time magazine said: "We are demanding that all ambiguities be removed before German reunification."<sup>78</sup> During a recent visit to NATO headquarters, the Polish Foreign Minister Mr. Skubiszewski said that

German unity had to be "linked with the corroboration, in treaty form of present borders.... Relations between European countries would not be able to withstand the weight of border questions of this dimension."<sup>79</sup>

With elections scheduled for March in East Germany, Mr. Kohl, attempting to gain support from conservative elements in East Germany, declared before the election, that any final resolution to the issue could only come after unification. This sent tremors of fear throughout Europe and criticism from Germany's principal allies. In June, both German parliaments passed resolutions reinforcing the inviolability of the Polish borders.<sup>80</sup> It remains to be seen if this issue has been defused to the satisfaction of all concerned parties.

Still, a vague foreboding exists in Europe. It is summed up by Austrian Gerhard Botz, professor of modern history at Salzburg University, who sees the Germans drawing special strength and dynamism from its strong economy, its position enhanced by the relative economic vacuum in Eastern Europe.... Every society that commands such power has so far used it. Limits can be easily overstepped.<sup>81</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Dominique Moisi. "Renovated Europe Has Foul Old Closets to Clean." International Herald Tribune, 23 May 1990, p. 8. The writer is associate director of the *Institut Francais des Relations Internationales* and editor of its journal, *Politique Etrangere*.

<sup>2</sup>"Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic on embedding the unification of the two German States in the pan-European unification process," Berlin, 23 February 1990. Handout at the NATO Symposium, Rome, Italy, 9-10 April 1990.

<sup>3</sup>Michael Howard. "The Remaking of Europe," 1990 Alastair Buchan Lecture, 12 March 1990, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in the New York Times, 12 December 1989, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>F. Stephen Larrabee, "The View from Moscow." The Two German States and European Security. Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989, p. 182.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>9</sup>"Soviets Ask \$20 Billion to Soften Position on NATO. Report Says." Stars and Stripes, 12 June 1990, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup>William Safire. "Germans Should Avoid Appearance of Duplicity." Stars and Stripes, 24 June 1990, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup>"U.S. Rebuffs Soviets On 5-Year Delay for Germany in NATO." International Herald Tribune, 23-24 June 1990, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>Jim Hoagland, "Weak Hand, Battle Trim and Exalting Problems," International Herald Tribune, 30 May 1990, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Strobe Talbott, "The Fears of Weimar Russia," Time, 4 June 1990, p. 21.

<sup>15</sup>Interview with Doctor Jonathan Eyal,, Research Fellow, Soviet and East European Program, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, 4 April 1990, Rome, Italy. For complete text see Appendix IV.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>"Thatcher rejects Concept of Federal Europe," Stars and Stripes, 21 June 1990, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup>See William E. Griffith, "After the Revolution: The New Politico-Economic Environment of East-West Relations," a paper presented to the NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990, Rome, Italy., p.10.

<sup>20</sup>Frederick Painton, "A Case of the Jitters," Time, 5 March 1990, p. 11.

<sup>21</sup>Mary H. Cooper, "A Primer on German Unification," Congressional Quarterly's Editorial Research Reports, Vol. 2, No. 23, 22 December 1989, p. 720.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Painton, p. 11.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>25</sup>Craig R. Whitney, "Europe Picks Its Lodestar," The New York Times, 4 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>Interview with Doctor Robert Kennedy, Professor of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, 27 February 1990, Rome, Italy. For complete text of the interview see Appendix II.

<sup>27</sup>Quoted by Dominique Moisi, The New York Times, 11 November 1989, p. 6.

<sup>28</sup>Cooper, p. 720.

<sup>29</sup>Joseph Fitchett, "France in the 90's: Has the Time Arrived to Shatter the Gaullist Icon?" International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1990, p. 6. For a coherent and sympathetic view of de Gaulle's beliefs on European security needs, see Jean Lacouture, "Respect for 'Russians,' Disdain for 'Soviets,'" International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1990, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup>Kennedy Interview, Appendix II.

<sup>31</sup>Flora Lewis, "France Holds Key to Remolding, Survival of NATO." Stars and Stripes, 18 June 1990, p. 10.

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<sup>37</sup>Michael Sturmer, "As 'Escape From Yalta' Came to Pass, a Strategy for Germany Crumbled," International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1990, p. 6. For a distinctly point of view on the changes in French foreign policy since De Gaulle, see Ann-Marie Le Glonned, "France's German Problem," The Two German States and European Security, Institute for East-West Studies, London, Mac Millian Press, 1989, pp. 242-269.

<sup>38</sup>Quoted in Painton, p. 12.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ryszard Wojne, "The German Problem and the Security of Europe: A Polish View," The Two German States and European Security, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989, p. 220.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Painton, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>"The Border Has to Be Confirmed Right Now," Time, 26 March 1990, p. 19.

<sup>44</sup>Atlantic News, Vol. 2206, 24 March 1990, p. 2.

<sup>45</sup>"German Legislators OK Merging of Economies," Stars and Stripes, 23 June 1990, p. 28.

<sup>46</sup>Painton, p. 13.

## CHAPTER V

### THE IMPACT OF GERMAN UNIFICATION ON MULTINATIONAL FORUMS

"Old structures usually outlive the circumstances that have led to their creation."<sup>1</sup>

As previously discussed, Europe of today has a proliferation of multinational forums. With events transpiring very rapidly, including German unification, it serves our purposes to briefly discuss the impact of events on these so carefully constructed forums and what the future might bring. Every political scientist and politician is talking about these changes. Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, Vice President of the esteemed Council on Foreign Relations says it this way:

The great democratic revolutions and impending German unification...have undermined the political and military arrangements that have kept the peace in Europe for 40 years, and so place squarely before Europe...the task of reconstructing the European security order.<sup>2</sup>

Michael Mandelbaum, Director of East-West Relations and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations said:

The revolutionary changes in Europe of 1989 and 1990 have rendered obsolete the security arrangements that have kept the peace in Europe for 40 years...new arrangements will have to be devised.<sup>3</sup>

NATO was formed to counter perceived Soviet aggressiveness in Europe. With the Soviet Union facing internal crisis, external designs appearing not to be on Mr. Gorbachev's agenda and troops withdrawing back to the Soviet Union, NATO's very

relevance is once again being challenged. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that NATO needs "to be "more imaginative and work on a bigger canvas" and warned that "the world is changing faster than our ways of thinking." She went on to say that NATO must change its role from "preventing war to building peace."<sup>4</sup> These are fine words for a politician but what; exactly, does that mean? We will now take up some of the tasks that face the NATO authorities.

In discussing NATO strategy and its relevance today,

There is a need to define what level of abstraction you are talking about. If you say that our strategy is war prevention, then it remains valid. If you say that NATO strategy is a strategy of deterrence and defense, then it remains valid.<sup>5</sup>

NATO military strategy has constantly come under criticism. It has not changed in 23 years and today, it seems that there really is a need for review. The twin pillars of flexible response and forward defense need to be examined and evaluated in detail. Flexible response was developed to counter overwhelming Warsaw Pact conventional strength. The Warsaw Pact is a shell of its former self, Soviet troops are withdrawing East, the democracies of Eastern Europe are asking for membership in Western European institutions, and with Germany unifying; how viable is this strategy? Michael Howard says it well in his esteemed Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture:

I can well understand the depression with which the officials of the Alliance must contemplate the prospect of *perestroika* within NATO - of demolishing and

rebuilding a structure which they have created in the face of almost insuperable difficulties as a result of innumerable compromises, and which hitherto served us all so well. But the fact must be faced, that a structure created to meet the needs of the 1950's is in danger of becoming, after 40 years, an archaic anachronism."

Fortunately, NATO staff officers had long recognized these shortcomings and have been quietly and diligently working on these issues for quite some time. Like all things in NATO, the work goes slowly. Gaining consensus among sixteen sovereign nations can be extremely time consuming and an exhilarating exercise in frustration. During a visit to NATO Headquarters, I sensed that all eyes were on this effort but the incredible fluidity of events and the number of variables that have direct impact on this strategic policy review - Four Plus Two talks, arms reduction talks in Vienna, events in the Soviet Union; the list is almost endless - would demand a considerable amount of time and effort. As David Tarrant of the Stars and Stripes wrote "NATO is in the midst of the most sweeping review of military strategy in the history of the alliance."

While at NATO, I was fortunate to have had the golden opportunity to interview two of the key officers in this strategy review; Colonels Klaus Wittman and Victor Stamey from the Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division of the International Military Staff (for complete text of discussions, see appendices VIII and IX). As Colonel Wittman stated:

The question is what is the most appropriate strategy for the post CFE (arms reduction agreement) environment.

This is just a shorthand formula that presupposes other things - post German unification, post Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe ... (and) Soviet military restructuring into a forward defensive posture."

NATO Military Committee publication 14/3 (MC 14/3) is the document that outlines overall NATO strategy. When asked if he could foresee a formal change to MC 14/3, Colonel Stamey answered

You bet. I guarantee it. It's going to be dramatically different. I see a 14/4 - not a modified 14/3.... It's just a matter of when we can talk about it."

One of the major problems in the strategy review was that the effort was not made public until May 1990 at a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers when it was announced that they had agreed to hold a NATO summit in London in early summer to discuss "future strategy, the need for nuclear weapons and NATO's political role in light of German unification and continuing Soviet collapse."<sup>10</sup> Colonel Stamey put it this way

Some feel that NATO has not done a good job of telling their story. There has been a considerable amount of work done but we have not been more forthcoming because we do not have agreement among the sixteen on how to go about it.... We have made a mistake by not being more open about this - getting some political mileage from this initiative.<sup>11</sup>

As late as March of this year, General Galvin, NATO'S senior commander, in testimony before the US Congress declared "we must maintain our current strategy and continue to support it."<sup>12</sup> Of course, if you read his entire testimony, he outlines in

detail the kinds of changes that NATO will engage in. Unfortunately, comments like the preceding quote make headlines and without the full import of his statement being reported.

Many questions face NATO that need answers. Will there

in fact continue to be a need for Allied forces on the soil of West Germany at all? If so, what purpose should they serve? How should they be deployed? What strategy should they adopt? There is today a need for thinking at least as bold and innovative as that called for 40 years ago if NATO is to be seen, both inside Germany and beyond its borders, as an antedate dinosaur, an obstacle to rather than an instrument for the remaking of Europe.<sup>13</sup>

Martin McCusker, director of the military committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, said:

we are in a revolutionary situation in which we have to rethink everything. Deep differences are bound to emerge." He went on to say "everything is linked to everything else. Sorting out a new security structure for the alliance will be incredibly difficult and potentially very divisive."<sup>14</sup>

The lessening of the types and numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe is at the heart of the flexible response options. NATO has always counted on a variety of types of nuclear weapons to aid in deterrence. A number of recent events make flexibility in any nuclear response less flexible. The elimination of intermediate range nuclear weapons, the cancelled upgrade to short range missiles, and the ongoing strategic arms limitation talks all play havoc with developing viable flexible nuclear options. In Colonel Stamey's interview, he brought home the point this way:

flexible response is going to have to change....Instead of having a neat and clean full spectrum of nuclear options, we are going to have great changes in the way the options can be planned for execution. Flexible response as we know it today, will know longer be flexible response. But there will continue to be multiple options. This will give us, probably under some other name, a way we can still keep the nuclear aspects of deterrence in our strategy.<sup>15</sup>

NATO nuclear strategy has always been an extremely emotional and divisive issue. The cornerstone of the strategy is that European nations must share in the burden of facing the nuclear threat. This translates into nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. This has long been opposed by many nations within the Alliance and has been in the past and will, most probably, become a major issue once again. A good example of the divisive role of nuclear weapons came up during a recent meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. The Washington Post noted:

they (the ministers) have not agreed on the overall goal of such negotiations (reduction of nuclear weapons) or on the wisdom of withdrawing existing weapons.<sup>16</sup>

The West Germans wanted all nuclear and ground based missiles removed from German soil. Britain wanted only a limited reduction throughout Europe. The Dutch wanted immediate withdrawal of all US nuclear artillery rounds. Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and West Germany all wanted unilateral withdrawal. This is opposed by Britain and the United States and Great Britain.<sup>17</sup> Colonel Wittman alluded to this when he

said:

In the public mind, flexible response is so tied to nuclear questions and deliberate escalation. We will probably have to do away with the label and call it something else.<sup>17</sup>

The second pillar of the NATO strategy has been forward defense. The principle calls for defending any NATO country as close to its border as possible. Wittman said "it will remain as a guiding principle. In Norway and Turkey it would be the same as today. The question is 'where is forward in the central region'."<sup>18</sup> Implementation of the strategy becomes the problem. Stamey added

It does not make any sense to have our defensive positions sitting on the East German border if there is no longer, realistically or legally, an East German border ....We must rethink many of the basic tenets in our overall NATO strategy.<sup>20</sup>

Another issue that will have to be dealt with was mentioned by Wittman. While stating that as an overall guiding concept, forward defense would remain valid, Wittman went on to say that in the minds of the general public (and the Soviets)

Forward defense is so closely linked with the inner German border that we may have to do away with it as the main label of our strategy.<sup>21</sup>

Force structure will be another major problem for the NATO staff to solve. How many and what kinds of force mix will be

required? This issue, unfortunately, will contribute to causing stress within the Alliance. Political pressures for troop reductions will become tremendous.

Deployment of forces will also have to be examined carefully. Where will NATO's forward defense begin? Which way will they face? What about the new democracies of Eastern Europe? Are they still considered part of the threat? These are the kinds of things that are giving NATO planners gray hairs.

Composition of NATO forces also needs close scrutiny. Currently, there are two multinational forces in Europe<sup>22</sup> and there are calls for more multinational integrated units. An official at the Conference on Conventional Forces in Europe in Vienna even hinted there had been some recent talk of a combined German-Polish unit. That would certainly be a novel approach. Problems of commonality of equipment, doctrine, training methodology and a myriad of others would need to be resolved. But the political palatability of this option makes it very attractive.<sup>23</sup> The idea, formally proposed in May, appeals to the United States as a

means of easing political opposition to the presence of US troops on the continent,...could provide a significant vehicle for further reductions of US forces...as well as lowering the profile both of US forces and the combined armed forces of a reunited Germany.<sup>24</sup>

The proposal was well received by the allies as it was perceived as a

means to submerge nationalistic tendencies and give NATO a more pan-European cast - at a time when the future of the Western military alliance is being debated.<sup>27</sup>

It could provide an acceptable method for France to quietly rejoin NATO's military structure, give the Europeans more command influence in what today is a US dominated command structure, and was

particularly well received by West Germany whose government is seeking...to allay Soviet security concerns over how to limit the size and alignment of the German military.<sup>28</sup>

To rewrite plans, redesign force structures, and to modify composition of forces, military officers are taught that you must have a threat array against which you develop your plans and build your forces. This is the crux of the dilemma that faces NATO planners. Troop reductions are underway on both sides and more are certainly coming. The former Warsaw Pact, including East Germany, is no longer hostile. These are the kind of developments that make it almost impossible to develop a coherent threat. Stamey puts it this way:

I think we are having more problems in articulating it than coming up with a threat. Maybe we will even change the word 'threat' to 'risk'....No matter what happens, unless there is a total breakup of the Soviet Union; it remains the largest military force in Europe. The Soviet Union will continue to be the only nation that has the military power to cause destabilization and could cause a threat to other European nations. That will not change until the Soviet Union goes much farther than Mr. Gorbachev has said about the internal changes of the structure and ideology of the Soviet Union....How we can articulate that...is where we are having problems."<sup>29</sup>

Possible future options for NATO will be addressed in Chapter VII.

Europe. after 40 years of stutter starts, has been making recent progress towards closer economic and; in some people's minds, political integration. EC 92 is to be the time when all trade barriers are dropped among the members of the European Community. After the Berlin Wall was breached, there were initial fears that the German rush for unification would derail the move toward European integration.<sup>219</sup> But the events of the last nine months do not bear this out. In fact, ironically, German unification has become a catalyst to further European integration. The Germans want to reassure their neighbors that their future will be enmeshed in tighter European unity. Colonel Wittman said it this way:

The German government must be very interested in avoiding complications to European unification or even giving the impression that we (Germans) are only interested in our national question.<sup>220</sup>

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, said

we seek the process of German unification in the context of EC integration, the CSCE process, an East - West partnership for stability, the construction of a common European house and the creation of a pan-European peaceful order. We Germans do not want to go it alone.<sup>221</sup>

He goes on to say that "European integration must be resolutely advanced", and that "the EC needs additional momentum for the sake of the whole of Europe."<sup>221</sup> It seems that most of the

other economic and political forums - the Western European Union, the Eurogroup, and the Independent European Programme Group - have all gotten a much needed shot of adrenalin because of the prospects of German unification. But, the bottom line on European integration is that

It will only go so far... the nation state and national sovereignty are here to stay. It is about harmonisation, cooperation, and coordinating common policies but it is not about giving up sovereign rights and having an Emperor of Europe and a European government with foreign and defense policies that is taken out of the hands of national governments. I think Mrs Thatcher is only expressing in a more distinct way what many people think."

Prime Minister Thatcher...rejected the idea of a federal Europe, saying she is concerned about German domination....A unified Germany, she said 'would be dominant both in numbers and political and economic power.' Asked if that worried her, she said: 'yes, and I think many people in Europe are a little bit apprehensive about a unified Germany. It's not surprising if you look back at the history of this century.'"

Progress towards German unification may have had a negative impact on conventional arms control efforts at the Conference on Conventional Forces in Europe talks between the members of NATO and Warsaw Pact. Public statements espouse that German unification is part of the "process" to achieve pan-Europeanism. Ambassador Grinevsky, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna CFE negotiations, at the closing plenary session of the sixth round, said:

current changes provide unique opportunities for healing the division of Europe....But they also introduce an element of instability creating ever new problems for

the CFE delegations. Such problems include the unification of Germany. Apprehensions that the German unification might complicate our work in Vienna have been repeatedly voiced recently. In my view, this historically inevitable process cannot be regarded as a hindrance....We should keep in mind that a new Germany is emerging within the context of enhanced European unity and all-European disarmament.<sup>24</sup>

Not being a diplomat. I wonder what the Ambassador really meant by these remarks?

After being given a major boost in priority by Presidents Gorbachev and Bush at their Malta summit, the sensing I got during a visit to Vienna was that the negotiations had stalled. An anonymous official told me "we'll be lucky to get CFE if the way things are happening with the German unification complicating the situation."

Pending unification does create a number of technical issues for the negotiators. The best example is the problem of which side counts the considerable East German forces in the balance of forces mathematics? The technical problems can all be worked out if the will is there. In discussing the factors that were slowing down the negotiations, Major General Adrian Saint John, Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the US delegation to CFE put it this way:

The most important factor is German unification. They (the Soviets) tried certain things here and it didn't work. The Soviets want a specific ceiling on the German military strengths. They have decided to, perhaps, wait and see if they can get it at the Two Plus Four Talks. They are thinking 'maybe we can get something there so we had better not sell the farm in Vienna.' All of these things are interrelated.<sup>25</sup>

One writer said:

German unification now represents its most important national security issue. The Soviet Union will continue to stall the arms control talks until issues of security surrounding German unification are resolved.<sup>36</sup>

Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security advisor "accused the Soviets of stonewalling on conventional arms talks."<sup>37</sup>

Others disagree saying that the awesome variety and number of problems in the Soviet Union has lowered the priority for arms control negotiations.<sup>38</sup> One report argues that "the Soviet stonewalling results from the inability of senior Kremlin officials to find enough time in the current chaotic situation in the Soviet Union to focus on the issue."<sup>39</sup> Colonel Wittman sums it up nicely when he said

There is no single reason for their behavior. It's the economic situation, the reassertion of military influence, the ethnic problems, and the objective to get as much out of the Two Plus Four Talks as possible in terms of economic concessions and assistance.<sup>40</sup>

He made another key point when he noted

It is certainly a sensing that the Soviets are feeling increasingly isolated and it is becoming increasingly difficult to coordinate a (unified) position within the Warsaw Pact. In Vienna, on many questions, it isn't a question of sixteen (NATO) against seven (Warsaw Pact), it is a question of twenty two against one.<sup>41</sup>

Another explanation is that because of troop withdrawals already made as a result of withdrawal from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, they have

very real organizational, logistical, and psychological problems in withdrawing their troops. It has been reported that as many as 50,000 Soviet soldiers and their families have been put in tents because they have no barracks in the Soviet Union for them to live in.<sup>42</sup>

As Major General Saint John said "all of these things are interrelated."

Whatever the reason it is very easy to theorize how German unification could easily impact on the Soviets sense of urgency in the arms control efforts. The loss of the largest, best trained and equipped ally from the Warsaw Pact seriously changes the numbers in the balance of power equation. Loss of East German territory greatly diminishes the Soviet territorial buffer and increases strategic warning time for NATO. It's little wonder the press says the Soviet General Staff is up in arms and not anxious about speedy resolution to any further troop cuts. One press report put it this way

Moscow may be rethinking the value of an agreement that would drastically curtail its military presence in Eastern Europe. Also, the Soviets might have a desire to keep major troop structures in place as a bargaining counter on a unified Germany.<sup>43</sup>

A senior NATO military official said "Two Plus Four has replaced CFE as the most important arms control process."<sup>44</sup>

For the United States, the conventional arms control accord is the

centerpiece of plans for a new safer Europe - an insurance policy, as one White House official put it 'against a change of attitude in the Soviet Union.' Another strategist said 'this treaty far exceeds any

others in importance'....Success would mean that no serious conventional threat against Western Europe existed.<sup>45</sup>

In the final analysis, Richard Perle, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, probably says it best. He is optimistic that the Soviets will eventually return to the negotiating table with gusto, for the same motivation that inspires most rational governments - it is in their national interest. Perle writes

The West would benefit from an agreement....But Mr. Gorbachev would benefit even more. With a quarter of the Soviet Union's meager national income going to defense, and much of it to maintain a huge conventional force, the prospect of successfully launching Mr. Gorbachev's stalled economic reform is negligible. The militarization of its economy has helped to bring the Soviet Union to the brink of insolvency. The shops may be empty but the arsenals are full (emphasis added).<sup>46</sup>

He goes on to write

Seldom have the interests of East and West converged as clearly as they do now in bringing to fruition an agreement cutting conventional forces and military budgets.<sup>47</sup>

Most men of wisdom would pray that Mr. Perle is correct. Time will tell.

<sup>1</sup>Address of Mr. Krzysztof Skubisewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland at the Extraordinary Sessions of the Assembly of The Western European Union, Luxembourg, 22 March 1990.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholas X. Risopouslos, Vice President, Council on Foreign Relations, in a foreword to Michael Mandelbaum's "Restructuring the European Security Order," Critical Issues 1990 - 1991, Council on Foreign Relations, March 1990, p. i.

<sup>3</sup>Michael Mandelbaum, "Reconstructing the European Security Order," Critical Issues 1990 - 1991, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, March 1990, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in Christopher Redman, "Time for the Retrofit," Time, 18 June 1990, p. 28.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with Colonel Doctor Klaus Wittman, German Army, Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 18 May 1990, p. 6. Complete narrative is at Appendix VIII.

<sup>6</sup>Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," 1990 Alastair Buchan Lecture, 12 March 1990, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup>David Tarrant, "NATO in the '90's," Stars and Stripes, 24 June 1990, p. 14.

<sup>8</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>9</sup>Interview with Colonel Victor E. Stamey, United States Army, Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, 21 May 1990, Brussels, Belgium. Complete text is at Appendix IX.

<sup>10</sup>Craig R. Whitney, "Europe Picks Its Lodestar," New York Times, 4 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>Stamey Interview, Appendix IX.

<sup>12</sup>USIS Wireless File, 9 March 1990, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup>Howard, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup>Redman, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup>Stamey interview, Appendix IX.

<sup>16</sup>R. Jeffrey Smith, "NATO Talks Hit Snag on Deployment in Europe," International Herald Tribune, 11 May 1990, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Stamey interview, Appendix IX.

<sup>21</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>22</sup>There are two multinational military forces in Europe: the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, NATO's strategic reserve, and the combined French-German Brigade.

<sup>23</sup>For detailed discussions on force structure see my interviews with Colonels Wittman and Stamey that can be found at appendices VIII and IX.

<sup>24</sup>Patrick E. Tyler, "Bush Suggestion for NATO: Combine the Military Forces, International Herald Tribune, 23 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Stamey interview, Appendix IX.

<sup>28</sup>For one expert's opinion, see my interview with Professor Robert Kennedy, Professor of International Relations, Georgia Institute of Technology. Complete text is at Appendix II.

<sup>29</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>30</sup>Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "German Unification As A Contribution to European Stability," address to the special session of the Western European Union, Luxembourg, 23 March 1990, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>32</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>33</sup>"Thatcher Rejects Concept of Federal Europe," Stars and Stripes, 21 June 1990, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup>O. Grinevsky, head of the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations, in a press release, 26 April 1990, p. 1.

<sup>35</sup>Interview with Major General Adrian Saint John, United States

Army (retired), Vienna, Austria, 26 April 1990, p. 2. For complete text see Appendix V.

<sup>16</sup>An unidentified NATO official being quoted in David Tarrant's "Soviets Now Cool to CFE Pact, Expert Says." Stars and Stripes, 2 June 1990, p. 28.

<sup>17</sup>R. W. Apple, "U. S. Grows Wary Over Kremlin Stalling," International Herald Tribune, 23 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>See my interviews with Sayatz, Forrester, Wittman, and Stamey at Appendices VI through IX respectively. See also Thomas L. Friedman's "Soviet Unrest is Seen as Peril to Arms Talks," New York Times, 6 May 1990, p. 20.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Apple, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup>Quoted in David Tarrant, "Soviets Now Cool to CFE, Expert Says." Stars and Stripes, 2 June 1990, p. 28.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Richard Perle, "Both Sides Need the American Agenda," International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1990, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.



## CHAPTER VI

### IMPACT ON GERMANY

The borders here are opening up and we; and I don't mean just the two of us but a wide mainly silent majority, wish we could have our wall back. To keep all those stinking vehicles and all those 'wanting' neighbors out.

They are very quick with demands but not so quick when it comes to getting things done. They say we have a rich family who is now there to look after us. And our politicians seem to think that money grows on trees and make agreements that are going to cost the earth and Lord only knows who is going to pay for them.<sup>1</sup>

This quote captures the emotion that has come to characterize German unification for some of the Germans. Love, hate, euphoria, anger, frustration are all there and you don't have to dig very deep to find it. A December 1989 visit to Berlin; my duty station for the past three years, left me with the sensing that: perhaps, the predominant emotion that prevailed among the most effected people - the Germans themselves - was the loss of a sense of order. The divided world that we lived in was artificial and unnatural but it was predictable. This is a personal opinion and certainly not based on serious scientific study or empirical data. It is based on six years of living in Germany and coming to know and greatly admire and respect the German psyche.

To say that unification will touch every thread of the German fabric is probably a gross understatement. The younger generation today has never known it and seems primarily

concerned with the costs associated with it. The older generation view it as the final chapter in the righting of a wrong that was the price paid for the escapades of an evil leader. In this chapter, we will examine the impact on the Germans themselves. In an attempt to keep this paper at a reasonable length, I will touch on a few examples of the impact of unification in the social arena and then focus my primary efforts on the implications in the security area.

The two Germanies that were created forty years ago have developed into two distinctly different societies. Christoph Bertram, the respected former Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies put it this way

Societies that have for forty years lived largely separate existences will not adjust easily to the new relationship.<sup>2</sup>

West Germany, with much help from the previous occupying powers established a political system of decentralized government along the western model. The economy has prospered and become a model of free market capitalism. East Germany developed as a centralized Communist state where every facet of the people's life was directly controlled from East Berlin; indirectly from Moscow.

Culturally, there is also divergence. I remember a bumper sticker on a car in Augsburg I saw ten years ago that humorously reflects some of the differences among the Germans: "its nice to be a Preis. but it's higher to be a Bayer" (it's nice to a

Prussian but it's higher to be a Bavarian - it rhymes in German). Joachim Fest, a well known German historian puts it a little more scholarly when he says:

one could even call it a revolution of civilizations. West Germany has become a country of Western culture, Americanized to a large extent, more or less like all Western European countries. East Germany combines Russian culture and traditional German culture.'

All of these facts are well known but a short reminder here is in order. Up to this point, we have dealt with the impact of unification of Germany on everybody but the Germans. It is time to examine the traumas that they are experiencing and the challenges they face.

My first topic will be the dilemma of abortions. This may appear out of order in a paper about security implications but it aptly demonstrates the point I was trying to make in the preceding paragraph - the great differences in the societies that have grown up in the two merging states. East Germany, where 85% of the women work outside the home, has an extremely liberal abortion policy. West Germany, where the majority of the women do not work outside the home, has extremely restrictive laws that make abortions almost impossible to obtain. Other social differences will make life very traumatic for those who will face dramatic change. With the large female work force in the East, there is a strong need for child day care and extended shopping hours. Indications are that the plans now call for imposition of the West German day care system that

is neither free or guaranteed and the unions have adamantly opposed any changes to the existing laws that ban shopping all evenings and most weekends.

Even such mundane things as speed limits and drunk driving laws are now different. East Germany wants to retain their 60 miles per hour limit and a very tough drunk driving law which provides for no alcohol in a driver's bloodstream. These too will also change with unification.<sup>4</sup>

East Germany currently guarantees workers the right to work. With the new economic systems being planned, it is estimated between 500,000 to 2 million East Germans will lose their jobs. Thousands have taken to the streets to protest.<sup>5</sup>

The tremendous imbalance in earning power of the individual workers is a major problem. The East Germans complain that they are being bought out by the West Germans. An East Berliner in a casino complained about the number of West Germans at the gaming tables said "they have taken over everything else, they might as well have this, too."<sup>6</sup> East German Communist party leader Gregor Gysi derided the unification plan saying that it "amounted to little more than annexation and colonization."<sup>7</sup>

East German psychologists report record numbers of patients seeking help. Doctors talk of a storm of visitors who cannot sleep, feel depressed or just wonder about their futures. Stress is showing in increased crime and drunkenness, in random attacks on foreigners, and in street demonstrations by frightened workers."<sup>8</sup>

Suffice it to say, "reunification will not be a smooth operation."<sup>9</sup>

Before turning to security, I will address a topic that is not talked about much in polite society but one that needs to be briefly discussed is the subject of what some call the "German National Character." It deals with attempts by academics to find the answer to why pre 1945 Germany behaved so very badly on the world stage. Thousands of pages have been written on this highly charged subject and I will not bore the reader with a regurgitation of the details.

While time has tempered many prejudices, many people today - particularly in Europe - still carry these burdens in their subconscious. David Calleo, in his very thought-provoking book, The German Problem Reconsidered, writes:

Such attempts at definition seem reminiscent of the very racist techniques made notorious by anti-Semites ....Although more vicious forms of anti-German are no longer fashionable among serious scholars, the effects of this defamation linger....Many of us, if we are honest, carry such a view of Germans just beneath the level of articulate consciousness.<sup>10</sup>

This subject certainly has a bearing on unification and will impact on how the future European security order takes shape.

The thrust of the issue goes something like this. Based on their social and cultural history, Germans are - by their very domestic character - prone to be aggressive and insecure. Golo Mann, one of the most provocative German historians wrote:

The German people have always been a dynamic force locked up in a big prison wanting to break out. With the north and south blocked by water and mountains, 'out' has meant west and east - particularly east, where Germans, owing to successive waves of migration,

intermingled with the Slavs. What has characterized the German nature for a hundred years is its lack of form, its unreliability.'

Probably one of the most vituperative pictures painted was done by the British historian, Sir Lewis Namier, in a 1947 review of A. J. P. Taylor's Course of Germany History:

Namier faulted Taylor for not carrying his analysis to the real German question: 'why do individual Germans in non-German surroundings become useful, decent citizens, but in groups develop tendencies which make them a menace to their fellowmen?' 'We call the German inhuman, for sometimes he behaves like a beast, and sometimes like a robot. He is educated but not civilized.' Namier went on to provide his explanation. Germans were isolated and tense, without grace or ease, suspiciously concerned with virility - in general, men with poor human contacts. Because their social intercourse was never natural, they required codes and rule books for all human relationships, even tyranny and mass murder. Among a people so inept at social communion, political creations were inevitably inorganic, incapable of spontaneous adjustment, and essentially grotesque. Germans had a cold tenacity and bitter intensity. Since Bismarck they had directed their tension into an immense drive to power. But every accession to power had only made them more frantically envious of those who possessed the 'unbought grace of life,' whereas every obstacle in their path had filled them with venomous rage. Frustration had finally driven them into a colossal doctrinaire totalitarianism: 'from introversive isolation they plunged into the heat and intoxication of undifferentiated mass hysteria.'<sup>12</sup>

Much of the emotionalism and open hatred that was bred as a result of the horrors perpetrated by Hitler and his henchmen has dissipated, thankfully, over the past forty years. But it is still an issue today. Chancellor Kohl, speaking at a villa in Berlin where Nazi leaders met in 1942 to plan the "Final Solution," told the leaders of the World Jewish Congress:

"Germans had to remain constantly aware of the lessons of their history and alert to all the temptations of totalitarianism."

Lothar de Maiziere, his East German counterpart, said "our history cannot be overcome but has to be borne, honestly and truthfully."<sup>14</sup> History has not been kind to the Germans.

The move towards unification has, unfortunately brought the issue of national guilt back to the newspaper headlines. Editors like A. M. Rosenthal of the New York Times fill their editorial pages with virulent, emotion-filled reminders of the evils found in German history.<sup>15</sup> Even social scientists are getting press. A study done seventeen years ago made recent headlines in The New York Times. An editorial was published describing a study done by an Austrian psychiatrist, Leopold Bellak, on aggressive behavior. The results were that both German children and adults were much more aggressive than their European neighbors. Bellak writes

Aggressive children grow up to be aggressive adults - adults whom I don't trust to be peaceful, democratic people.

Bellak closes his article with an invitation to other psychologists to repeat his experiments and find fault with his results. His last sentence says it all: "If its disproved, I will feel much better about German unification."<sup>16</sup>

In a well thought out, logically presented article, Robert D. Kaplan addresses the question of the German character and a few key quotes will summarize his rationale and help to put to

rest what Rosenthal calls "the sins of the father." Kaplan writes that one legacy that Hitler left Germany was that Germany was so totally destroyed as a result of World War II that much of its national heritage disappeared. The two German states had

the internal organization of their societies completely rebuilt according to the political and moral values of their respective victors....Today, Germany's eastern portion, economically and politically moribund, is poised to accept the embraces of Germany's modern, vital western portion.<sup>17</sup>

He goes on to say that the character of the new German state will be totally western and that the East German special character is "being sloughed off like molten skin." Interestingly, he writes:

West Germany today is perhaps the most complacent, satisfied, *petit bourgeois* nation in Europe, if not on earth. It is the antithesis of the inflation-ravaged, socially torn society of the pre-Hitler period.<sup>18</sup>

Kaplan closes by saying that the power of "prosperity and democracy works strongly against any return (of the evils of the Third Reich)."<sup>19</sup> As the esteemed William Griffith, Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology profoundly said "nothing fails like failure."<sup>20</sup>

We will now turn to the impact of German unification in the field of German security. Most of these issues are interrelated but for the sake of discussion, they will be dealt with individually. Suffice it to say, changes in one area will most certainly impact on the others.

Before addressing issues, it must be said that the primary German security concern has been for centuries and is today is how to allay the concerns of the Soviet Union. Without being redundant; in short, the Soviets have major internal and external challenges facing them at the moment. The last thing they need to feel is that a unified Germany is going to add to their problems. As outlined in Chapter IV, the historical relationship between the Germans and Russians has always been one of where each country is the lead item on the security agenda of the other. Today is no different. The dilemma for the Germans, as well as the rest of Europe, is how to satisfy the Soviets in a way that is palatable to the Germans. Lieutenant Colonel Schuyler Forester, a Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, put it

At the end of the day, the Soviets may not have a choice but I would hate to see a united Germany and a new security order that was created by coercing the Soviet Union."<sup>21</sup>

He goes on to say that the best solution for a unified Germany is one "in which the Soviet Union has warm, fuzzy feelings about its own security."<sup>22</sup> The problem, of course, is what is that solution.

Keeping in mind the previous paragraph, the first major issue facing the Germans is one of where will Germany place her strategic security needs. As Michael Sturmer writes

The German Question in the past sounded...no different from the German Question today: 'whom is Germany supposed to belong to, and where are the Germans supposed to belong?'

This question rightly belongs to the Germans to answer and all the posturing by politicians and academics will be placed aside when the German people go to the polls to map their destiny. But for the sake of discussion, I will outline several options that are being put forward.

One of the historical options is the one of neutrality. Many call this the 'loose cannon' option. In a little known book that was written in 1945 in his bunker beneath the streets of Berlin as Russian shells were landing, The Testament of Adolf Hitler, *der Fuhrer* wrote:

(After the end of this war) there will remain only two Great Powers capable of confronting each other - the United States and Soviet Russia. The laws of both history and geography will compel these powers to a trial of strength, either military or in the field of economics and ideology. These same laws make it inevitable that both Powers should become the enemies of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these powers will find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people. I say with all the emphasis at my command that the Germans must at all costs avoid playing the role of pawn in either camp.<sup>24</sup>

"Hitler proved perhaps a better analyst of the world after his death than before."<sup>25</sup>

Without going into detail, Stalin strongly supported neutrality for a unified Germany. He firmly believed, and probably rightfully so, that the Soviets could exert influence

only with a distancing of Germany from her Western allies, particularly the United States. Until recently, this has been the public position of the Soviet leadership. Privately, many Soviet leaders are coming to the conclusion that: perhaps, German neutrality is not in the best interest of the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> There is also a very small minority of Germans, particularly, in the East, that support German neutrality. But the idea is pretty much passe these days. Critics point to the experience of Germany after World War I where she was forced into isolation and looked inward to provide her own security needs. This resulted in a divisive resurgence of nationalism and many experts feel this was one of major causes of World War II.<sup>27</sup> Quoting Sir Anthony Eden, Forester said

If Germany is neutral and armed, who is going to keep it neutral? If Germany is neutral and unarmed, who is going to keep it unarmed?<sup>28</sup>

In summary, neutrality is opposed by the Western and Eastern European nations, the United States, and the West Germans themselves. Egon Bahr, one of the leading German Social Democrats, said

Neutrality is out of the question. We either live in common security or common insecurity.<sup>29</sup>

If an option is strongly supported by the two biggest villains of this century - Hitler and Stalin - it probably is not in the best interest of anyone.

The next option is the one that today appears to be the one espoused by the current German government and the Western allies. This calls for a united Germany remaining in NATO and for this reason I; facetiously, call it the "status quo" option. Germany would remain in a yet to be defined 'restructured' NATO that would take on an expanded political dimension. The major criticism of this option is how do the Soviets accept this option, politically at home, without appearing to have lost "the fundamental prize of the Cold War - East Germany."<sup>30</sup> Another problem is who provides the security umbrella for the former German Democratic Republic. Doctor Colonel Friedrich Sayatz, an East German put it this way "it is unrealistic to say that the security responsibility for the DDR (German Democratic Republic) could go to NATO."<sup>31</sup>

A third option is commonly called the "French Model." In it, the Germans remain in NATO outside the integrated military command structure as the French do today. They would be politically integrated but would (theoretically) not participate in things military. The thinking is that with a restructured NATO, the Soviets could probably accept this option. The major criticism is that it would virtually destroy Alliance cohesion for the integrated defense of the NATO Countries. It would place the largest European army outside the Soviet Union outside the constraints of undergraduate military command. It would also place Germany militarily without the explicit nuclear guarantee given indirectly through NATO military membership.

Germany would have nuclear powers on each side of her without this guarantee; not a very comforting thought. So while this model has a few proponents and the big advantage is that the Soviets could probably support it, it's interesting to note that even the French no longer support the "French Model." Michael Sturmer writes:

France's worst fear is that Germany might flatter her by imitation: bid farewell to the Americans, look for nuclear weapons, neglect conventional defense and build an oversized arms industry while dreaming of a full fledged defense."

The last option that I will discuss is one that, at first glance, appears to be totally unworkable. It was, as far as I could determine, put forth by Professor John Lewis Gaddis, a Professor of History at Ohio University. I first read it in an article by Professor Gaddis in the 21 March 1990 New York Times. On first reading, I laughed and filed it away for future reference. In the ensuing weeks, I kept going back to it and giving it more and more thought. His idea may merit serious consideration.

His basic premise is that what maintained stability for the past 45 years in Europe was the imposition on Europe of spheres of influence by the two Super Powers who were locked in a global military and ideological battle for influence. This forty year 'Cold War' had the effect of "suppressing the regional rivalries that had propelled Europe into two world wars in the three decades that preceded 1945." He goes on to say

The Cold War was for Europe a 'long peace' .... A distinct improvement over the way Europeans had managed their own affairs.<sup>14</sup>

Gaddis proposes the consideration of the one option he sees that would preserve a semblance of the old security order while accommodating German unification - German membership in both a reorganized NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The two alliances were formed to counter each other; haven't we been saying that the level of confrontation has been dramatically reduced and our mission for the future was to build mutual trust and confidence? Everywhere I went at NATO headquarters I was told one of NATO's most important future roles would be to replace confrontation with cooperation.<sup>35</sup>

Some say that the Pact is all but dead.<sup>36</sup> Would this not be a way to force a meaningful restructure and breathe life back into the Pact with an entirely new frame of reference as Mr. Gorbachev wants. As Gaddis wrote

Why shouldn't alliances outlast the enmities that gave rise to them, and then go on to find new roles?<sup>37</sup>

He also said

If the Warsaw Pact is allowed to expire, it will almost certainly become necessary, at some point in the not too distant future, to reinvent it (emphasis added).<sup>38</sup>

Joint membership would firmly entrench Germany in both alliances, reassuring her neighbors in the West and the East. It would give much needed reassurance to the Eastern European countries and particularly, the Soviet Union, that they would

have some say in the future of the European security order. It would probably give new life to the conventional arms talks where the two alliances are the players. It would provide a mechanism to maintain a Soviet troop presence temporarily in the area of the old German Democratic Republic if that should be an outcome of the Two Plus Four talks. Militarily, it could provide the bridge for more transparency and dialogue - items that I will discuss in the next chapter.

Critics of Professor Gaddis highlight the technical problems that would go with this proposal. Most of them presuppose continued military confrontation. While at NATO I heard repeatedly that the role of the future NATO is to replace 'confrontation with cooperation.' What better way to do this than to have the biggest power on the Continent firmly entrenched in both alliances? This could start as the first step of an evolutionary process that leads to the Pan-Europeanism or as what Mr. Gorbachev likes to call his 'European House.' Leaders on both sides of the old iron curtain see this as the future for Europe. What better first step?

Of course, the big loser in this proposal would probably be the United States. It would certainly lessen US influence over Germany and dilute US muscle in NATO. I would suggest the NATO of five years from now will reflect a much smaller US role.<sup>37</sup> Hasn't that been the US stated goal since NATO was formed?

In summary, Gaddis ends his article by stating:

It is a principle...that one ought to retain what history shows to have worked, even as one accommodates to the changes that history is bringing....The benefits it (joint membership) offers ought not be overlooked.<sup>40</sup>

I find it absolutely fascinating that within two weeks of the publication of this article, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Washington and offered the Gaddis proposition as an option.<sup>41</sup> American Secretary of State Baker seemed very surprised and indicated that this was the first time he had heard of the idea.

Looking to internal security impacts, I will outline items that are on the German military's agenda.

The first major issue is what to do about the former East German Army. Desertion is taking its toll and morale is at a low ebb, but it is still a formidable force. What will come of it? Integration? My discussions with experts on the subject revealed that is not likely. Most probably, it will be drastically reduced in size and equipped with excess West German equipment that will become available due to force reductions in the *Bundeswehr*. This reduction will save money, allay some of the fears of the Soviet Union and some of the other nations of Europe who have expressed concern about Germany having the largest military on the Continent outside the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup>

In addition to equipment differences, the former East German soldiers that remain in uniform will have to learn the ways of the *Bundeswehr* and this is no small undertaking. Most things military are currently different between the two armies -

doctrine, tactics, logistics, rules and regulations. It might be easier to start over again.

The situation is complicated even more in that the Bonn government is receiving thousands of applications for transfer to the *Bundeswehr* from officers and noncommissioned officers of the People's Army of the DDR. As a soldier, I can empathize with those in uniform facing the prospect of unemployment, particularly with grim prospects outside the military in what was East Germany. This is no small problem.

Another issue is the question of the future of stationing of foreign troops on German soil. It appears from press accounts that foreign troops - both Soviet and NATO will probably remain on German soil for the immediate future. This will add stress to an already very stressful situation. The current German government appears to support it to allay Soviet concerns and add stability during the transition. As Doctor Kennedy said

If the Germans want the US troops out, we will be gone in a heartbeat.<sup>43</sup>

Pierre Lellbuce asks the question:

We will have a bizarre co-presence of Soviet and NATO forces on German soil - and the German government being asked to pay for both! How long that Kafkaesque situation will be expected to last is anybody's guess. But clearly the question will be asked by the Germans.<sup>44</sup>

To end this discussion, suffice it to say that unification will require the Germans to rethink their entire security policy

and build a military force to implement that policy. This will not be an easy task. As Egon Bahr, the father of Willy Brandt's *oestpolitik* pointed out at the NATO Symposium in April "no plan for unification existed" and "if you don't like what we are doing, please help us."<sup>45</sup>

The issue of the need for a formal peace treaty once again looms on the European security agenda.

World War II ended without a formal peace treaty. This was never intended but like most things associated with post 1945 Europe, formal closure was held hostage by the confrontation between the Super Powers.

The legalists will tell you that we must have a treaty to settle all of the open issues that have never been finished. Michael Sturmer writes:

The German question belongs to that kind of question which will never be solved without leaving a remnant of controversy. just as the Palestinian issue has been since The absence of any peace treaty, which had been planned for in 1945, is the clearest sign of this unsolvability.<sup>46</sup>

In my opinion, all of the major issues have been addressed over the years and while this approach is not necessarily "neat and tidy", reopening old wounds would be much more damaging to the future of Europe. Most experts agree with my conclusion.<sup>47</sup> Quoting Lieutenant Colonel Forester who said it very plainly "the problem is that it focuses a very hot magnifying glass on the Germans; on winners and losers."<sup>48</sup> This process would

Raise questions of reparations, borders, ownership of land ....The whole issue of German guilt.<sup>49</sup>

On the issue of borders, Professor Kennedy said

We should remind our Polish friends that the Polish border issue does not only involve Poland's western border but also their eastern.<sup>50</sup>

For a continent that is going through the throes of very tumultuous times and attempting to foster a spirit of integration and international cooperation, few can find any resulting benefit that would merit going through the process. Professor Kennedy summed it nicely:

Ultimately, it's a question of what kind of Germany do you want to create? It's very easy to humiliate the Germans now....They are not going to forget it. It is inevitable. It will happen. And if you are going to be a spoil sport now; it's not going to be forgotten....You can consider the agreement from the Two Plus Four talks as a *de facto* peace treaty.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In an unsolicited letter from friends, John Tindale and Lilo Jarvis, 15 May 1990, p. 1. Tindale, a British expatriate, has resided in Germany for the past 17 years; Berlin for the past seven years. Jarvis, a Berliner, is a school teacher who has vivid childhood memories of the World War II bombings of Berlin.

<sup>2</sup>Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, Vol. 69, No. 2, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup>Joachim Fest, "Germany After the Two States," The European Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1990, p. 75

<sup>4</sup>Marc Fisher, "'Easties' and 'Westies' - Anxiety Over German Unification," Stars and Stripes, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>See "East Germans Voice Concern on Merger," International Herald Tribune, 11 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Fisher, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>"East German Party Leader Fears Colonization," Stars and Stripes, 22 April 1990, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. In my three years in Berlin, I never heard of an incident of any attacks on foreigners. During my numerous visits to East Berlin, I never saw a demonstration or a drunk.

<sup>9</sup>Bertram, p. 49.

<sup>10</sup>David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present, 1978, p. 124.

<sup>11</sup>Quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, "The Character Issue: Can the Germans Get It Right This Time?" The Atlantic, May 1990, Vol. 265, No. 5., p. 24.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 124-125.

<sup>13</sup>"History Lesson - the World Jewish Congress Meets in Germany," Time, p. 17.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>For just a small sample, see A. M. Rosenthal's, "Germany's Reunification is Everybody's Business," New York Times, 2 March 1990; "Germans Must Ensure Fears are Stilled for All Time," 28 April 1990; published in Stars and Stripes, p. 10; and "German Ascendance: It's Too Late to Stop It," published in the International Herald, 14 May 1990, p. 40. Richard Helms also

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wrote an article that was highly critical in "Germany: Why Do We All Accept the Rush." New York Times. 27-28 February 1990.

<sup>16</sup>Leopold Bellak. "Germany: More Aggression in the Playgrounds?" International Herald Tribune. 26 April 1990. p. 6.

<sup>17</sup>Kaplan. p. 32.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid... p. 34.

<sup>20</sup>In an address given by Professor William Griffith to the NATO Symposium. 9-10 April 1990, Rome, Italy. Doctor Griffith is a Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

<sup>21</sup>Interview with LTC Schuyler Forester. US Air Force, Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe. Vienna. Austria. 27 April 1990. For complete text see Appendix VII.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Michael Sturmer. "Inter-German Common Domestic Policy." The European Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1990. p. 139.

<sup>24</sup>Quoted in Calleo. p. 110.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid... p. 116.

<sup>26</sup>See my interviews with Wittman, Saint John, Forester, and Sayatz for their discussions with the Soviets on the question of German neutrality.

<sup>27</sup>I will not belabor this point. Frankly, there is little I could add to the arguments put forth against German neutrality. See my interviews in the appendices for opinions of people who get paid for thinking about things like this.

<sup>28</sup>Forester Interview, Appendix VII.

<sup>29</sup>Egon Bahr addressing th NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990, Rome, Italy.

<sup>30</sup>Forester Interview. Appendix VII.

<sup>31</sup>Interview with Doctor Colonel Freidrich Sayatz, Senior

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Military Advisor to the German Democratic Republic's Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Vienna, Austria, 24 April 1990. See Appendix VI for complete text.

<sup>11</sup>Michael Sturmer, "As 'Escape From Yalta' Came to Pass, a Strategy for Germany Crumbled," International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1990, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, "One Germany - in Both Alliances," The New York Times, 21 March 1990, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>See my interviews with Colonels Wittman and Stamey. Appendices VIII and IX.

<sup>16</sup>See my interviews with Saint John, Forester, Stamey, and Wittman. All say that, at most; the Warsaw Pact's death knell has been sounded. At the very least, it's a shell of it's former self.

<sup>17</sup>Gaddis, p. 8.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>For a concurring opinion, see my interview with Colonel Stamey at Appendix IX. See also Pat Schroeder, "Dual Basing Would Also Heighten Readiness," Stars and Stripes, 26 June 1990, p. 10. Schroeder, a member of the US House of Representatives Armed Services Subcommittee, states unequivocally that US troop strengths in Europe will fall to 50,000. While the numbers and time table can be argued, the end result is the same - lessened US presence and less US influence.

<sup>20</sup>Gaddis, ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Christopher Ogden, "Stop Thrashing," Time, 23 April 1990, p. 12.

<sup>22</sup>For discussions on what the future German Army might look like, see my interview with Colonel Stamey at Appendix IX.

<sup>23</sup>See my interview with Professor Kennedy at Appendix II.

<sup>24</sup>Pierre Lellouche, "Redo the European Puzzle Around NATO," International Herald Tribune, 18 May 1990, p. 18.

<sup>25</sup>Egon Bahr in an address to the NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990. Rome. Italy.

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<sup>16</sup>Sturmer, p. 133.

<sup>17</sup>In addition to the numerous opinions in the media, see each of my appendices. Not one favored reopening the issue of a formal peace treaty negotiation process.

<sup>18</sup>Forerster interview at Appendix VII.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Kennedy interview at Appendix II.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OPTIONS

In a wonderful article in The Atlantic Monthly, John Lewis Gaddis wrote:

We are at one of those rare points of leverage in history when familiar constraints have dropped away; what we do now could establish the framework within which events will play themselves out for decades to come.<sup>1</sup>

Gaddis goes on to predict that we will not do well in meeting the challenges offered us. He says that the West suffers from what he calls his 'dog and car syndrome':

dogs spend a great deal of time chasing cars but very little thinking about what they would actually do if they were ever to catch one.<sup>2</sup>

Gaddis draws the parallel between the leaders of the Western nations and the dogs in his syndrome. He wrote:

When victory actually arrives, they treat it as if it were an astonishing and wholly unforeseen development.<sup>3</sup>

Pessimistically, he predicts:

What we will probably do is fritter away the fruits of victory by failing to think through what we want victory to accomplish.<sup>4</sup>

Without the experience of the past eleven months, I would have probably agreed with Professor Gaddis. Having spent the past year studying, listening, and learning about how things really work within the European security order, I am much more

optimistic. Without belittling the numerous challenges ahead, I feel that Europe is certainly "on the right track."

In this chapter, I will address some of the future characteristics of the new order, issues that will challenge our leaders, and present an amalgam of ideas that represent ways to meet these challenges. As I said in my introduction, I will not presume to present a blue print for a future European security architecture. I will focus on principles and ideas. I need not remind the reader that these thoughts primarily belong to others.

The identity crisis that Europe faces today was not caused by German unification. If the Berlin Wall still stood, I submit the vast majority of these challenges would remain. What the drive for unification has done is add a few new dimensions and put a degree of urgency to the endeavor of building a new security order for Europe. Frequently, the international order is rightly criticized for moving too slowly in resolving issues. German unification has put a stop watch on this task and I, for one, applaud it.

Before delving into specifics, I will describe what our bright new world of the 90's might look like. Bipolar security arrangements are now *passé*. Internationalism is sweeping our shrinking globe as the proliferation of multinational forums increases geometrically in numbers, responsibility and authority. Declining confrontation has ended the predominant reliance on military power. Wars are now being fought in the

market place with the yen continuing to increase its position in the world economy. The Third World continues to suffer and looks to the developed countries of the North, to assist. Unfortunately, most resources are being spent in rebuilding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The peoples of the developing world are clamoring for the cleanup of our environment and ecological endeavors have spent most of the 'peace dividend' that resulted from the dramatic reduction in the armed forces of the nations of Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States. But there are still security challenges. The proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons among some very unstable states threaten the world security order. Regional conflicts still persist with civil wars in Africa and the Middle East. Ethnic unrest in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union threaten stability. Contrary to what some say, the days ahead portend instability; albeit, different concerns than those of today.

As previously mentioned in Chapter II, the traditional European security order has been based on a balance of power: be it Triple Entente or the Super Power conflict in the Cold War. During my travels, I sensed that the winds of change that are blowing in Europe today bring with them a new and exciting underlying theme for the manner in which nations will conduct business among themselves. I heard it in lectures, during interviews, in Vienna, and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The new future theme is what Michael Mandelbaum

called "a move from balance of power to cooperation."<sup>7</sup> Colonel Victor Stamev sees it as a "move from confrontation to cooperation."<sup>8</sup>

In preparing for the future, we should attempt to learn from the past. Dominique Moisi says that nothing "fails like success."<sup>9</sup> What he is saying is that victors in a conflict have a tendency to rest on their laurels and assume the status quo is good because the status quo is the form that resulted in victory. Let us hope our leaders do not fall into this trap.

A major lesson of history that is being repeated over and over again is that the victors should not humiliate the losers.<sup>10</sup> If there really was a loser in the Cold War, it had to be the Soviet Union. Today it is less threatening but also much less stable. In Egon Bahr's words "Germany is not the problem; the Soviet Union is."<sup>11</sup> The imminent Professor William Griffith foresees extreme violence coming to the Soviet Union as a result of what will be "the bloody nature of the decolonization of the Soviet Union."<sup>12</sup> Bahr went on to say that *glasnost* has succeeded perhaps too well and that *perestroika* has failed miserably with an economy that is in shambles. Bahr sees the biggest problem in implementing *perestroika* is how to "maintain control of the military."<sup>13</sup> His answer is to bind the Soviet Union and all of its institutions, including the military, to the West. Professor Gaddis, an arch conservative, agreed with the Social Democrat Bahr when he wrote

it was the failure to arrange for Germany's reintegration after the First World War that led to the Second. Power vacuums are dangerous things. Solicitude for a defeated adversary, therefore, is not just a matter of charity or magnanimity. It also reflects the wise victors' calculated self-interest.'

Fortunately, NATO has recognized the need not to take actions that isolate the Soviet Union or add to its instability. In describing the future security role for NATO, Colonel Stamey said:

The most significant change in our role will be in the concept of mutual security in the relationships between the nations. We are openly going to be looking for doctrines and strategy that will support this concept. No longer are we at NATO just going to be looking at what is the best for NATO....We are going to throw into the equation what (actions) give confidence to the other side - the Soviet side. We must ensure that our actions are not destabilizing or threatening. That is the principle that will cause us to rethink how we are doing much of this.'

Stamey went on to point out that this new way of thinking will virtually impact on just about everything NATO does and the manner in which it is done: strategy, doctrine, exercises, force structure, deployments, and the planned use of nuclear weapons. For those of us who have worked around the old NATO plans and are familiar with the old way of doing business, these are certainly welcome changes. Hopefully, gone are the days of the 'red catcher' missions along the Czech border where US aircraft tried to see how close they could get to the border

before drawing a hostile reaction. Maybe we have seen the end of helmeted and flak jacketed soldiers of the Berlin Brigade patrolling the Wall in their armed gun jeeps.

In previous chapters I have mentioned several times that it is now consensus among the leaders of Europe - east and west - that the US must maintain a presence in Europe. Michael Howard writes,

Especially sacrosanct should be the participation of the United States. There are good reasons for this. First, the Soviet Union...will remain a very strong military power with a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons. And it will remain, at least for the time being, an alien power. However sincere Gorbachev's wish to be admitted to the common European home, the course charted by Lenin and Stalin has removed the Soviets so far from the structures and values of Western society that it may take a generation of sustained reciprocal effort before we can really treat them in the same fashion as we do one another.

Another reason is generally admitted but seldom mentioned in polite society. There is a German Problem. It may be only a perception but it exists none the less. An alliance without the United States would be an alliance dominated by Germany. The peoples both of Central Europe and the Soviet Union would see this as a threat...because of deep-rooted instincts for a balance in Europe.<sup>14</sup>

With the threat diminishing, will the American public continue to allow it? We will then be faced with an irony "in which all of relevant countries want an American presence in Europe except the American people."<sup>15</sup> At the end of the day, what Americans cannot forget is that it is the American nuclear deterrence umbrella that shields Western Europe. Without a substantial US military presence in the continent, we may hear again the haggard and trite question that is often asked. "will

the U. S. risk a nuclear strike on New York to defend Hamburg?" If the Europeans determine that the answer is "no," the future security environment for Europe could be further destabilized with possible consequences that no one wants to talk about.

What can be done to convince the American public that it is in their best interest to keep American military on the continent? Moisi said that it is imperative that Europeans take the initiative to convince the US public that "We want you. We will do more."<sup>16</sup> Mandelbaum called it an "investment in security and stability"<sup>17</sup> that must be sold to the American public. Even the former neutralist Bahr said "the new order must have a legal basis for the maintenance of US presence in Europe."<sup>18</sup>

The issues of borders will most likely stay on the European agenda for the foreseeable future. Old animosities and inequities will haunt international relations. Reopening the problem does not appear to be a solution. Jonathan Eyal, former British representative to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, said

Borders should not change but borders should not count  
- we should make them less important.<sup>19</sup>

One of the tenets of the Helsinki Accords is the right of self determination. Eyal said this must be a guiding principle in resolving questions of borders. Otherwise, he cautioned "you are likely to get the kind of government you deserve."<sup>20</sup>

In defining a new security order, a good place to begin is to identify what functions are needed to be performed. In his superb "Restructuring the European Security Order," Michael Mandelbaum identifies the following functions for a new security order: implementation of arms control accords, police force among nations, management of political change, conflict resolution and crisis management, act as a forum for dialogue among nations, be a conduit of aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and probably most importantly - provide a security guarantee for all the nations.<sup>21</sup> This is certainly a tall order but it is worth our effort to list them out when we begin to consider what options are available.

Every political scientist and politician has his formula for new order in Europe and rather than go through them all, I think the best advice is what the sage Dominique Moisi said at the NATO Symposium: "use all existing institutions."<sup>22</sup> Seems that there certainly is enough work to go around.

Some say the CSCE should become the umbrella forum and there is sound logic to their argument. It is the only forum that incorporates all the nations of Europe - even Albania has finally seen the light - and the Soviet Union and the United States. Michael Howard criticizes the CSCE because it is not institutionalized; has no permanent staff, and provides no security guarantee. Colonel Stamey feels that trying to gain consensus among the 35 nations of the CSCE is too unwieldy.<sup>23</sup>

Moisi feels that majority rule should prevail at CSCE as it currently does with the European Community forum. Griffith feels that the nonaligned and neutral states would not agree to majority rule - not to mention the Super Powers! Griffith and Howard both support the NATO method of consensus.<sup>26</sup> Whatever new voting procedures are developed, there is unanimity among the experts that CSCE will certainly play a key role in the future security architecture for Europe. All agree it needs a permanent staff and needs to develop an institutional framework. Leo Tindemans sees additional role for the CSCE. He envisages the CSCE taking on the additional responsibilities of monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords and the management of arms control implementation.<sup>27</sup> Colonel Wittman sees a verification center, a risk reduction center and; possibly, a crisis management center for the CSCE.<sup>28</sup> Leo Tindemans envisages an expanded security role for the Western European Union with a mutual security treaty with the United States.<sup>29</sup>

Michael Howard sees:

The first task facing Europe is to reabsorb the peoples of Central Europe into our cultural and economic community where they properly belong: to the ties between London, Paris, Rome, Munich and Leipzig, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest.<sup>30</sup>

Howard goes on to ponder the question of long term security arrangements that would incorporate both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Will they rejoin our security community as well?...A single security system embracing the whole of Europe, involving the dissolution or the amalgamation of the existing pacts, is certainly a reasonable long-term goal. ...If such a system were to include the Soviet Union, it would at present be unacceptable to many of its members. If it did not, it would be seen by the Soviet Union as at least potentially hostile, especially if it were still linked to the United States.<sup>71</sup>

So how to we resolve this dilemma? Leo Tindemans had the obvious solution when he said "there should be as little discussion as possible about the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact."<sup>72</sup> He went on to say a "new relationship has been developed between the two alliances. Each trusts the other. They have become elements of stability for Europe."<sup>73</sup> He added that it would be a good idea to have a mutual security treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is a novel idea but it aptly demonstrates how things have changed.

Almost all the experts agree that NATO must remain. Bahr, Lellouche, Mandelbaum, Griffith, Gaddis - the list is almost endless. Michael Howard said: "The Alliance itself...should be sacrosanct however radically the manner in which it operates."

<sup>74</sup> He goes on to write:

All the rest is superstructure: the integrated military organization, the command system, the overall strategy - all this was negotiated separately and need not be considered in any way sacrosanct.<sup>75</sup>

There is much ongoing discussion about giving NATO an

expanded political role. But as the 1967 Harmel Report so eloquently pointed out, NATO has always been an alliance with major political dealings. A Swiss writer points out

The Atlantic Pact has always been primarily a political union which has had to confront political problems in the course of its history. In addition to nuclear weapons, the political strength of Allied unity and a U.S. troop presence have been major elements of deterrence.<sup>40</sup>

What will the new NATO look like? Consensus seems to point to a smaller U. S. role, increased European leadership, a more flexible strategy and doctrine that is less obtrusive.<sup>41</sup>

Moisi sees NATO as the "forum for building consensus among the western allies in the development of the new order."<sup>42</sup>

The role of the French must be properly defined in the new security order. Perhaps a French Supreme Command who has multinational units at his command might make it easier for the French to reintegrate into the NATO military command structure.<sup>43</sup> Professor Kennedy sees possible French participation if the Military Committee was properly restructured.<sup>44</sup>

Militarily, Colonel Stamey envisages NATO's role to be one that will "enhance transparency, understanding, and consultation."<sup>45</sup> Colonel Wittman sees NATO as an instrument of dialogue with the Soviets and Eastern European military.<sup>46</sup>

In conclusion, it was said:

I don't think there is; or should there be, some great guiding light out there that says that this is the

way Europe should look. I would be very worried if someone said, 'this is the way it ought to be and I am going to make it happen.' The reason for this is that what it ought to be is what everybody can stand. What they can tolerate, accept....It becomes a question of what the allies will accept, what the East Europeans will accept, what the Soviets can tolerate, and finally: what the Germans can tolerate.<sup>47</sup>

# ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>John Lewis Gaddis. "Coping With Victory." The Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 265, No. 5, May 1990, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Michael Mandelbaum in an address to the NATO Symposium, 9- 10 April 1990, Rome, Italy.

<sup>6</sup>Interview with Colonel Victor E. Stamey, United States Army, Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, 21 May 1990, Brussels, Belgium. Complete interview at Appendix IX.

<sup>7</sup>Dominique Moisi in an address to the NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990, Rome, Italy.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Egon Bahr in an address to the NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990. Bahr is a prominent German Social Democrat and the father of Willy Brandt's *ostpolitik*.

<sup>10</sup>Professor William Griffith, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the NATO Symposium, 9-10 April 1990, Rome Italy.

<sup>11</sup>Bahr address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>12</sup>Gaddis, p. 51.

<sup>13</sup>Stamey Interview, Appendix IX.

<sup>14</sup>Howard, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup>Michael Mandelbaum, "Unified Germany Means New Role for United States." Army Times, 19 March 1990, p. 21.

<sup>16</sup>Moisi address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>17</sup>Mandelbaum address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>18</sup>Bahr address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>19</sup>Interview with Doctor Jonathan Eyal, former British representative to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

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Europe. 4 April 1990. Rome, Italy. Complete interview is at Appendix IV.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Michael Mandelbaum. "Restructuring the European Security Order." Critical Issues 1990-1. Council on Foreign Relations. March 1990.

<sup>73</sup>Moisi address at the 1990 NATO Symposium.

<sup>74</sup>Stamey interview. Appendix IX.

<sup>75</sup>Moisi address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>76</sup>Griffith address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Tindemans address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>79</sup>Interview with Doctor Colonel Klaus Wittman, Army of the Federal Republic of Germany, Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters 18 April 1990. Brussels, Belgium. Complete text at Appendix VIII.

<sup>80</sup>Tindemans address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>81</sup>Michael Howard, 1990 Alastair Buchan Lecture, "The Remaking of Europe." 12 March 1990. The International Institute of Strategic Studies. p. 6.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>83</sup>Tindemans address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Howard, p. 10.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>87</sup>Hans Rudolf Kamer, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Changing Europe." Swiss Review of World Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No. 11. February 1990. p. 3.

<sup>88</sup>See interviews at Appendices. All interviewees called for a new, expanded NATO as the centerpiece of the new security order.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"Moisi address at the NATO Symposium.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Howard discusses this in his Alastair Buchan Lecture. See also Flora Lewis, "Europe Must Decide Quickly How to Proceed," in the Stars and Stripes, 29 March 1990, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup>"Kennedy interview, Appendix IV.

<sup>4</sup>"Stamev interview, Appendix IX.

<sup>5</sup>Wittman interview, Appendix VIII.

<sup>6</sup>Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Schuyler Forester, United States Air Force, Special Assistant to the U. S. Ambassador to the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna, Austria, 27 April 1990.

## APPENDIX I.

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APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW OF DOCTOR ROBERT KENNEDY

27 February 1990

Rome, Italy

Professor of International Affairs. Georgia Institute of Technology; former Civilian Deputy Commandant. NATO Defense College; former Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies. Department of National Security, US Army War College; former Foreign Affairs Officer, US Arms and Disarmament Agency.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW OR BEING QUOTED IN MY PAPER?

A. No.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE?

A. Let me start with some concerns that may not be readily apparent: particularly for Americans. If you surveyed the people of Europe, you find that a great antipathy still remains for the Germans as a result of what happened in World War II. I think it would be fair to say that if you asked the average Pole whom he disliked the most, he would probably respond - the Germans. Only secondly would he say the Soviets. There remains a great concern among northern European countries - Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxemburg, France - over the possibility of a resurgent Germany.

The Germans, ... part. probably bring this on. They're extremely organized - and I hate to go to stereotypes - but I think they are fundamentally an extremely organized people with a great capacity - to be honest - a certain sense of

superiority. Given the tools, they would probably assume as a people that they can do it better. This frightens Europeans from several perspectives. First of all, the enormous power of a potentially unified Germany could bring to bear in the economic area. If you define power in terms of influence, decisions in the economic area may well be influenced in favor of the Germans simply because they bring so much power to the table.

The fear that politically once they were unified and were able to wield economic power that could be translated into political power. This concerns not just the small countries but the British and the French. In general, we are confronted with the old adage - NATO was formed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. In some countries of Europe, this still pertains. I would not underestimate the anti German feeling you see in a lot of countries. It does not pertain to the southern Europeans - Spain, Italy, Portugal, Turkey.

Q. WHAT MEASURES CAN BE EMPLOYED IN EUROPE TO REASSURE GERMANY'S NEIGHBORS THAT THERE IS NOT A SECURITY THREAT FROM A UNIFIED GERMANY?

A. Let me deal with this on two levels. We in the west, by our policies, can contribute to a potentially adverse climate in a post-unification phase. The West Germans have been more than loyal allies. Any reasoning person in Europe must come to the conclusion that the Germans have given more than their share.

They rightly feel that since it was a condition for joining the Alliance that they should have the support of allies that they have loyally supported. Add that to the enormous emotion of a Germany unnaturally divided. If we respond with too strong a reluctance: you have the roots of resurgent nationalism in Germany. This is dangerous. We must be very careful during this period. Despite the concerns of other allies: from an American perspective, we must appear to be loyal to the Germans who made it clear when they joined the Alliance, it was based on the prospect of future unification.

What we should not be doing is appearing to drag our feet. What we probably should be doing is to focus on the nature of the order that we are trying to create in Europe and asking the Germans to think about that order and what role they see themselves playing. Ask them what they think a NATO might be. Don't engage them in one on one dialogue but in an Alliance dialogue so that we can find the formula that keeps Germany in a political dialogue with it's neighbors. If we find that formula we will have gone a long way toward satisfying the concerns of some other Europeans.

We will not solve the economic problems. The countries of Europe will have to solve that. The other countries will just have to become more productive. They will have to work harder to compete with a unified Germany. But we will have gone at least a part of the way toward allaying fears of a rapid move of Germany out of the Alliance with the possibility of a quick

growth of nationalism and independence in Germany. A Germany that: instead of engaging in dialogue, is appearing to throw it's weight around.

Q. THE POLITICAL POLLS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST GERMANY SHOW THAT THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ARE LEADING IN THE POLLS. ONE OF THEIR PLATFORM PLANKS CALLS FOR GERMANY TO LEAVE NATO AND FOR GERMANY TO BE NEUTRAL. WHAT ARE YOUR COMMENTS ON NEUTRALITY AND GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO?

A. The SPD has been meddling in East German politics. They see great opportunity there and they see some of their concerns are what you might expect from a country emerging from socialism. In a unified Germany, I see the SPD fairing much better than the CSU or CD but that remains to be seen.

I think we have a big problem here and I don't know how to solve it. There's no way you can keep Germany in NATO. If the SPD wins and pursues that approach, I think we must ask ourselves what's the next best alternative. I think it might be important to begin thinking about a different kind of NATO so that if the SPD comes to power we can offer them an alternative. It would give the new German government a way out. They could tell their people that they were going to leave NATO but that now it's been restructured and serves a greater interest.

I think NATO should invite observers from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Q. DO YOU SEE THE WEU, THE CSCE OR SOME OTHER ALTERNATIVE FORUM ASSUMING NATO'S SECURITY ROLE?

A. No, I don't. I think the WEU is too narrow. The EC doesn't have a security dimension now and it also narrow. Only certain players are in and loyal allies are excluded. My own view is that Americans must remain involved in Europe. I think it's both in the American and European interest to keep America involved. A case could be easily made by a German that it's in Germany's interest to keep America involved. NATO is the best mechanism to do that. We are not part of the EC or WEU. In the wake of a united Germany, I'm not sure the Europeans would be prepared to settle their problems themselves. American political influence would be very important. The French still hate the Germans. The British hate the French. All of those animosities are still there. We are the only honest brokers. Although we have appeared to most Europeans as not being particularly apt, we still are the people with the least self-centered motives.

Q. COULD NATO AND EUROPE LIVE WITH A NEUTRAL GERMANY?

A. Sure, why not. It can be done. It would be a different kind of alliance. If NATO'S task from a military point of view was to create a more stable environment. If a unified Germany was neutral, you would have to take into account the reduction of the nature of the threat. Particularly when you consider the reductions in the Soviet military and their withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Nobody's knocking at the door anymore.

The question then becomes what kind of NATO do we want and what are it's purposes. What political objectives?

Could NATO with a new focus and new political objectives survive with Germany outside? Not well. Germany would have to be at the table. They could be outside of the central core by their own choice. But whether there in the second ring and are there all the time as the French have been in the second ring on the military side. NATO could probably live with that and accomplish the same amount of business.

A truly neutral, isolated Germany - I don't think NATO could survive that way. We would be back to just the EC.

Q. WHAT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS DO YOU SEE FOR THE SOVIET UNION?

A. There are several problems they must confront. The first is that their Eastern European allies thought the Soviet Union brought stability to the equation of frontiers. Whatever environment they leave, if it doesn't solve the frontier questions, the Soviet Union will suffer politically. This would cause a security problem if borders aren't guaranteed.

I don't think the Soviets see a military threat from a unified Germany if they could arrive at a formula where a neutral Germany was truly neutral. The problem is that the Soviets see an inevitable gravitation to the west for Germany. You could be neutral in name only.

The Soviet Union will retain awesome military power and I don't think any sane leader (German) would ever challenge that.

Q. THE POLES HAVE STATED THAT THEY HAVE ASKED THE SOVIET TROOPS TO REMAIN IN POLAND TO PROTECT THEIR FRONTIERS. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO LESSEN THEIR FEARS?.

A. A Germany inside of NATO in some shape or form. There are a lot of configurations you could come up with. Germany could stay in the integrated military structure and East Germany remains free of any soldiers on their soil. That could be orchestrated in such a way, I think, to be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The bottom line is that, any reunified Germany, inside or outside of NATO, has to involve a clear settlement to World War II. It must be bought on by a unified Germany.

Q. THERE'S BEEN TALK IN THE PRESS THAT A FORMAL PEACE TREATY HAS BEEN OVERCOME BY EVENTS. YOUR COMMENTS, PLEASE.

A. People say that but I'm not sure the Poles feel that way. What they want is a clear indication that recognizes their borders. CSCE does not appear to be enough for Poland.

Statements by current German leaders do not go far enough to satisfy the Poles. A lot of politics is being played and the Poles are concerned about what that means for the future, and rightly so.

Q. WHAT ROLE DO YOU SEE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PLAYING IN THE REORDERING OF THE SECURITY DIMENSION FOR EUROPE?

A. They must be involved in the decision making to make it work. I see them becoming more active players in what I call the "NATO community" - expressing concerns, encouraging

approaches. Perhaps dual forums where NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries sit down and attempt to develop a new international order. Absent that, we need extensive US - Soviet discussions to get a feeling for their concerns and tell them our concerns. Out of that, we can come up with a minimum of a four power agreement that protects the interests of all parties, including Germany.

Q. THE TWO PLUS FOUR PLAN WAS DEVELOPED OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE BY THE TWO SUPER POWERS AND FORCED ON THE ALLIANCE. COMMENTS?

A. I would like for that not to happen. We have had some very negative repercussions. I think the more powers involved in the discussions - it takes longer - but you get better results. But we may not be able to do that. Some countries are reluctant to agree to almost anything.

The Two Plus Four is a workable, possible solution. It may be the only one. But there is a prospect for frictions when our allies feel that their interests are not being considered. This includes the Dutch, Belgians, Poles and Czechs.

It is in western interest to get the Soviet troops out of Poland.

Q. WHAT IS HAPPENING IN FRANCE?

I think the French are scared to death. Scared that Germany will become the premier economic power in Europe. They are concerned that, once again, France will not be delivered to her rightful place in the sun as the leader of Europe. It is no

surprise that the French were quick to support the WEU. For a period, France had seen a Europe without the United States meant French supremacy which; culturally, they think they deserve.

I don't think the French think they can stand evenly with the Germans. We must remember that the French suffered in wars with Germany.

I think they are scared to death of a reunified Germany. a Europe without NATO. For the first time, I think they are beginning to realize that their interests are clearly better served with the United States in Europe than with the US out of Europe.

I would not be surprised that if they thought they could keep Germany in the Alliance, they would offer to rejoin the military structure. We should look at a possible restructuring of the Military Committee to make it palatable to the French. Particularly if the Germans give some suggestion that they would remain in NATO if the French were in the military structure.

Q. EC 92 IS LOOMING ON THE HORIZON. WHAT IMPACT WILL A UNIFIED GERMANY HAVE ON THIS PROCESS?

A. The EC window is already open to East Germany. An enormous amount of capital will have to be pumped into East Germany. It may quickly overtake the American economy and doors for American investment may be permanently closed.

In the short run, it may slow down EC integration.

Q. THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS REPORTS OF A RESURGENCE OF GERMAN NATIONALISM. WHAT ARE YOUR COMMENTS?

A. I have been troubled by the trend. It's a very small minority and they can only benefit if we screw up.

I think the Germans consider themselves as part of the western house and as long as we support them, it will remain small.

Nationalism has devastated Germany in the past and the notion is not a popular one.

Q. WHAT COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE ON THE CSCE PROCESS?

A. It's been very successful. The follow-up on the final act is great. Whether that's the forum to choose for the new order in Europe is debatable. We must be careful not to undermine the structure of the Alliance. If we used the CSCE, we'd still need NATO to decide the position of the 16 before we went to the CSCE table.

Q. WHAT IMPACT WILL GERMAN UNIFICATION HAVE ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK COUNTRIES?

A. It will have an adverse impact as Germans shift investment east. We need to get US investment over here for joint ventures.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY ASIAN POWERS PLAYING A ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?

A. We should get Japan involved in NATO. It should get involved in world issues.

Q. HOW DO THE ALLIES GET OUT OF BERLIN?

A. There are some technical problems but: provided that the appropriate security arrangements are forthcoming and that we don't simply withdraw forces, it will be easy.

Q. HOW MANY US TROOPS WILL BE IN EUROPE IN NOVEMBER 1992 - THE NEXT US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?

A. If everything keeps going, there will be enormous pressure to bring home the troops. 30-40-50,000 will stay. If the Germans don't want us - we will be gone in a heartbeat. It would be a great mistake but...

END OF INTERVIEW

APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW OF PROFESSOR PETER OPPENHEIMER

2 March 1990

Rome, Italy

Lecturer in Economics, Christ Church College, Oxford; former economist with the Bank for International Settlement, Basel, Switzerland.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW OR BEING QUOTED IN MY PAPER?

A. No.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE?

A. In terms of NATO-Warsaw Pact implications: I don't see any (implications) beyond that which is apparent from the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the rethinking by the Soviets of their policy. The fact is that economic forces being what they are; the West has won the Cold War. By Germany reuniting, the more interesting question is whether there will be a whole new, or if you like, a reversion to old threats to security caused by the reunification. After all, the map of Europe was split East-West by World War II. You can say there's a long history going back two millennium of an East-West split. There's always been a funny kind of frontier across Europe that has asserted itself in different ways from time to time over the centuries. The Iron Curtain was merely the 20th century version of what's come up time and again. I accept that but that phase is basically over and what we should ask ourselves is 'does the reunification of Germany portend an eventual return, sometime in

the next century. of European conflicts that we thought we got rid of once and for all with the rise of the super powers and the diminishing of Europe's world role.'

Q. HOW DO YOU SEE UNIFICATION IMPACTING ON THE PROGRESS TOWARDS EC 92?

A. On the whole: positively. I mean the whole upheaval in Eastern Europe has been one of the factors along with the Single Market Program and the new wave of investment in Europe lifting the economic spirit in Europe and overcoming the low point of confidence in the early 80's. I think, by and large, that's positive. You must qualify that by saying there's a very acute head-scratching problem of how to stabilize the situation and allow progress to take place in an orderly manner and put an end to this pell mell migration of East Germans. This will result in the depopulation of East Germany if it's allowed to continue. The population is only 16 or 17 million and at half a million year, you don't have to empty a country for it to be effectively depopulated. There are tremendous economic technical problems in how you instill enough confidence in the East Germans combined with patience to remain in their country.

Q. HOW WOULD YOU DO IT?

A. Nice question. If I had a clear answer to that I would have already published. You must encourage German industry to view the whole of Germany as an economic area in the same way it is a cultural area. On the other hand, you must persuade the East

German population that after all the misery they have been through in terms of low living standards for the past 20 years. for God's sake. be patient for a few more years and not go for all the jam in a hurry. You need to make an institutional arrangement that will convince them that they are in the West for good and will not lapse back. There are two major incentives for them to migrate. One is the fear that this is just a temporary lapse and the Soviet army will be back and the barriers will go up again and they must get out while the going is good. The other motive is that the prospect for a decent income in East Germany in the next few years is lousy. It's an easier way to prosperity to migrate. The first of the two motives is relatively easy to deal with. Following the East German elections, the new Soviet line and willingness to withdraw troops should make it relatively easy to solve. It's all the neighbors too - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. I'm not too worried about that. The real challenge to solve is the immediate search for prosperity versus the willingness to stay and build up a country. There is no precedence in history for opening a border on this scale - for two countries that are adjacent to each other with such enormous disparities in income levels. Clearly what the German government is doing is searching for devices like monetary union that will instill confidence and perhaps kid the East Germans that they are more prosperous than they really are to get them to stay.

Q. HOW WILL GERMAN MONETARY UNION EFFECT THE REST OF EUROPE? WILL IT CAUSE INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES TO RISE?

A. No. I don't think so. It may require the Germans to raise taxes in order to pay income subsidies to the East. If you suddenly have an influx of unemployed workers, the existing population has to bear a greater tax burden. If the West Germans are pleased about reunification with the East, it's their duty to show their solidarity by putting their hands in their pockets and not merely preaching sermons that the East Germans must work harder. It will be interesting to see if Germany will ask their European neighbors to make a contribution. If they try and give the subsidies without raising taxes, there is one scenario which has worse inflation and higher interest rates. This could happen. It is a burden on the receiving country that they will have to meet. They have a choice of meeting the burden responsibly or irresponsibly. If they don't raise taxes, there is a chance for economic disorder.

Monetary union is not the essence of the matter. Monetary union is a technicality; the terms of which the authorities are trying to manipulate in order to ease their problem by easing the demands which the Easterners are making on the West. What they are hoping is that if the Easterners feel they got favorable terms, they won't immediately spend their accumulated savings, they will be content with low wages for some time, they will moderate their demands on the social security system, and the problems for the West will be eased. But that's a kind of

can trick. The essence of the matter is not monetary. The essence is the integration of a new population and a new area which sees the opportunity to better itself quickly but which can only better itself quickly at someone else's expense.

Q. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ARE LEADING IN ALL THE POLLS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST GERMANY. ONE OF THEIR PLANKS CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF GERMANY FROM NATO AND NEUTRALITY FOR GERMANY. WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS ON THIS SUBJECT?

A. I would have thought until not long ago that withdrawal from NATO was the only terms the Soviet Union would accept for German reunification. It appears that may not be so. To me, that's the most astonishing change. Everything about Gorbachev - his confession of the failure of the Soviet economic system, his desire to withdraw from not only Afghanistan but Eastern Europe, letting Eastern Europe go it's own way. All of that is remarkable but not staggering. What is staggering is the idea that a united Germany could stay in NATO without any quid pro quo. It might be that the Soviet Union has in mind that it can maintain friendly relations with NATO as a whole and this will provide the best possible curb on Germany becoming adventurous and a threat to European stability again in the 19th century, early 20th century mold. And that we really have to break out of the NATO - Warsaw Pact mold and regard the duty of these alliances is to keep shackles on their own leading members.

Q. DO YOU SEE SOME OTHER EXISTING FORM TAKING OVER NATO'S SECURITY ROLE - THE WEU, EC, CSCE?

A. No. I don't. All of that is just a rethinking of the NATO role. The choice of one set of initials or another is not important. The basic fact is that NATO has been the only military organization that has counted internationally in Europe. It's rationale was based on East-West confrontation. If that confrontation is going to the extent that it's going, what is the rationale for NATO now? It doesn't have one. Perhaps we should contemplate the possibility that it's rationale now ought to be to ensure the pacific (peaceful) attitude of a united Germany. In which case, we need an alliance between NATO and the Soviet Union. With Germany still in NATO but, as has been suggested, with the Soviet Union still having troops in East Germany in order that we all keep our arms around each other's shoulders and prevent any of us from getting out of line.

Q. ONE OF OUR LECTURERS THIS WEEK USED THE QUOTE 'NATO WAS CREATED TO KEEP THE U.S. IN (EUROPE). THE SOVIETS OUT, AND THE GERMANS DOWN.'

A. Yes, that's right. So maybe the third of those will loom larger in importance relative to the other two.

I THINK A "LOOSE CANNON" IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE DISASTROUS.

If it becomes less important to keep the U.S. in Europe and less important to keep the Soviets out since the Soviet view of what Europe is all about has so radically changed. Maybe the Soviets could act as the U.S. agents in Europe to help keep the Germans in order.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY MAJOR JAPANESE ROLE IN EUROPE IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?

A. No more so than in any other part of the world. I think there will be Japanese investment. There is tremendous Japanese investment in the Pacific. There's some in America and some in Britain. There's no more reason why the Japanese ought to keep out of Eastern Europe than IBM or any other western firm. I don't see Japan having any special role but I do see Japan having a role commensurate with it's world economic position.

Q. PORTUGAL, SPAIN, GREECE, AND TURKEY HAVE ALL MADE GREAT ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THE HELP OF THE WEST EUROPEANS AND TO A LARGE EXTENT, THE GERMANS. WITH ALL THE ATTENTION GOING TO EASTERN EUROPE THESE DAYS, WHAT DOES THIS PORTEND FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION?

A. It doesn't portend anything unfavorable. When you say these countries have prospered primarily because of Western help, I think that is misleading. They have prospered primarily from their own demonstrated capacity to respond to the opportunities available to them. Those opportunities have included trade with northern Europe, the ability to send workers to find employment in northern Europe and send wages back and eventually return with new skills. They've included the opportunity to attract investment from western firms. But they themselves are responsible for their own progress. They've put the infrastructure. They've shown that they're industrially competent to an increasing degree. They've developed tourist

industries. They're just modernizing their economies. I see Eastern Europe, in a favorable scenario, going the same way. These things take time. After all, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey did not get on this path over night. But I don't see it as a matter of alternatives. Because there's a population there that wants to join the world - in Eastern Europe - just as there was and is in Turkey and Spain. They'll join the world not only as producers but as consumers. They'll do so on the backs mainly of their efforts and their resources with organizational know how and technical advice coming in from the western countries. But that is not a zero sum gain. If a firm sets up in Eastern Europe, it's not just because they see it as a base for cheap labor from which they can gain a competitive margin against Spain and Portugal in the markets of the West.

They see them also as a nation of potential consumers and buyers. One will balance the other.

END OF INTERVIEW

APPENDIX IV

INTERVIEW OF DOCTOR JONATHAN EYAL

4 April 1990

Rome, Italy

Research Fellow. Soviet and East European Program, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London SW1A2E1.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW OR BEING QUOTED IN MY PAPER?

A. No.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS WOULD YOU LIKE TO MAKE?

A. As far as the East Europeans are concerned, the main worry is the possibility of a unified Germany would be a big country which would be able to control Europe in the same way it controlled it before the Second World War. I.E. an alliance between the Germans and the Russians. The small countries of Eastern Europe would be boxed in between a big Germany and the USSR and they would have their fate decided for them by an arrangement above their heads between these two powers. I think that is the general view as far as the East Europeans are concerned.

As far as the implications for NATO, the most important one is that it is possible that Germany's views within the NATO Alliance will diverge increasingly from the Alliance as a whole. In the terms of foreign policy, it could lead them to consider things like their involvement in Eastern Europe; their special relationship with the Soviet Union - much more than any other

Western European country and therefore: it would reduce NATO to its lowest common denominator yet again which might be lower than it is now.

Q. WHAT IS THAT COMMON DENOMINATOR?

A. To keep stability again which is a hazy notion that can be redefined at every stage. (To keep stability) in Central Europe and not to annoy the Soviet Union too much. To consider compromises towards the Soviet Union and to engage the Soviet Union in political and economic cooperation that maintains the borders and maintains the new status quo in Europe.

Secondly and this is what I think the Americans would like is that Germany will probably call the tune. Essentially, we have lived in a fiction since 1945 and this was that Germany, Britain, and France and are broadly comparable in size and force and they were not. But they were not because West German economic might grew much faster than the other two. The fiction could be maintained as long as Germany was divided. France was still happy because the fiction was kept. President Mitterand and Kohl could stand in a cemetery holding hands celebrating the anniversary of the war because they felt: more or less, equal. With the unification of Germany, the fiction can no longer be kept. It is not that Germany is becoming much bigger which is also true. But it is that for the first time Germany's might is not only real but also apparent. It is obvious for everyone to see and the balance (in Europe) is much more upset. I don't

think France will try to tie Germany down within NATO. They have tried. France has become much warmer to NATO precisely because it kept West Germany in (NATO). But it wanted to keep Germany in and divided. That has failed. I think France will attempt to reach a new accommodation with Germany outside of NATO. The European Community immediately comes to mind and as far as the other countries are concerned; Germany will call the shots. So the lowest common denominator will ultimately be - German interests and that is only likely to create more and more tensions in the Alliance. Partly because France again will have no incentive to get closer to the Alliance and partly because the American recognition that Germany will be the one calling the tune on the European continent. This will irk a lot of people in the West. Just look at the reaction you had from the moment it was agreed in Ottawa on the two plus four arrangement. You not only had a bad reaction from Poland but from Holland and Denmark who said they wanted to be consulted. And it's essentially a knee jerk reaction. It's an instinctive reaction to saying 'we know that Germany is one of the biggest players. We don't like that.'

I suspect the frustration will not be channelled into NATO. Up to now we did not have other institutions so the frustration went to NATO. We quarreled; we talked. We did whatever within the framework. We all agreed ultimately that NATO was the best framework. I'm not sure that still is the case. I think it can

be seen much better within the CSCE framework. Partly because within a group of 35, France has a bigger say and could rely on more allies, both east and west. And partly because the bigger the group, the less important Germany is as a singer in that group. In that respect, I think it (unification) will weaken the western Alliance. Not because Germany is not determined to remain in the Alliance but because of the side effects.

Q. WHAT CAN WESTERN EUROPE DO AS A COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, INCLUDING THE US AND USSR, TO REASSURE GERMANY'S NEIGHBORS AND MAINTAIN STABILITY.

A. I never believed in the notion of stability - I think it was largely an illusion. It's the same kind of fiction that says countries are more or less equal - certainly the big players - and that the situation was containable. It was containable only because no other option was considered feasible - like German unification or the break down of the barriers in Europe.

I think we need to define just what we mean when we say 'the maintenance of stability.' If we mean keeping Germany boxed in: I suspect we fail short of using force. It is a question of size and the success of Germany economy. If we mean that most countries will feel satisfied and that their security needs are being satisfied: I feel we will fail yet again because the times for fictions is gone. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark - even Italy - will have to get used to the fact that the plain truth is that they are inferior in size and in the amount of say that will have in their own affairs.

The pooling of sovereignty within the European Community among the rush for new structures is precisely an attempt to recreate the fiction by saying that 'we're all in this together even though you're bigger and stronger than we are.' That's the game and I think it's more a psychological reaction than a very well thought out response.

Q. THE POLLS LAST WEEK IN BOTH EAST AND WEST GERMANY AND THE POLITICIANS IN THE SPD PARTY HAVE INDICATED THAT SOME OF THE LEADERSHIP AND THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN GERMANY FAVOR NEUTRALITY. WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT THAT?

A. Based on the concept of neutrality, my feelings are entirely negative. For two reasons. First, I don't believe a big lump like Germany plunked right in the heart of the Continent can be neutral. It's just a contradiction in terms. Germany cannot be neutral. Partly because it relies for its success on a large intake of raw materials and a large market for its' manufactured goods on Western Europe. So that means it will have to defend its interest and that means taking sides in international disputes.

Secondly, the sheer size of the country makes sure that even if the Germans claim they are neutral and everyone believes that: all the war plans in Europe will have to take into account the German nation. A country of over 80 million people cannot be neutral in the position that it is which is the heart

of the Continent. India's neutrality has become more and more doubtful for the same reason. I think the concept itself is not advancing our case very much. This is on the factual side.

On the public policy side: I think it is very dangerous to encourage German neutrality. Let's assume we get a treaty that conditions unification on neutrality which is what the Soviets still seem to be suggesting; although I think that will change. Let us assume that's what happens. This generation (in Germany) that is now will remember why it happened - this was the price the Germans paid for unification and in order to keep everyone else feeling secure. But the next generation; in 25 years time, will not remember and will not understand why all the countries around them can pile up weapons, build systems, keep armies; do whatever they want to do while their country - the most important in Europe - does not have that right. You will get in the situation of the 1930's where people will say 'why not, unless the others do it - Disarm or proclaim their neutrality as well; we are going to rearm or we going to arm the Bundeswehr with what we think we need rather than what someone else thinks we need.' In that respect, I think it's not only impossible to achieve, but it would also be dangerous to encourage the feeling of neutrality. It would be dangerous just because it would encourage the distancing (if you wish) of

Germany from the other European countries and it would encourage a lot of politicians to devise all sorts of schemes for the country.

We must not forget that German nationalism always had two strands. It had a pro-western strand and it had a eastern strand. But it's not clearly comparable because a lot has changed in Germany in far as the diplomatic scene. But it's still the case that someone like Adenauer fought very hard with everything in his power to tie with as many knots - like the Giant in Gulliver's stories - to tie with 101 knots, Germany into the West, in every possible way to preclude the opportunity that Germany would turn East: towards an agreement with the Soviet Union and towards territorial expansion. That's a genie that once it comes out of the bottle destroys German democracy.... Neutrality will put the question back on the arena of the major orientation of Germany: of Germany's place in Europe, and in regards to the US.

You might find an interesting liege to argue that NATO might not be the long term solution and might not be ultimately the framework to which Germany remains. For the immediate future, the greatest service of NATO will be incorporating a united Germany and making (it) absolutely clear that Germany is not a neutral state.

Q. YOU STARTED YOUR REMARKS BY TOUCHING ON THE CSCE PROCESS AS POSSIBLY EVOLVING INTO THE FUTURE SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF EUROPE. IS THAT WORKABLE? CRITICS HAVING BEEN SAYING FOR YEARS THAT THE

CSCE WAS THERE FOR YEARS AND UNTIL THE SUPER POWERS BEGAN TWISTING ARMS. ONLY THEN DID SOMETHING HAPPEN. WITH THE SECURITY EQUATION CHANGING - LESS AMERICAN INFLUENCE. LESS SOVIET INFLUENCE. PROBABLY MORE GERMAN INFLUENCE EVERYDAY - HOW DO YOU BUILD IN SAFEGUARDS IN THAT PROCESS TO - NUMBER ONE - TO DO SOMETHING POSITIVE. I'M NOT SURE WHAT THAT MEANS - MAJORITY VOTE. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS. HOW DO WE (QUOTE) "REIN IN THE NEW BIG GUY ON THE BLOCK" (UNQUOTE)?

A. Two sides to your question. On the CSCE question, they have some very grave problems. I don't believe the gravest question is the fact is that the CSCE hasn't done much....I believe it has. It has encouraged....cooperation and it has put forward very strongly a point that is now acceptable everywhere. Human rights are indivisible. They are as applicable to Albania as they are to Belgium and anywhere in-between. They are not something that is not only western and they have always rejected something called 'the right to work' which the Eastern Europeans have always said. Something they guarantee and we don't. The right to unemployment. Hazy ideas. That is gone because of the CSCE which provided the charter for international behavior in the field of human rights. And also the idea that you can have security without having democratic states. You cannot. If you have a democratic state, you rely on the control of the people in that country against adventurers and people trying ... things. The ultimate guarantee of peace - democracy - and it's a very good guarantee.... In that respect, CSCE did a lot. It didn't solve the disarmament problem. It didn't solve the general security problems but I don't think that's the problem with CSCE. It's much more technical. It hasn't got a

secretariat - no permanent staff - so all the question of enforcement or monitoring will have to be created either within or without the organization. As you know, that's not the problem - they're are plenty of people prepared to accept fat salaries from international organizations.

The second problem is that it's (the CSCE) 35 countries. This is a very unwieldy thing because it's far too big for making quick decisions. So it will not be a forum which can make quick and binding decisions. The third thing is that it has the rule of unanimity so it's one thing that one country out of 35 says 'no' which you can always find for it not to be enforceable and: especially, for the country you want to enforce a decision upon. The public will simply veto it.

The next point is that it still maintains the fiction that 'all are equal'. It doesn't solve our problem which is how to equate an institutional framework to the realities.

Q. ARE YOU LEADING UP TO A (UN) SECURITY COUNCIL KIND OF ARRANGEMENT WHERE THE BIG POWERS HAVE VETO AUTHORITY?

A. No. I think it must be a combination of things. With NATO going down in importance and the CSCE going up. On the positive side. (the CSCE) is an institution that unites both east and west and includes the Soviet Union while maintaining the North American - US and Canada - involvement in the affairs of Europe. That's the greatest advantage. NATO will probably have to be kept for awhile but, depending on how the CSCE evolves, it

(NATO) will probably lose some of its function to CSCE. It probably not be able to lose the functions like military coordination. These could not be taken up very quickly by the CSCE.

What the CSCE can provide is a quick means of conflict discussion rather than conflict resolution. This is giving states a stake in their affairs. In order to do that (resolve conflicts), it would probably have to evolve into a smaller council of countries that really matter. It doesn't have to be very formal but it would have to be a coordinating, steering mechanism. It would probably have to adopt, like the European Community did, majority vote rather than unanimous vote. As long as you have unanimous vote, nothing will be done. But in terms of ensuring the security of Europe. I think at the end of the day it is still NATO. For the moment and for quite sometime in the foreseeable future.

Q. HISTORICALLY, THE CRITICS OF NATO HAVE SAID THAT NATO IS JUST A "FRONT" FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS; THAT IT'S JUST A WAY FOR THE US TO PULL THE STRINGS IN EUROPE UNDER THE GUISE OF TACIT APPROVAL OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THE CURRENT INCLINATION IN WASHINGTON SEEMS TO BE LESS INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE AND MORE INVOLVEMENT BY THE EUROPEANS. HOW DO WE DO THIS AND STILL MAINTAIN SOME FRAMEWORK TO RESOLVE CONFLICT IN EUROPE?

A. NATO should be explained to the American public as a public service - rather like the Public Broadcasting Network. It's something that is bound to lose money but the loss is worth taking on as it frees America to look elsewhere and devote more attention to Latin America or the Pacific. But it keeps

American involvement in Europe so that no solution without America and no surprises could come to America like they did before the Second World War. You would not have a flair up without America being involved in it from the beginning and trying to influence it.

The crisis with Germany - and German Unification can be called a crisis - has illustrated that the argument that NATO was just a facade for American influence is completely wrong! The way that the United States almost gave carte blanche to Germany on the pursuit of German unification is a perfect example of how the United States realized that Germany was going to be the major player and that no good would come in trying to force a settlement on them. The Americans bent over backwards to get an agreement with the other Second World War powers that whatever the Germans - within reason - would agree among themselves as the conditions for unification would be ultimately accepted by the Allies. The German crisis has actually highlighted that the relationship within the Alliance is much more equal vis a vis North America and Western Europe than some people would have claimed.

Q. YOU TOUCHED ON THE PROCESS OF HOW THE TWO PLUS FOUR FORMULA WAS PUT TOGETHER - MR BAKER TWISTING FRENCH ARMS AND MIDNIGHT PHONE CALLS TO LONDON TO GET CONSENSUS - AND THEN PRESENTING IT TO THE OTHER NATO ALLIES AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI. DO YOU SEE MORE OF THIS KIND OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE FUTURE? IF SO, WHO ARE THE MAJOR PLAYERS GOING TO BE?

A. I think we will and I think it was a breakthrough in the American conduct of foreign policy. They (the Americans) have decided, despite all their reservations, that the other European states are far too divided at the moment to devise a German solution. The Americans realized that the crux of the German problem did not lie in what we said in the West - we can convince each other 'until the cows come home' that German unification should proceed slowly and cautiously and that people should take their time. The fact of the matter was that it was a revolution from below - crowds in the street. And the crowds in the street were not prepared to listen to the arguments that you can have your unification but take another ten years because you are asking too many difficult questions. They just said 'no. we want it now! Now, not later! This moment!' This was the result of the German elections. This is what Baker understood before he made his move. It was one of the most brilliantly executed policies because it was quite clear that the question could not be postponed and it was quite obvious that both Britain and France were so paralyzed in a time boggle that they could not get out of it. There was 101 arguments but at the end of the day, there was not a clear policy.

There was two big dangers. One was the total collapse of East Germany with an enormous problem for West Germany if it (unification) was done too slowly. The other was the collapse in Moscow of the beginning of the understanding that something

had to be done about it (unification) now. Paradoxically, by waiting, it brought German unification that much quicker and in a less predictable way. So he (Baker) decided to move. Once he moved, he did not move in the general Alliance framework. He moved with the people that really mattered in order to get results. He discarded the fiction that we are all equal in this. It must be said that he, conveniently, had the legal basis to do it because ultimately it was up to the four allied powers to decide.

Q. THAT MADE IT EASIER?

A. Yes, but I don't think that was the first consideration. The first consideration was that it (unification) had to be done on a proper basis, a predictable basis. And that it had to be done now not in years to come or, as Mrs Thatcher said until December 'I don't think I need to face the German question for 15 years.' That was nonsense.

Q. FIVE YEARS FROM NOW, WHO WILL BE THE POWER BROKERS ON THE CONTINENT?

A. Quite clearly it will be Germany, Russia in some form or another. Not because of its potential might but because of the potential mischief that it can create if it is not kept informed and in the picture. It will be the United States but a much different level than today - not such a direct and dramatic involvement as today. And the big question is whether Britain or France could lead the front of the lesser powers. It is not

a crown that anyone wants to take at the moment because both are mentally unprepared to take the second league leadership. If you are accustomed to believing that you are in the first league, to be given the prize of leadership of the second league is not such a big prize.

But I don't think we will see confrontation. France will not play the role she played between the wars when she was the leader of all the anti-German nations. But she could act as a counterbalance to the German domination of all economic and political decisions.

Q. DO YOU SEE THE WEU TAKING ON A SECURITY DIMENSION?

A. Yes. I see a more active role but it does not answer the major question of how to maintain a US presence. And it doesn't answer the question of Soviet involvement.

Another problem is what security arrangements are reached to get German unification. Gorbachev's insistence on the neutrality of Germany is a typical Gorbachev bluff. If you haven't got any cards, pretend that you have the ace. Gorbachev has nothing to offer. Everyone knows that East Germany is a dead duck. The only question is whether Gorbachev can get someone to pay some money for this dead duck. I suspect he will lock the Soviet Union into an all-Europe security arrangement from which the Soviet Union cannot be pushed out. If he manages to do that he will have done much more for the security of the Soviet Union than all the rubbish about the Warsaw Pact ever did.

Two points. I don't think the East European countries are going to join NATO or any other security arrangement unless it's European wide. The East Europeans can never forget that if there is a war in Europe that it's going to be fought on their land and they have nothing to gain from this. So I suspect most of them will be neutral - if not in legal terms, at least in practice. Gorbachev can see the advantage in that. Unlike in the past, he doesn't need to keep eastern Europe under control with a lot of money and forces. He can have his buffer zone of neutral states.

Once he gets his buffer zone, the Soviets would like to be constantly involved - locked into - a European security arrangement which will ensure that nothing will be done without their consultation.

The difference between Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders in the past is that Gorbachev realizes that he must pay a price for that arrangement. His price, of course, was to give Eastern Europe away, to accept that the Warsaw Pact is dead, and to accept that American forces should not only stay in Europe but are actually beneficial for the Soviet Union.

I never believed that the Soviet policy was to kick the US out of Europe because if that happens quickly, what would be the result? The only thing that could happen is that the west Europeans will get such a fright about their security situation that they would unite in some security framework. If that were

to happen. you would have the European Community which is already a world economic super power coupled with a united military might. It would be a community of 300 million people who could put up an armed force that is a bigger threat than the US. If you sit in Moscow, you see that you still have the US to reckon with. China. Japan. And now a united Europe. How many more can you take on at the same time and hope to win?

The Soviets have seen that keeping Americans in Europe prevents the wider issue of European integration from becoming too acute. It buys them time and actually makes the east-west relationship more predictable (for the Soviets). The key to the Soviet Union today is to get predictability and some kind of stability. Something they can plan for the long term while cutting down on defense expenditures. At the same time, they hope to cut the risks so ultimately the equation remains the same from their point of view. They are prepared to pay a price for it which was not the case under Breznev.

Q. WESTERN EUROPE IS MOVING CLOSER AND CLOSER TO LONG AWAITING INTEGRATION. EC 92 IS BEING TOUTED AS THE START OF THE END. WHAT IMPACT WILL UNIFICATION HAVE ON THAT PROCESS?

A. I never believed that I would wake up on January 1, 1993 feeling different. I think EC 92 was more of a framework that was very well sold in the west in order to implement a whole host of regulations about the harmonization of the economies in Western European countries. On the whole, the process will be slowed down (by unification) but not by much. It will be slowed

down by arguments about the subsidies for the East Germans which will be quite expensive. Some of the costs will have to be taken over by countries other than Germany. What will happen is that the west Europeans will go ahead with their integration plans without facing the issue of whether they should integrate the east European countries now.

The attraction of the EC to the east Europeans is because of the unity and its perspective greater unity.

The Germans have a very strong interest into getting into the EC. Any sensible German politician is aware that Germany needs to be tied to a lot of institutional frameworks so it doesn't 'go all over the shop.' German trade with eastern Europe is only about 5% of their trade. The majority of her trade goes to western Europe and a slowdown in European integration would adversely impact on her trade.

I think the paralysis today is caused by what we thought would never happen (unification) is happening. It opened all the Pandora's boxes - what do we do about Hungary? This, that and the other thing. What I think will happen is that the eastern European countries will get associate EC status - mainly to keep their mouths shut - and if they behave well and their economies improve, then they will be allowed to join the EC.

Q. DO WE NEED A FORMAL PEACE TREATY TO END WORLD WAR II?

A. No. Absolutely not for a variety of reasons. First of all, it would be extremely difficult to keep the Eastern European

countries from becoming involved and it would open up all the borders of the continent in the most awful possible way. We should remind our Polish friends that the Polish border issue does not only involve Poland's western border but also their eastern border (with the USSR).

There is the problem of compensation (reparations). If we are going to saddle Germany with a massive compensation bill, we are going to have a very large problem for the German economy for years to come.

Ultimately, it's a question of what kind of Germany do you want to create? It's very easy to humiliate Germany now: to insist on specific rights on stationing troops, on demilitarized zones, on specific rights for the four powers in Berlin, etc. They're not going to forget it. And this is what's behind Baker's jump straight for German unification. It is inevitable. It will happen. And if you're going to be a spoil sport now: it's not going to be forgotten.

The real question at the end of the day is like when your daughter comes to you and telling you that she's going to marry someone whom you do not like. You can't win. It's better to pretend that you are happy from the beginning by not humiliating Germany and not being engaged in a peace treaty.

You can consider the agreement of the two plus four as a de facto peace treaty.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF GETTING THE ALLIES OUT OF BERLIN?

A. No. I would think it will be part of the two plus four agreement. Berlin was considered a special zone by agreement of the four powers so that agreement can be cancelled by the four powers. The Germans cannot be involved in that process.

Q. SEVERAL BOOKS I HAVE READ LATELY THAT HAVE THE UNDERLYING PREMISE THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE ARE AGGRESSIVE BY NATIONAL CHARACTER AND THEY WILL ALWAYS POSE A THREAT TO THEIR NEIGHBORS. WOULD YOU COMMENT?

A. I don't believe in ethnic stereotypes. I think there are particulars with Germany which don't exist today that existed in the past which made for the German reality. The first one is that the Germans can't help but be a constant problem in Europe. There are 100 million German speakers in the heart of Europe. They are highly industrious. Highly disciplined. Very hard workers. Therefore, they are constantly a threat in the heart of Europe. In economic terms, they obviously pose a threat. What has happened in Germany is a rather peculiar nation formation - the creation of the German state. It was created under Prussian control with absence of democratic traditions. It went through a strong industrialization process that uprooted and moved a lot of people yet did not provide the intellectual support for a strong middle class with it's strong moderating influence in politics. There was also a heavy influence of the Prussian armed forces in political affairs.

In the last 45 years, all of these factors have gone away. Democratic traditions are very deeply rooted. They existed since 1848 but they never succeeded because of the kind of Germany that came into being in 1871. It was essentially an extended Prussia. This is no longer the case. The beauty is that Prussia with its autocratic traditions has been isolated when the Federal Republic was created.

The Constitution is enough of a guarantee for the moment. The federal system that disperses power is enough of a guarantee that no central force will have the amount of power to impose a new dictatorship. These are important differences from the past.

We must not forget that in terms of trade that Germany's orientation is towards her historical enemies and it could not change her policies very radically even if she wanted to.

We must not forget that 50 years have passed since the dramatic events and people are much more free to travel and are much more in contact with each other. They don't think in terms of the nation state in the way they did in the 30's.

German politicians have a fear themselves about the capability of their own citizens to maintain democracy. Their are two good examples. The first is the pathological fear of any German government about inflation. That is what destroyed the Weimar Republic and that must be avoided. It is a very important issue on the economic unification - to prevent at all

costs - inflation. They are not even prepared to discuss the issue. The second one is the very violent reaction of the West German government when urban terrorism started in the late 60's. They spent enormous sums of money and broke many human rights rules. But they destroyed it because they had the fear that the Weimar Republic was weak and could not defend itself. Germany today was not going to repeat that mistake. There is a determination there that is genuine and will continue.

It is interesting that Kohl insists that when Germany is united that there is no need to draft a new constitution. He insists that a constitution that was drafted without Prussia - for the first time in German history - should remain in place and be accepted by Prussia rather than be drafted with it (Prussia). That it is quite a strong point. It is never said because it is not polite to say these things.

Q. WHAT ROLE WILL NATIONALISM PLAY IN A UNIFIED GERMANY AND WHAT IMPACT WILL THAT HAVE ON THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A PAN EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

A. I think the idea of the European citizen is like the idea of the Soviet citizen - it's putting the cart before the horse. You have to get the identity of views before you can claim that people have a common identity. We are not yet there. The concept (Pan European) never existed. When East Europe opened up, everyone got terribly frightened. The European Man turned out to be essentially a West European Man. A man that a very clearly defined enemy who knew more what he was against than

what he was for. Now we are being asked what we are for and it is a much more difficult question to answer.

I think the Germans will be convinced that only within Europe could they avoid their isolation and the explosion of German nationalism from within. I think that is strongly felt by most German leaders. At least of this generation and probably in the coming generation.

The Germans will expect to be treated with the dignity they deserve as the biggest power in Europe. This is not a question for them as it is a question for us to accept when they demand, for instance, that German be used in European fora. They know what they are saying. They are going to be the driving force of the European Community and they expect to be treated nicely. This German pride has reasserted itself and will continue. We do ourselves a disservice if we take the German pride, by definition, to mean steel helmets and goose stepping. It means to be treated with the status you deserve. I don't think the United States would like to be treated as a second class power in international organizations.

This will be a very careful game of accommodating the new Germany in its proper status - in terms of its nationalism.

Q. IF YOU HAD A MAGIC WAND AND A CRYSTAL BALL, WHAT KIND OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WOULD YOU PAVE FOR EUROPE FIVE YEARS FROM NOW?

A. That's very difficult. There are many possibilities but I cannot identify any probabilities. I envisage a system that will

lock the Soviet Union into some kind of an arrangement especially over the question of troop stationing in East Germany and what kind of weapons systems can be advanced how far into German territory.

I would expect a united Germany as part of Europe. I would expect a Europe that is more closely integrated. I would expect the growth of regional arrangements - like little satellites - around the EC. One would be Austria and Hungary together with Italy. Although Italy is in the EC and NATO. It would be more of an economic and political arrangement that would serve the needs of the three of them. Another one would be a much stronger Nordic Council which would include independent Baltic States.

Q. ONE SOVIET IDEA WAS ONE THAT WAS SIMILAR TO WHAT YOU DESCRIBE. ANOTHER ONE WAS THE IDEA OF CONCENTRIC CIRCLES.

A. The only question is what is the Soviet intention. I have a feeling that they would love concentric circles. They could then have their cake and eat it too. They would have their say in Europe, lessen the US role in Europe, and prevent total European integration from happening.

At the end of the day, I see a total European structure that will include a military dimension.

Q. YOU CHANGED THE LUMPINGS OF SOME OF THE COUNTRIES, BUT IT SEEMS THE FUTURE WILL BE A FLASHBACK TO THE TURN OF THE CENTURY WITH IT'S GRAND ALLIANCES?

A. Yes, it is because we are trying to fit in East Europe. The other alternative is to simply forget about East Europe. When you decide that you want to integrate them, you must begin by thinking of regional arrangements. Total integration into the EC or NATO is unthinkable. It would not satisfy the security needs of the East Europeans or Soviets.

Q. THERE IS AN ARGUMENT THAT THE ONLY THING THAT KEEPS THE US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OVER EUROPE IS NATO? DO YOU SEE THIS BECOMING LESS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE LESSER PERCEIVED THREAT AND US POLITICAL PRESSURE BACK HOME?

A. I don't think that the only thing that kept the US in Europe was NATO. It helped because once you establish a framework, it is less likely to be challenged. So we will need a framework that continues to be unchallenged. That is the real task for future security.

Most west European leaders accept that a balance of conventional weapons is not sufficient to guarantee security. It did not prevent either World War. They depend too much on the human factor. But nuclear retaliation makes war much less thinkable.

If the US withdraws the nuclear guarantee, you will probably see an extension of the British-French effort which is going ahead.

A nuclear element is accepted by everyone; including the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX V

INTERVIEW OF MAJOR GENERAL ADRIAN SAINT JOHN

US Army (retired)

26 April 1990

Vienna, Austria

Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the US Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW OR QUOTING YOU IN MY PAPER.

A. No objection to the taping and I will tell you what is off the record.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE.

A. The answer to this question is hard and I'm like most of the other people - we sort of half think about it and begin to think about it and realize that it's too hard and we had better not think about it.

The Germans have done a lot of thinking about it and they have their views and they are related to their own agenda, of course, of what they want. I will give you some examples and they deal with security in the broadest sense.

This is my own opinion and I'm not to be quoted.

DELETED

It seems to me if we can get this thing tied down (CFE I) as best we can between now and September. -every week we wait; it gets more complicated. We can get a CFE I - that's still within the realm of possibility. But when it's over, that doesn't mean that sex, heating and arms control is going to end.

DELETED

But whether it's going to be a CFE II; whether it's going to be separate from the CSCE or whether it's going to be under the CSCE umbrella is the question.

DELETED

A neutral Germany? We should have learned that lesson after World War I. It's an unnatural state. You have a powerful, vigorous nation. Even the Poles talk this way. I just came from Warsaw last week.

The Germans say not to complicate things and that we will work on the manpower issue during CFE II. And I hear that Germany isn't going to be neutral and stay in NATO. The Germans say 'don't worry; it'll work out to your satisfaction during CFE II.' I've given you enough examples. I could give you eight or nine more.

My personal opinion is that the Germans don't know how to deal with the current situation either. Some of the things I

hear aren't very logical. In Poland, at a very high level - they say 'we have to do something but one thing is that Germany can't be in NATO. We (Poland) agree with the unification - it's inevitable and nobody can stop it.' They go on to say that maybe Germany can be half in NATO and half out. Or there could be no NATO forces in East Germany. They have thought of all the things they don't want but nobody has really thought about what they want. How can you have half of Germany in NATO and half out? They will certainly have to combine (military forces). By the way, the West Germans are getting reams of applications for transfer to the Bundeswehr from East German officers and soldiers. They really can't do this: except for special cases, because the Bundeswehr will be reducing too. Why would they kick out their own guys to hire East Germans? It's a very difficult problem to workout and they haven't worked out all these problems yet.

There are some pretty wild thoughts flying around - even at pretty high levels. For example, there is talk of a combined GDR-Polish Brigade like the French-German Brigade.

Q. IS THAT A GERMAN OR POLISH IDEA?

A. It's more of a German than Polish idea. They (the Germans) are grasping at ideas that will get people 'off their backs' so they can go ahead with unification and get that settled and get it on the way without all these problems having to be resolved right now.

The Germans are realists. They recognize the problems. They know that even people like the Dutch haven't forgotten World War II, and especially the Poles.

Q. HOW DO WE PLACATE THE SOVIETS IN ALL OF THIS? THEY HAVE SOME VERY LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS ABOUT GERMAN UNIFICATION.

A. One of the things they (the Soviets) want is the 750,000 man ceiling (on the *Bundeswehr*). But even that isn't going to solve all their problems. I don't know how to placate them. I talk with the Soviets at a fairly high level and they understand that unification is inevitable - there's not a damn thing they can do to stop it. What they'd like to do is keep the Germans out of NATO. That's why Shevardnadze floats all these wild ideas - '(they) can't be in NATO.' They can't be in the Warsaw Pact because there isn't any Warsaw Pact. Then the Soviets say that the FRG can be in NATO but not the DDR - how do you have a unified Germany with one in and one out? You can have an agreement that a unified Germany is in NATO but no NATO forces are stationed in the old DDR. These are the kind of things that people are talking about and in my judgment; the Poles, the Soviets, and to a lesser extent; the Czechs and Hungarians, are absolutely beside themselves on what to do. One, they know it's inevitable and they can't stop it. They have to figure out, in their words, how to 'damage limit' unification. People don't know what to do. They are coming up with some real gems of

ideas. They are even talking about a combined German-Polish Brigade. The German-French Brigade doesn't mean shit. It's a symbol and I guess the Polish-German Brigade could be a symbol.

We haven't even figured out how to count 20,000 tanks. What happens to the DDR tanks? Do we count them against the FRG? There are some people who have put together a sufficiency rule analysis and left out the GDR from the other side. Everybody criticizes this kind of thing but nobody knows what to do about it.

That's why everybody is saying - including Saint John - let's get an agreement now as best as we can. Get it on the books and then we can see where to go.

Q. WITH ALL THE CHANGES IN THE EAST. THERE IS A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT THAT SAYS THIS WHOLE CFE PROCESS IS MOVING MUCH SLOWER THAN THE REAL WORLD. HAS CFE OUTLIVED ITS EXISTENCE?

A. Yes. I kind of hedged but that's what I was talking about. Who knows when you're no longer logical. If we can get this damn thing going and get an agreement by September, then I think it's in the interest of the United States of America and the Europeans to get whatever we can now. We've got a "damage limit" kind of a treaty. Nothing like we would have had a year ago. If you can get some tanks destroyed, some tanks moved out, some Soviets moved back, some sort of control, some kind of inspection regime set up - then I think it's worth all the complications.

One of the hardest things was trying to determine national responsibilities. What happens if one country violates the treaty? Does the whole treaty fall apart? It's been an international lawyers' nightmare trying to work these kinds of things out. The Warsaw Pact is breaking up and people, particularly the Hungarians, don't want to be tied to it - they want to have national quotas that they can do with as they wish.

The most difficult thing to work out is the German Question.

Q. WITH THE PACT ON ITS LAST LEGS; WITH CFE BECOMING LESS IMPORTANT: WHAT DO YOU SEE FOR THE FUTURE AND WHO SHOULD BE BUILDING THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE?

A. I would go along with what Baker said in East Berlin. I think CSCE will probably evolve into the umbrella forum. CFE is not practical. The WEU will obviously play a stronger role. France is really pushing for improvement in European cooperation. The Germans are now saying it too because they realize that they will dominate it. Now that they are going that way instead of NATO. Within NATO, the Germans play a dominant role with the US. Now they see NATO going down. NATO has always been a political and military alliance. I would hope that NATO would continue to exist but that it would put more stress on the political role. It can keep Germany in the western camp - that's the kind of thing NATO can do.

It's the Harmel Report all over again - going back to square one and trying to figure out what it's all about.

Q. DO YOU SEE MORE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN THE FUTURE?

A. I don't know. We'll have more than we did five years ago and there will be lessening of the multilateral on the Eastern European - Soviet side.

I was having lunch with a Soviet general yesterday and he was kidding me about how long it took the US to get things coordinated. I told him that about 60% of our time was spent trying to get things out of Washington. 30% with our allies and only 10% with the Soviets. He laughed and said that 85% of their time went to resolving differences with Moscow. 5% with our allies, and the remaining 10% in dealing with the west.

Things are totally different today. During negotiations in the old days, we would have a very closely held bilateral agreement - so we wouldn't surprise each other. Today we get surprised regularly. They'll table something at a plenary and it's obvious that they had just gotten it the day before from Moscow. They frequently don't even coordinate with their allies much less with us. We could never get away with that.

Q HERE APPEARS TO BE A STALEMATE IN THE NEGOTIATION ON THE EAST SIDE. SOME SAY IT'S BECAUSE OF DISSENSION AMONG THE PACT MEMBERS. OTHERS SAY IT'S BECAUSE THE SOVIETS ARE WORRIED ABOUT GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THEY'RE DRAGGING THEIR FEET TO SEE WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS.

A. I would agree. The last Baker-Shevardnadze talks were much more negative than we anticipated. The tensions in the Soviet Union are incredible. The Baltics are just the start. What about the Balkans. Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Ukraine? That would boggle my mind if I was there. These things are giving impetus

to give the Soviet General Staff more power. They are saying that they should slow things down until we can see where things are going.

The most important factor is German unification. They tried certain things here and it didn't work. The Soviets want a specific ceiling on the Germans. They tried here and didn't get it so maybe they've decided to: perhaps, wait and see if they can get it at the two plus four talks. They're thinking 'maybe, we can get something there and we better not sell the farm in Vienna.' All of these things are interrelated.

I am not of the opinion that the Soviets had really decided to block this thing (CFE I) or that they have a hidden agenda to hold it up until after the German elections. I think it's more of a case where they just can't handle it. I also believe they want a CFE agreement. All things considered, it's just like us. I can think of a lot of reasons on why we should back off and sit home for six months and let the dust settle. On the other hand, I think on balance it's in our interest to get a verification regime in place, an inspection regime, to get a commitment to destroy 40,000 tanks and whatever aircraft we decide. If we can get something like this, it's in our best interest.

We've got to get it moving because each month it gets more complicated.

END OF INTERVIEW

APPENDIX VI

INTERVIEW OF COLONEL DOCTOR FRIEDRICH SAYATZ  
People's Army of the German Democratic Republic  
24 April 1990  
Vienna, Austria

Senior Military Advisor to the German Democratic Republic's  
Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in  
Europe.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW  
OR BEING QUOTED IN MY PAPER?

A. Not at all.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE?

A. I think what is going on in Europe now has very important  
security implications. We must understand that German  
unification is closely connected with the security problems for  
all of Europe. That is why we must try to find solutions in this  
(CSCE) process that can be agreed to by our neighbors and that  
will give us a stabilized situation in Europe as a whole. It  
means that we will find solutions that are connected with the  
results here (CFE). I don't know the solution but the results  
here in Vienna and the results of the Four Plus Two negotiations  
are closely connected. The main problem is to find a solution  
that will be part of the disarmament process for all of Europe.  
It means a new German state with an army that will be much  
smaller than the two armies we now have in the FRG and GDR. The  
question of disarmament in central Europe and the new German  
state is connected with the armed forces of the stationing

troops. We must find a solution. The first steps are on the table here and after the negotiations. we will have a clearer picture.

Q. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH CHANGE IN EUROPE DURING THE PAST YEAR. NATO HAS CHANGED. THE WARSAW PACT HAS CHANGED. SOME SAY THAT CFE IS GOING TOO SLOWLY AND WORLD EVENTS OUTPACE THE CFE TALKS. DO YOU SEE ANY ONE OF THE MULTILATERAL FORUMS TAKING THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING THE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE?

A. I see moving forces in all the countries involved and the disarmament process must go ahead. We have a NATO and Warsaw Pact treaty and both alliances are interested in going ahead in the process of stabilization in Europe. The character of the two alliances must change. The Warsaw Pact treaty, negotiated in Bucharest, gives impetus to the new political character of the alliance (Warsaw Pact). I see some attempts by NATO. Perhaps in the future both alliances will come to a new structure. Maybe it can be the CSCE.

My personal view is that the structure is not the main question. The movement in the direction of finding a stabilizing solution for Europe is the main thing. There are difficulties in this but we must find a solution for the German security question. This will help to solve the security problem for all of Europe. CFE I will give us a starting point to develop a new security order.

Q. WHAT KIND OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES CAN BE PUT IN PLACE TO MEET THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND TO REASSURE GERMANY'S NEIGHBORS THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION WON'T UPSET THE SECURITY BALANCE?

A. This isn't the subject of the CFE negotiations but if we can include in the disarmament talks the question of nuclear disarmament - tactical nuclear weapons. We must include the air force and naval forces. These are very controversial questions now but we must deal with them. Information exchange and other CBMs will help. Exchanges on the military budgets will help. We can work on Stockholm I and II. As a stabilizing measure, CFE I will certainly help. CFE II should include CSBMs. They should be right in the treaties.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT GERMAN NEUTRALITY?

A. That is a very political question. Now we have two armies and will probably remain separate for a time. I don't know how long.

Q. TWO ARMIES? ONE IN THE WARSAW PACT AND ONE IN NATO?

A. NO!! We must find another solution. There must be some mechanism to bring the two armed forces together. There must be military forces in both parts of Germany.

It's unrealistic to think that soldiers from the People's Army could be stationed in the FRG. And it's unrealistic to say that the security responsibility for the DDR could go to NATO.

Q. BESIDES THE LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS, I DON'T THINK THE SOVIETS OR THE POLES WOULD BE TOO HAPPY ABOUT NATO GUARANTEEING THE SECURITY OF THE DDR.

A. It's my understanding that the Soviet troops would remain for some time. US troops would remain in the FRG.

Q. AS A GERMAN, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

A. This is reality. We must finish World War II. We can't say 'now you must go home.' The existence of stationing troops is a stabilizing measure in Europe. We must be realistic.

Q. WOULD IT BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF EUROPEAN SECURITY TO NEGOTIATE AND SIGN A FORMAL PEACE TREATY?

A. I don't have a clear understanding but my personal view is that a formal peace of paper isn't what we need. We don't forget the past but we must look ahead.

Q. MOST ACADEMICS AGREE. NEGOTIATING A PEACE TREATY WOULD BE HARDER THAN CFE AND YOU WOULD GET INTO ALL KINDS OF THINGS THAT PEOPLE DON'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT; LIKE BORDERS.

A. And reparations.

Q. THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN BOTH PARTS OF GERMANY HAVE MODIFIED THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF GERMANY - PARTICULARLY THE SPD. FOR MANY YEARS, THEY WERE NOT PRO-NATO AND LOOKED TO A NEUTRAL GERMANY. IF THE SPD WINS THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS, MANY FEEL THAT GERMANY SECURITY POLICIES WILL CHANGE. WHEN THE US AND SOVIET TROOPS GO HOME, HOW DO WE BUILD SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SO THERE WILL NOT BE A VACUUM LEFT IN EUROPE?

A. I think this should be a matter for the CSCE to do that. By that time, both alliances will have evolved into something different. In the initial stages, the main impetus will be from the alliances. In the future, I think the influence will come from Europe as a whole - as a common society.

Q. AN INTEGRATED EUROPE?

A. Yes, an integrated Europe.

Q. A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. SUPPOSE THE SPD WINS THE NEXT ELECTION AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM GERMANY. WHAT PROBLEMS WOULD THIS CAUSE FOR GERMAN SECURITY?

A. I am not so sure the SPD can win the next election. I don't think even a social democratic government would call for withdrawal. They understand the stabilizing role of the Soviet and NATO troops in Germany. A quick withdrawal would be very destabilizing. There's general consensus among all political parties in Europe on this point.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY TECHNICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE ALLIES TO WITHDRAW FROM BERLIN?

A. No.

END OF INTERVIEW.

APPENDIX VII

INTERVIEW OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHUYLER FORESTER

United States Air Force

27 April 1990

Vienna, Austria

Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW OR BEING QUOTING YOU IN MY PAPER?

A. No.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS WOULD YOU LIKE TO MAKE?

A. I don't think there is; nor should there be, some great guiding light out there that says this is the way Europe should look. I would be very worried if someone said "this is the way it ought to be and I'm going to make it happen." The reason for that is that what it ought to be is what everybody else can stand. What they can tolerate; accept. Most of the players don't yet know what they want. A year ago, the Soviets thought they would never be able to accept a reunified Germany; much less a reunified Germany in NATO. They still don't like the idea much. Privately, they now say "I don't like it but maybe that's less bad than a neutral Germany."

The Poles aren't sure what they can accept. The Dutch, French, Brits - they're not sure what they can accept. The US doesn't know what it is that we want.

So to ask the question of how all this is going to evolve is very premature. What is probably more important is to identify

those issues that will determine how all this is going to turn out.

Q. WHAT ARE THE ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING THE NEW SECURITY ORDER?

A. The first big question mark is what happens in Lithuania, the other Baltic states, the Ukraine, and everywhere else on the western rim of the Soviet Union. If these problems explode, the first thing that will happen is that the Soviet perceptions will change - their sense of what their interests are will change. They may decide that they can't accept any of this (arms reductions, unified Germany, etc). At the end of the day, they may not have a choice but I would hate to see a unified Germany and a new security order that was created by coercing the Soviet Union. In the long run, that would certainly cause problems.

The best solution for a unified Germany and a new security order is one in which the Soviet Union has warm, fuzzy feelings about its own security. If the Soviet Union becomes the "odd man out" on the Eurasian continent and doesn't have any say on what's happening, the political implications for the leadership of the Soviet Union might decide that it would be in their national interest to undo whatever had been done in Europe.

In summary, the first consideration has to be the Soviet Union. If that place goes to hell in a hand basket; all bets are off for a treaty, for negotiations, for Two Plus Four, you name it. Everything else is built on the assumption that they can come to some kind of accommodation and Gorbachev survives

and the political leadership stays on a reasonably even keel. As long as Lithuania departs the Soviet Union under reasonable conditions-like a divorce with appropriate alimony. Not like when somebody gets thrown out of the house or, on the other hand, not like when somebody gets locked in the bedroom.

The second issue is how warm and fuzzy the East Europeans feel. If they go into crisis, which they could. If democracy turns out to be a disappointment, a rise in ethnic conflict.... These kinds of things could cause those governments to look inward and to feel anxious.

Assuming none of those things happen, the real problem about German unification and NATO is defining the institution and institutional relationships. The Soviets find themselves initially with a preference for German neutrality. This has always been the standard Soviet answer. The dilemma in the 50's was, as Sir Anthony Eden put it: "if Germany is neutral and armed, who is going to keep it neutral? If Germany is neutral and unarmed, who is going to keep it unarmed?" This isn't the case today. Germany will be armed and will function within the CFE process.

The problem for Germany has always been finding options. There's neutrality. Option two is an alliance with the west. Or there's an option for an alliance that involves the east in some way. In the 50's, it was neutrality, NATO, or the Warsaw Pact. Today, the Warsaw Pact doesn't exist anymore in any meaningful fashion. From the Soviet point of view, the options

for Germany are neutrality which the east Europeans don't want. The Soviets are no longer so sure they want neutrality either, because a neutral, powerful Germany becomes a power unto itself. There would be no constraints which alliances apply. No matter how powerful a country is, alliances constrain their members as well as give them more influence. In this respect, the Soviets would prefer to see Germany in an alliance rather than neutral. The east Europeans would certainly prefer to see Germany entangled in NATO rather than a neutral Germany. And the West would certainly like to see this happen.

The difficulty is in how you define all of this. If Germany is permitted to stay in NATO, for the Soviets that comes across as a loss. Politically: no matter how you look at it, they lost. They lost the fundamental prize of the Cold War. So when you see in Grenesky's (phonetic) (Soviet ambassador to CFE negotiations) statements when he's talking about a new European house, a new European framework, you can keep that from looking like you lost. To do this, you do away with both alliances - everything old. You redefine something new in which you have a role.

The problem of Germany staying in NATO for some countries in the west, it gives the appearance of not being forward looking enough. NATO is going to have to change in a whole variety of ways which will change its character. But there's a lot of reluctance in some corners to let NATO lose its traditional character.

The alternative is the CSCE kind of forum. The problem with the CSCE process is that it is just a consultative process. It is not treaty-binding and it provides no security guarantees to anybody. And fundamentally, Germany needs a security guarantee; so do the French, Dutch, and the Poles, and everyone else. There is a whole bunch of good intentions where there are no good answers. It becomes a question of what the allies will accept, and what the East Europeans will accept, what the Soviets can tolerate, and finally, what the Germans can tolerate. The problem with Germany in NATO is what do you do about East Germany? NATO has said they cannot extend their guarantees to East Germany. Your guess is as good as mine.

How do you do military planning when there is no front line? We continue to mutter the words "forward defense" and "flexible response". There's no GDPs that make any sense. Sam Nunn has slammed one of the final nails into the coffin of Lance. Short range nuclear forces won't be improved. How do you keep the old edifice and pretend that it is still there?

Q. YOU ALLUDED TO SOME CHANGES THAT NATO MUST MAKE TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEW ORDER IN EUROPE. BESIDES THE STRATEGY WHICH WE JUST DISCUSSED, WHAT INTERNAL CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE NATO A VIABLE ENTITY?

A. There are two views of the future of the integrated military structure. One argument says that the US will ultimately militarily disengage from the defense of Europe. This is a very common theme in Europe. At which point, the German army - depending on how its constrained by CFE - becomes the largest

army in Europe. This is not a picture a lot of people would like. One of the ways you constrain the German military is to do what they started to do in 1950 but they could never get through the De Gaullists in France. Essentially, go back to the old European Defense Community idea. You had an integrated European military force. Some would point to the integrated Franco - German Brigade as a model for that. It would be a West European Union-based model. It would have a European SACEUR. In other words, you europeanize the integrated military command system. It would have a small, token American presence. The US would continue to provide the nuclear guarantee but it would not be land-based except for possibly tac air. That's one vision.

This model doesn't solve the East European or Soviet Union's problem. You entwine them politically and economically but not with a security guarantee. You entangle them in the European Parliament and the EC in the classical web of interdependence of economic and political networks.

The second vision says NATO becomes more of a political entity with Germany part of it. Ultimately, you have a problem with the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr will have the mission of defending the new, expanded Germany. Yet the Bundeswehr is entirely integrated into the NATO command structure. This gets very awkward when you say the defense ends at what will become the German equivalent of the Mason-Dixon line.

The integrated military command structure in NATO doesn't work because it is too western-focused. The two models have the

US dominating one and in the French model, it is too European dominated. In either case, the problem of the security of East Germany is unsolved. I can't fit it into this model anywhere. You can't have German politicians making silly statements like "we will demilitarize the DDR". Genscher once said that East German 18 year olds won't be drafted! That's one way to get the people to go east again! But I don't think that was the purpose of the exercise. It becomes very difficult. You could do this if you had a confederation of two pieces - sort of like Flanders and Walloon (Belgium). We know how well that works. In this case, the East Germans just become second class citizens and you build in a civil conflict in Germany that will last for decades. I was talking with an East German yesterday and they are already starting to talk about being treated as second class citizens. This model works reasonably well in the security context but not very well in the political context.

If you define the eastern border of Germany but you can't have any troops east of the Elbe - that doesn't work. You then begin to question the utility of an integrated military command structure. Why do you need an integrated command structure? Maybe it should be what the French have always argued - national, coalitional, coordinated planning. Sharing of information but not integrated command. This would be a looser military association. It would be close coordination and planning but not the integrated command structure. That changes the politics. This would have a lot of appeal because it allows

the French to play as a full partner in NATO. And it draws the distinction between West Germany and East Germany west of NATO, smaller. You can argue that this model is the more likely political model to take. You end up with no integrated military command structure but you would have military committees and international staffs. But you won't have a NORTHAG or a CENTAG.

Q. WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT OF GERMAN UNIFICATION ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION?

A. You need to define what you mean by European integration. I think you can draw a cause and effect line between perception of threat and the formation of a security alliance in which security guarantees are at the heart of the alliance. I don't think you can get political or economic integration on the same basis.

Q. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE NEXT WAR WILL BE FOUGHT IN THE MARKETPLACE.

A. The economic integration we are talking about will include Germany as a principal partner - a major share holder, not the majority share holder but a major one. On the one hand you can entangle them like Gulliver. On the other hand, they are going to be the most powerful player and carry the biggest weight.

If you have political integration that goes along with economic integration, the dilemma for countries like France or Britain is that if political influence derives from economic influence, they will be giving up some sovereignty to an organization in which they will not have the dominant voice.

That's always been the French debate and the British debate about the EC and European integration.

Q. LATELY. THERE HAS BEEN A BIG PUSH FOR FASTER INTEGRATION. MITTERAND AND KOHL ARE BOTH PRESSING HARD FOR IT.

A. You can run that debate right down party lines and you could back in the 1950's. Remember, in 1950-52 it was the French socialists who offered the plan for the European Defense Community. It was the Gaullists who had come to power and who vetoed it out in 1954. Because the Gaullists ultimately chose national sovereignty over international absorption.

The British debate has been more or less along the same lines. The conservatives have always chose national sovereignty and total national autonomy instead of some international entanglement that is going to diminish their freedom of maneuver.

You have to look at the domestic politics in all of the European countries. These debates run along the same lines in each of the countries. If you tend to be on the left of the political spectrum - like the Social Democratic Party - you tend more to look to international solutions rather than solutions based on national sovereignty while conservative parties tend to stress national solutions. Mitterand is trying to control the Germans and his solution would be more of an internationalist one than Maggie who is of a different political persuasion. I don't see the Labor Party beating the Conservatives out of power unless Maggie absolutely does something really stupid.

Another factor that needs to be considered is the future of the German political character. We in the west were surprised that the East German CDU did as well as they did. This is the birth place of the SPD and the CDU leader had been accused of being a Stasi informer. There's probably a lot of truth to the story that the West German political parties came in and bought the election. You can't underestimate the power of promising 1 to 1 and speedy unification. Helmut has discovered that it was such a powerful promise that he could afford not to give it. If you look at the CDU security platform, it looks an awful lot like what's coming out of the SPD in the west. Egon Bahr has changed his tune. The CDU line and the West German SPD line are fairly close - no nucs, no forward defense, etc.... Reading between the lines, it does not envision an indefinite American presence (in Germany) any more than it envisions an indefinite Soviet presence. It is a platform that transforms NATO in such a way that US influence is reduced and the role of nuclear weapons is reduced. Egon Bahr and others have rediscovered again the importance of the American security guarantee.

Bahr understands that with all this fluffy talk about the CSCE, the CSCE does not give you a security guarantee and that's what they need. Others need it too.

It is not clear that Helmut Kohl is going to lead a unified Germany. He may find himself the Chruchill of German history: winning the war but losing the election. That could change things.

I am not sure that if at the end of the day, we don't find ourselves happier with an SPD government in a unified Germany. We have had more trouble with European conservative governments than with socialist governments. The conservatives were the most staunch in their need to exercise their own national sovereignty. De Gaulle. The French leader we have gotten along with the best? Mitterand, a socialist. We got along famously with Harold Wilson. Our thing with Maggie isn't all that great. I think we will find that Helmut Kohl is not entirely predictable. We know a lot about what Kohl says he is doing and what he will do in the future. But once the election is over and he is a reelected chancellor with a longer mandate, I think we may not hear quite the same tune.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT CFE II. THE GERMANS ARE PASSING A LOT OF PROBLEMS ALONG TO BE SOLVED IN THAT FORUM - TROOP CEILINGS, DISPOSITIONS ETC?

A. The Germans want CFE I to be signed quickly. The reason is that CFE I is already structured. It will be much easier if CFE I is done before unification. If you have a German unification right in the middle of the (CFE) process, who gets the East German army for numbers? There is a German fear that unification is only possible because of the Soviet involvement in CFE and unification might hinge on the success of CFE I. And partly because you have a (CFE) process in which the Soviet Union is engaged and committed. Their fear is that the longer CFE drags on, the more this whole process might blow up. And if it blows

up, so does German unification. So there really is a chicken and egg thing between the Germans and CFE. All I'm suggesting is that there are lots of other reasons why the Germans want CFE I. I'm sure there are a number of Germans who would not want to see CFE II to come about just like there are a lot of Americans who feel the same way. CFE II is going to be interesting because it will probably focus on manpower ceilings and that's why we've rented this building for the last 15 years.

I find it hard to believe that any German government could politically survive and sustain the criticisms if it came to the point where they were viewed as the ones who said "right: we got what we wanted. Now adios." They would find themselves isolated in the middle of Europe. This has happened before.

Q. WHAT ARE THE PROS AND CONS OF A FORMAL PEACE TREATY?

A. If it can be handled amicably in a way that doesn't embarrass Germany. The problem is that it becomes a separate set of negotiations, by default, which focuses a very hot magnifying glass on the Germans; on winners and losers. It raises questions of reparations, borders, ownership of land. It focuses issues like people going back across the border and saying "this used to be my uncle's estate. I want it back." That's already a problem. All of the issues become focused - reparations, Jewish interests get factored in. The whole issue of German guilt. Ultimately, all of this can only be negative in terms of its political weight on the process.

When you are trying to put the past behind you and you focus on the past, all this stuff comes out. Because now you don't have East European and Soviet populations that are under control. In fact, they have been awakened to think about these kinds of things. I think it would all be an extremely negative process. I don't know what would be gained by going through it.

END OF INTERVIEW.

APPENDIX VIII

INTERVIEW OF COLONEL DOCTOR KLAUS WITTMAN

Army of the Federal Republic of Germany

18 May 1990

Brussels, Belgium

Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division, International  
Military Staff, NATO Headquarters

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW OR  
BEING QUOTED IN MY PAPER?

A. No.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE CONCERNING THE SECURITY  
IMPLICATIONS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION?

A. We are not talking about replacing NATO with the CSCE. The  
future we are facing will be one of multi-layered organizations  
where NATO will continue to be the functioning link of political  
harmonization and security arrangements in a trans Atlantic way  
and efforts to build the famous European pillar and to find  
over-arching structures under the auspices of the CSCE. This  
notion of over-arching CSCE must be looked at very critically.  
With that many nations involved; it's never worked in the past.  
Look at the United Nations or even the old League of Nations.  
One must make a clear distinction between the "peace observing"  
function that a collective security system like CSCE or other  
forums could perform, and the "peace enforcing" function which  
they probably could not handle. This is where we really need a  
"community of interests" between nations that share some very  
concrete aims.

Thinking about the CSCE, there are some dramatic things that can be done. A verification center, institutionalizing meetings of foreign ministers or defense ministers, a risk reduction center - things that enhance transparency, understanding, and consultation. The "peace enforcing" functions for CSCE would be futile. I think we are well-placed to stick with what we have.

In NATO, we can see where that will be complemented by European structures but they cannot replace NATO.

Q. FROM WHAT YOU SAID, THE CSCE NEEDS A PERMANENT STAFF WHICH THEY DO NOT HAVE TODAY?

A. There are several ideas floating around and I agree that the CSCE process needs to be institutionalized. But one should not expect too much from it. CSCE is a process, a conference, and I cannot see how it could replace the well-functioning mechanisms which we have in NATO.

The big question is how to integrate the Soviet Union into European structures. This can only be done step by step. The better they cooperate, the better one can include them. One must make them offers.

In talking about the Harmel Report, we are close to attaining what the report aimed at. The first leg of it remains valid. You must have a security fundamental. But the second aspect - dialogue and cooperation - now needs to be made more concrete. It needs to be spelled out in more concrete conditional offers to the Soviet Union. In this whole process, we must invest a lot of imagination in how to facilitate their

face saving retreat. Physically with their troops. politically from untenable positions and not make it difficult for them without compromising on our principles.

Q. WHAT ORGANIZATION DO YOU SEE TAKING THE LEAD IN THE OVERALL COORDINATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VERIFICATION FUNCTION?

A. Verification is a sovereign national responsibility. There are discussions going on here in the headquarters on how best to coordinate it. As a military man, as a planner, as a person who is used to thinking in terms of organizational charts. I could imagine a very streamlined organism that would do it all. But nations aren't ready to give up much of their prerogatives in this field. It will be a compromise that perhaps isn't so rationalized in how it will work. It will have to be a compromise between national prerogatives and what you can achieve with coordination and cooperation. Common training, for instance. Or evaluation of the results or distribution of the results. These are the kind of things that need to be coordinated. It won't totally eliminate redundancy.

Q. I WAS READING A VERY TIMELY ARTICLE THIS MORNING BY PIERRE LELLOCHE IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE IN WHICH HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NUCLEUS OF A PAN-EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE NATO. HE SUGGESTS YOU HANG THE OTHER ORGANIZATIONS - THE EC, WEU, ETC.- AROUND NATO WHICH WOULD BE IN THE CENTER.

IN A PRACTICAL SENSE, HOW DO YOU SEE NATO INCREASING IT'S POLITICAL ROLE AND DECREASING IT'S MILITARY ROLE? A YEAR FROM NOW, WILL YOU (OR I) HAVE A JOB? HOW DO YOU SEE THE EVOLUTION TAKING PLACE?

A. Practically, I could subscribe to Lelloche's point of view. But politically and psychologically, it would be very difficult

for the Soviet Union to subscribe to that. So, if you label it like that, just "join the club," that would be very difficult. It must be done in a more subtle way. The labels would have to be different. One could title the whole thing with CSCE labels and still: practically, just expand the NATO system of coordination, consultation, political harmonization, and retain as much as we can of the well established mechanisms.

Q. THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER ON THE FRENCH ALSO, I WOULD THINK?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. HOW DO YOU SEE THE GERMAN UNIFICATION PROCESS IMPACTING ON EC 92 AND EUROPEAN MOVEMENT TOWARDS UNITY?

A. It will certainly not slow it because Germany must be interested in not making European unification more difficult. The two processes are already a bit out of synch in terms of timing. One always said that German unification would only come with European unification. Now German unification, because of the revolution in November, is ahead of European unification. The German government must be very interested in avoiding complications to European unification, or even giving the impression that we (Germans) are only interested in our national question. This is the background of the Kohl-Mitterand initiative involving European Union. Many people have quite skeptical thoughts about the European Union and I, personally, believe it will only go so far and that the nation state and sovereignty are here to stay. It is about harmonization, cooperation, and coordinating common policies but it is not

about giving up sovereign rights and having an Emperor of Europe and a European government with foreign and defense policies that is taken out of the hands of the national governments. I think Mrs Thatcher is only expressing in a more distinct way what many people think, and she is not too far from the realism that other people share. It is only a question of how you express it and how positive you are.

German unification has lots of other implications. The security status of Germany; NATO's strategy which is my field.

Q. IN THE PAPERS YOU READ THAT NATO STRATEGY IS STILL VALID. HOW DO YOU DO FORWARD DEFENSE? WHERE DO YOU PUT THE EGGS ON THE MAP? FULLY REALIZING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY WHAT WE ARE DOING, HOW CAN WE TALK ABOUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE? IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ENTIRE NATO STRATEGY HAS TO BE RE-LOOKED AS A RESULT OF GERMAN UNIFICATION.

A. We share that view, and there are many things to say to that. First, you must know on which level of abstraction you are talking when talking about NATO strategy. If you say that NATO strategy is war prevention, then it remains valid. If you say it is a strategy of deterrence and defense, it remains valid. Of course, deterrence must be redefined in much broader terms than just militarily. If you say it is a strategy of forward defense and flexible response, American troop presence and reinforcement etc., you have then come to the area of implementing concepts of the strategy. You must then make the distinction between principles and implementation. Take forward defense; forward defense as a principle to defend any country in the alliance as close to its border as possible; will

remain. In the public mind, forward defense is so closely tied to the inter-German border that we may have to do away with this as the main label of our strategy. On the other hand, in Norway and Turkey, it remains valid. The question is rightly asked "where is forward in the Central Region?" The front line is going away. But, I think, forward defense will remain as a general principle. The question of where remains to be defined. Wherever NATO territory is violated, we must be ready for that.

Take flexible response or flexibility in response. That will remain a valid concept. We will have to think a lot about it. Not only in our operational concepts where we will have to become more mobile but in terms of reinforcement. We must have more flexible force planning. Again in the public mind, our strategy of flexible response is so tied to nuclear questions and deliberate escalation. We will probably have to do away with that label and will have to call it something else.

I resent the notion that because Germany is going to be united, we are now going to have to relook NATO strategy. I would put it in positive terms - since the division of Europe is being overcome and our aims that we stated in the Harmel Report are being attained, we have an opportunity to look at our strategy. We can study what we mean that we have gone from confrontation to cooperation.

There are discussions going on within NATO headquarters on whether we should review MC 14/3 and there are some that are very cautious that say we must not open Pandora's Box. They say

that they are afraid that the public will say that 14/3 is no longer valid. There are others, myself included, and the German public, who would laugh their heads off if the DPC next week said there were no changes to NATO strategy. I think we must be seen as starting to review our strategy, and the public will understand that this takes time. The public will also understand that before a new basic strategy document can enter into force, a couple of prerequisites must be met: such as: implementation of the CFE I treaty, and elimination of SNF disparity. Some of our assumptions about a post-CFE environment are, in fact, prerequisites for continued change. On the other hand, the breaking up of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance and the disappearance of the front line in the central region impact on our implementation of the strategy.

The question is what is the most appropriate NATO strategy for the post CFE environment. This is just a shorthand formula that presupposes a couple of other things- post German unification, post Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe, even, in the longer run, Soviet restructuring on the Soviet homeland into a "forward defense" posture.

There are some in the CSBM process that strongly believe that we must have a much more systematic and stronger dialogue with the Soviets on strategy and doctrine. I believe there is a genuine process of rethinking of Soviet security interests and military strategy going on. We should influence that constructively. We should try to help them solve their security

questions in a less costly way and in a way that is less threatening to us.

Q. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ARTICLES WRITTEN ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY RETHINKING THEIR STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE STRUCTURE. SOME SAY "YES" AND SOME SAY "NO". HOW WOULD YOU INCREASE THE DIALOGUE? THE CSEM PROCESS? THE CSCE? WOULD YOU CREATE ANOTHER FORUM?

A. At the moment, you get no answers from the Soviets and, in my mind, that is a key indication that they are uncertain themselves. They are looking for solutions and there are different factions. Across the board, I think there is a genuine search for solutions which are less costly and can be implemented with fewer troops. I think this will result in a kind of strategic forward defense of the Soviet homeland. In a couple of years we will say that the decision was made in 1988-89 by them to rethink their strategy. Until that time, we will go through a couple of years of uncertainty. I think the west should press them for more transparency in their planning and restructuring process. I also think we should think about how to influence that process in a constructive dialogue and which forum would be suited.

I think I was among the first (in my Adelphi Paper) who said that we should take up the challenge they made at the Berlin Summit in '87 where they restated that their doctrine was defensive and that the East and West should enter into a dialogue on military doctrine. NATO refused that for about one and a half years because they thought it would only be a

propaganda exercise again. I always said that we should immediately and demonstratively accept that offer and then tell them how concretely how we want to deal with these issues. Not just on the political level of defensive doctrine but really talking about military strategy, force structures, and implementing concepts. People found me rather reserved and naive in advocating that but after almost two years delay, NATO took up the offer and incorporated it into its CSBM proposal. At the insistence of the French, it was proposed to put it into the forum of 35 (CSCE). At that time, I thought it would have been better alliance to alliance. But the seminar was really a historic event and was very interesting. One must now look at that as a kind of "door opener" and one must think now about how we will proceed. It will not be enough to take up the Soviet proposal to institutionalize it as a yearly seminar of the CSCE nations. That is really not enough. It should be coordinated within NATO - between the Americans and the Soviet Union. Between the Germans and the Soviet Unions. Ideally, it would be done between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But that is not possible as the Pact is in trouble. It should follow some well thought objectives that we want to achieve. We must help them to make face-saving retreats. And a strategy review from our side could be a signal that says "we really don't want to give you any reason to think of NATO as threate . We want to move from confrontation to cooperation."

We haven't come any where far enough in conceptualizing some of our aims in stability and cooperative security structures. What does that really mean? All these notions are still very far apart.

Q. WHEN I VISITED VIENNA, I HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALL BUT STOPPED THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS. SOME THINK IT IS TIED TO THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT GERMAN UNIFICATION. DO YOU SEE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT UNIFICATION TIED TO HOW THEY ARE BEHAVING IN THE ARMS CONTROL TALKS?

A. There is no single reason for their behavior at the moment. It's the internal difficulties. It's the fact that Gorbachev and the leadership seems to be over burdened. It's the economic situation that is getting worse and worse. It may be a reassertion of military influence. It certainly has to do with the objective to get as much out of the Two Plus Four talks as possible in terms of economic concessions and assistance.

It is certainly a sensing that the Soviets are feeling increasingly isolated, and it is also becoming increasingly difficult to coordinate a position within the Warsaw Pact. In Vienna, on many questions, it isn't a question of 16 against 7. it's a question of 22 against one.

The statement that the "Soviets dug their heels in, isn't correct." They were without guidance from Moscow. They had nothing to offer because they had no guidance.

It will be a shame if CFE has gone down on the list of priorities in Moscow, but that is one of the many very pragmatic explanations. They also have very real organizational,

logistical, and psychological problems in withdrawing their troops. They have decelerated the process of withdrawal considerably. I heard that as many as 50,000 Soviet soldiers and their families have been put into tents because they have no barracks in the Soviet Union for them to live in.

We must really think these things through and show them tolerance. In Germany, how long will they accept Soviet troops in East Germany during the transitional phase? They just can't get them out as fast as we would like them to do it and, probably, as fast as they would like to do it.

Q. FROM THE MILITARY PLANNERS POINT OF VIEW, IS ANY WORK BEING DONE ON WHAT POSSIBLE CHANGES WE MIGHT SEE IF THERE IS A DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE? SUPPOSE MRS THATCHER GETS BEAT OR THE SPD WINS THE UPCOMING GERMAN ELECTIONS. WHAT IF THERE IS A DEMAND TO WITHDRAW ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM GERMAN SOIL?

A. I am the one doing most of the speculative work here at NATO Headquarters. I do not delve into concrete scenarios such as if we had different political orientation in this or that NATO country.

How will NATO become more political? This really isn't a change in substance. It's a change in degree. NATO has always been a political organization. The military factor was more urgent and more emphasized. But if you look at the density of political consultation here and the different fields that are talked about: Beyond foreign and security policy - economy, science, and ecology. One must not support the opinion that to become more political, NATO must do away with its military

functions. The political functions will become more prominent in the public mind.

As far as political parties go, opposition parties always talk a bit differently when they are in the opposition. Among the German Social Democrats, there are very many people sensitive to the need for NATO.

We are doing a lot here to try and show our people and parliaments the value of NATO's political functions and how dense the political consultation and coordination really is here at NATO. If the other side can understand this, I think they will be more responsive to the idea that NATO must be retained. And also in respect to that famous third function of NATO - how to control a unified Germany, to reassure everybody that Germany is tied into a bigger structure. I don't know when the Soviets will openly acknowledge that a neutral, nonaligned Germany would not be in their best interest. This recipe (NATO) might be the best formula to prevent a resurgence of nationalism and a Germany that might think that it might have to take its defense into its own hands.

I talked with some of the Soviets and their concern is the balance or, more importantly, the perception of the balance by the Soviet people. I told him that he was the head of one of the liberal think tanks in Moscow that influence Gorbachev so he should take it as his obligation to make these things clear to the Soviet people. You must show them what is really in their best interest as far as Germany is concerned.

We must help them (the Soviets) to do it in a face saving way - to acknowledge that Germany should remain in NATO. Many prominent Soviets feel this way but it is not yet the main stream.

Q. THE WEU RECENTLY CAME UP WITH THE IDEA OF CREATING A MULTI-NATIONAL THINK TANK. IS THERE A PLACE FOR THIS IN OUR ENVIRONMENT.

A. I certainly think there is a place for something like that. There is always a very large gap between the military planners and the strategic community. I feel very fortunate to be one of those who has a leg in both camps. But very often the day to day work really absorbs you and you cannot read but only write staff papers.

I would certainly welcome any ideas on how to bring these communities closer together. The military planners look at the scholars in their ivory towers and the scholars look at the military planners who are driven by staff deadlines and worst case thinking.

I would hope for a fundamental military strategy review, we would have one or two years where we could really have workshops where we could consult with experts from the IISS, American think tanks. But I do not think just the creation of a body of an institute would be the solution. I think we must find ways to bridge that gap - to bring the planners and scholars together.

Q. CLOSING COMMENTS?

A. Military strategies may come to evolve in a more interactive way between the Soviet Union and NATO. This would be a major confidence building measure.

END OF INTERVIEW

APPENDIX IX

INTERVIEW OF COLONEL VICTOR E. STAMEY

United States Army

21 May 1990

Brussels, Belgium

Plans and Policy Directorate, Operations Division, International  
Military Staff, NATO Headquarters.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TAPING OF THIS INTERVIEW  
OR BEING QUOTED IN MY PAPER?

A. No.

Q. WHAT GENERAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE?

A. The process of German unification is moving but it has  
slowed considerably from some initial expectations, both on the  
German side and the western side. I believe that even now with  
all of Kohl's talk of a bi-German election, we won't see  
unification before 1992. The delay will be caused by the  
nitty-gritty complications that come into it. There will be de  
facto unification before that, but the actual formal unification  
won't happen until 1992. Many of the subelements, a lot of the  
security aspects will begin to take shape and we will know the  
form they will take. But for the German people to have the  
election and officially, by referendum, to say that "yes, we are  
going to unify" and to work out all the arrangements, it's going  
to be 1992 before that occurs. My German colleagues concur.  
It's not going to occur; formally, as quickly as some people

would like to see. The question if German unification is going to happen - there is no question, that's an absolute given unless the bottom falls out in the Soviet Union and we have some type of conflict that occurs that derails everything. But the timing is going to be 1992.

We are going to see the East German military restructured into a much smaller force. This is, of course, to take care of some of the concerns that the Soviets have. Simultaneously, it takes care of some of the concerns that people in East Germany have, and to satisfy some of the concerns that some of our western allies have about this nation that is going to have 20 million people and will have the largest military force in Europe outside the Soviet Union. It will be restructured into a much smaller force. There will be stipulations and limitations put on those forces so they will be restrained to the present day boundaries of East Germany. We will not allow NATO forces to cross that boundary for some period of time. There will be interaction of sorts and the time frame we will see come out of it will be 5 to 7 years where these restrictions will be placed on that force. That's to give the political situation time to sort itself out; people to become accustomed to a new unified Germany; for the Soviets to sell this thing to their people over a period of time, and that it's going to be OK. This is a very big concern to the Soviets. We'll have a period where things are not that noticeably different as far as security

goes. We're still going to have Soviets in East Germany - again for a five year period as they phase out and to show that they're not just tucking their tails between their legs and being forced out by events. They must maintain their credibility with their people - their super power image.

Q. WHAT ABOUT NUCS?

A. Nucs are going to be there for some time. We've got a significant number of organic short range nuclear systems in East Germany with Soviet forces. The Soviets, through the CFE process and their own unilateral actions are going to be withdrawing those systems as the units are phased out of East Germany.

Q. WITH THEIR UNILATERAL CUTS, THEY KEPT THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABLE ARTILLERY IN PLACE?

A. That's right. But with CFE, we've got something in the neighborhood of 380,000 Soviets in East Germany to keep the political emphasis in a positive way for the Soviets. The large numbers they have - they will unilaterally take some out. Notwithstanding, the prospects are very different today for negotiations to begin on short range nuclear systems than they were two weeks ago. The Soviets will unilaterally take some of the systems out and this will receive great publicity, but it will still leave a significant number (of nuclear systems) in East Germany with the forces that remain there. Until we go into specific negotiations for some reduced levels on both

sides, and as long as we have short range nuclear systems in West Germany, we will see short range Soviet nuclear forces in East Germany.

2. HOW MUCH BILATERAL TALKS ARE GOING ON IN REGARDS TO THE NUCLEAR QUESTION?

A. There have been bilateral discussions between the Soviets and the US. between the US and the UK. I don't know about the US and France but I'm confident that they have had talks. These discussions have, in part, led to President Bush's announcement a week ago that we're not going to upgrade the Lance system and that we're not going to upgrade our short range artillery nuclear systems. These bilateral talks have been important just to keep the nuclear players in the same ballpark with each other and to face the reality of the sensitivities that do exist in Germany (on nuclear weapons) and help politically to keep a stable situation as best we can without facing a unilateral directive from the German people on what you'll do with your nucs. This is something they could do and there wouldn't be a damn thing we could do about it. Through their elected leaders, if the German people said get everyone of them out of here, we would have to do it. There have been bilateral talks to deal with this issue.

Q. WHAT ROLE IS NATO PLAYING IN THE 2 PLUS 4 TALKS?

A. NATO is playing no direct role. It is a process, by mutual agreement, that NATO will be informed and in on the consultation

process. But as far as being an active partner on the decision made, absolutely zero. But you can bet that there is tremendous sensitivity on the German part to be sure that they are doing every thing they can to keep their NATO allies feeling they're part of the process and these sensitivities of many of the NATO allies are being considered as part of this process. But no decision making is allowed. Sensitivities, keeping them informed, consultation before the events (is very dynamic).

Q. WITH ALL THE TURMOIL IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, WHAT KEEPS YOU AWAKE AT NIGHT? AS A NATO PLANNER, WHAT IS ON YOUR AGENDA?

A. Keeping to German unification this question has directly impacted on how we are thinking about the credibility of NATO strategy. Specifically, our concept of forward defense and our general defense positions on the East - West German border. If unification does occur, it does not make any sense to have our general defense positions sitting on the East German border if there is no longer, realistically or legally, an East German border. If we have the trend continue towards democracy in the other non-Soviet countries of eastern Europe, we will be front line defending against states that are moving openly towards our democratic ways. We must rethink many of the basic tenets in our NATO overall strategy. I am very much involved in that as a planner here in strategic plans.

Q. MY SENSING IS THAT EVERYBODY IS WAITING TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS. BEFORE YOU WRITE A PLAN, YOU MUST HAVE AN ENEMY. A THREAT. I

FEEL THAT WE ARE HAVING PROBLEMS COMING UP WITH JUST A CONCEPT OF A THREAT.

A. I think we are having more problems articulating it than coming up with a threat. Maybe we'll even change the word "threat" to "risk". After all is said and done, no matter what happens unless there is a total breakup of the Soviet Union: it remains the largest land mass in Europe. They will continue to have the largest military force in Europe. The Soviet Union will continue to be the only nation that has the manpower and the military power to cause destabilization and could cause a threat to other European nations. That will not change until the Soviet Union goes much further than Mr. Gorbachev has said about the internal changes of the structure and ideology of the Soviet Union. There is still a dichotomy between the Soviet Union and the democracies of the rest of Europe. A risk will continue to be there. How we can articulate that as the old West - East "good guy versus bad guy" is where we are having problems. And we haven't completely sorted that out as a way of explaining to our people that there are still security considerations that are very real that we must think about and will continue to make defense and expenses for defense a reality for the foreseeable future.

Q. WITH THE DRAW DOWN OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES, HOW VIABLE IS OUR STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE?

A. It has been one of our basic tenets. The concept of flexible response is going to have to change. In the next nine months, we will have complied with the intermediate nuclear forces treaty. Those systems will be out. We have already agreed that we are not going to continue with the followon to Lance so, by definition, by 1995 the Lance systems will be obsolete. We will have to make a decision about the withdrawal of those 88 launching systems that we have in Europe today.

If we are not going to modernize the artillery nuclear shells then we are going to look at some type of phase out of those systems as they reach the point of obsolescence. If we enter negotiations on short range nuclear systems, we are going to see a much smaller number of artillery systems. After German unification occurs in the short term future, there will be no ground based short range nuclear systems. We will revert to air systems and submarine launched systems only for the short and intermediate range nuclear options.

So instead of a having a neat and clean full spectrum of nuclear options, we are going to have great changes in the way the options can be planned for execution. Flexible response as we know it today, will no longer be flexible response, but there will continue to be multiple options. This will give us, probably under some other name, a way we can still keep the nuclear aspects of deterrence in our strategy.

Q. SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT WITH NUCLEAR POWERS ON EITHER SIDE. IT WON'T BE LONG BEFORE THE GERMANS BUILD THEIR OWN NUCS.

A. No. absolutely not. I don't see that at all. There are a couple of reasons. First and foremost, the German feelings about nuclear systems. The youth of Germany has been ingrained with the thought that there is no place for nucs. I don't believe the German government could stand it from their own people to make a push to have nuclear systems.

On the broader side, it would not be acceptable to the Soviets. It would not be acceptable to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and there are some NATO allies that would not accept it. Like France and Belgium that would find it totally unacceptable to have nuclear weapons in German hands under German control. I don't see that occurring and I suspect that it will be one of the things that will be documented in the final results of the 2 plus 4 talks as a stipulation for a unified Germany. It will be very clearly stated.

Q. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PUSHING FOR A CAP ON THE SIZE OF THE GERMAN ARMY AS PART OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS. THE WESTERN POSITION HAS BEEN THAT THE SIZE OF THE GERMAN ARMY IS A MATTER FOR NATO TO DECIDE. WHERE IS ALL OF THAT GOING TO GO?

A. I think part of that is posturing on both sides. I believe there will be some type of agreement on the limitation of the size of the German army. This will be in the 2 plus 4 agreement. We are seeing already unilateral decisions made by Germans and this is an appreciation of the sensitivity of other people. The Germans aren't dummies at all. They are also

looking economically and they are presenting their plan now for phase back of the size of the West German military. They are making unilateral plans to reduce the size of the East German force so that it just has the ability for territorial security. They will not openly talk about it because it's a question of sovereignty. They are not being addressed now as a defeated power, so they are not going to sign up to an agreement that sets a finite number on their military force. But, they are sensitive to the issue. There's little doubt in my mind that the number will go down and there will be some kind of understanding that there is a need to ensure that the size of the German military does not get too big because of the concerns that would raise, but you won't see any specific mention of it in a document. The German sensitivity to the issue will take care of that for the foreseeable future. None of us can speculate what's going to happen after the year 2000.

Q. NATO'S ROLE HAS BEEN DEFENSE, DETERRENCE, AND THE PREVENTION OF WAR. HISTORY SAYS WE HAVE DONE PRETTY WELL AT THAT. WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE FUTURE SECURITY ROLES OF NATO?

A. The most significant change will be in the concept of mutual security and the relationships between the nations more so than in any time since the end of World War II. We are openly going to be looking at doctrines and strategy that will support the concept of mutual security. No longer are we as NATO just going to be looking at what is just the best for NATO, with our force structures, with our employments, and our exercises. We are

going to have to throw into that equation what gives confidence to the other side - the Soviet Union. We must consider that our actions are not destabilizing or threatening. That is the principle thing that will cause us to rethink how we are doing so much of this. Does it support mutual security for all of Europe? That is the question we will have to ask ourselves.

Q. WHAT CONDUITS WILL WE USE TO PIPELINE OUR THOUGHTS TO THEM AND GET THEIR FEEDBACK? WILL IT BE CSCE?

A. CSCE is the structure that is in being right now that allows the communication in a formal way among the 35 member states.

The formal arrangements of that are still very much up for debate. The concern is that the CSCE role must in no way detract from the future role of NATO as a security alliance. That is something that is going to have to be protected.

As far as any new structure being formed, I don't see something that radical coming about. Using CSCE as one of the key ways that we can include all the nations concerned into a forum where we can discuss some of these security matters. CSCE will play a large part.

Q. WHAT ROLE DO YOU SEE THE WEU PLAYING IN ALL OF THIS?

A. The WEU will play a greater role as events take their course and as the United States continues to reduce its involvement in Europe with the presence of military forces.

We have the concept of more European security concerns. The WEU will get a larger role than it's had in the past. The thing

that has made NATO so dramatically different is the significant presence of the North American commitment.

Q. THERE IS A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT THAT SAYS THE ONLY REASON WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AVOID A WAR FOR 40 YEARS IS BECAUSE THERE IS A LARGE US PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. WITH THAT PRESENCE BEING REDUCED, WHAT DO YOU PORTEND FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY OF EUROPE.

A. I think that there is recognition on almost everyone's part that the large presence of US forces in Europe has been the predominant stabilizing factor since the end of World War II.

As the United States withdraws through arms control negotiations and through unilateral actions that are being talked about in Washington, there is a point where the presence of US forces would become so diminished that, in my opinion, it would be destabilizing. There comes a point where you have too few American military personnel present to be significant. That number is going to be higher than the numbers we have been talking about in South Korea. I certainly don't know what that number is but in my own thought process, if we go below a six digit number, we're going to have a potential decoupling effect mentally in NATO. We won't have enough Americans to be that significant and there will be a loss of confidence by other European allies. Is the US seriously committed to this and would they (the US) be willing to really step in with full force? As long as our presence remains at a credible level, I don't see destabilization or decoupling. If, for whatever reason - budget cuts, change in commitment, change in philosophy, we

lower the US presence so that they are no longer absolutely integrated into the full defense structure. there will be difficulties to convince the American public that there really would be a need for us to get involved again. And there would be difficulty convincing the European people that America really is committed and they can count on us. This would be very destabilizing and could possibly lead Soviet planners to think differently about their options.

Q. DO YOU SEE BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT IN THE FUTURE?

A. I see the absolute more importance of multi-national forums. That is going to be the thing for the foreseeable future. I see that as the only way we are going to keep the presence of other nations forces in Germany. This is absolutely essential.

Multi-national forces is going to be the way that it will be done.

Q. ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT MORE OF THE FRENCH-GERMAN BRIGADE KIND OF THING?

A. Yes. A lot of discussion is going on right now on this subject. But that's the concept. It won't be down at brigade level but probably at Corps level.

It's not a new idea but its time has come.

Q. DO YOU SEE THE FRENCH PLAYING IN THAT?

A. I do.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY CHANGE IN THE FRENCH ROLE ON THE NON-POLITICAL SIDE OF NATO?

A. I see a possibility for it. Since 1966, when they quit the integrated military structure, with the events that are unfolding now: with a possible relook at a new NATO strategy, the reintegration of French forces into the NATO structure, is more possible today than at any time since 1966.

Q. WHERE DO YOU SEE NATO TWO YEARS FROM NOW?

A. Two years from now, you won't see much change. Five years from now, you will have a smaller US presence. The composition of the member nations will be the same. The French could very possibly be reintegrated into the military structure. As the US presence goes down, I predict the French presence will go up. That is in the national interest of France to do that - to keep their oar in the main part of the water.

I don't think other nations will be allowed to join NATO. That would be looked at as destabilizing by the Soviets. And based on our concept of mutual security, that is not in the best interest of NATO.

Security by consensus of 35 will never work. It's too much like the United Nations. It's difficult enough getting 16 nations to agree on courses of action and direction, 35 would be impossible. And they have nothing to hold it together. So we

are going to continue to see 16 nations as members of NATO. It will be absolutely important for that nucleus to be there as a viable and credible security structure that can respond.

NATO as we know it will not be that different. It will have more of a political emphasis. That absolutely will occur; that makes good sense. If the risk for all of Europe is changing - restructuring to some lesser level, then the absolute emphasis on security won't be that important. We want NATO to get more involved in the political side and to continue to convince our people that security will remain important.

We're looking at this politically and this is a way to continue the growth and prosperity of Europe as a whole. NATO can, is, and will play an important part.

Q. WHAT FORM WILL THE EAST GERMAN ARMY LOOK LIKE?

A. It will be phased. For an interim period of time, it will be a security force strictly for the territorial security of East Germany. For some period of time - maybe five years - to coincide with the withdrawal of all the Soviet forces from East Germany.

They will be restricted to operations in that area and their mission will be restricted to the security of that area.

The equipment will change. The old equipment will either be sold or turned over to the Soviets in some kind of negotiated payment. West German equipment will be phased into that force. It's not going to happen right away, but it will happen.

The uniforms will change and they will look just like the Bundeswehr. There will be a separate chain of command for an interim period. There may even be a chain of command that will give the appearance of a separate military structure.

Q. WHAT ABOUT LINKAGE WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE WARSAW PACT?

A. That will be cut. In essence, it's been cut already except for continued compliance with the treaty for payments to the Soviets. After 2 July, we will see the Soviets start to get paid in west marks. That tells you right there: there will be a complete delinkage with the Soviets.

Q. THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF EUROPE ISN'T CLEAR. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WIN THE NEXT GERMAN ELECTIONS?

A. It will have an effect on NATO. It will slow down the process of unification for Germany even more.

I think a lot of the differences we read about are political and it is going to make a difference. Genscher has never said there should be no NATO. He has said we should do things differently; we should be more concerned about Germany. He has said we must be more conciliatory toward the East - let's reduce the confrontational things. He has made some very profound statements on nuclear matters.

The first thing we would see would be a greatly moved up time table on reducing the number of nuclear systems. That's a

solid base in their platform. The nuclear component would be effected much greater and much quicker than any time tables that anyone is looking at today.

As far as Germany being pulled out of NATO, that's absolutely out of the question. Genscher couldn't support that. It wouldn't be in Germany's interest. It wouldn't be in anyone's interest.

I think it would effect more emotions than it would directly effect real events within NATO, with the exception of the nuclear components.

Q. HITLER WROTE A BOOK IN 1945 CALLED THE SECRET BOOK. IN IT, HE CALLED FOR A NEUTRAL GERMANY. IS A NEUTRAL GERMANY A DEAD ISSUE?

A. Nobody is talking about it. The Soviets have been convinced that a neutral Germany is not in their best interest.

The Germans are a very disciplined people. They know how to make a plan and follow it. They have economically demonstrated their capacity and their ability to become a leader in Europe. They will do the same thing politically as we have seen. For any one to think that a united Germany will not continue to be a leader in Europe just does not understand the German people. I think events and times have changed, the prospect of Germany wanting to become the dominant military force in Europe is no longer realistic. They would have too much to lose and there

isn't any chance the Germans deciding that they want to take charge. The situation is too different today. There are other ways in which they can lead.

Q. DO WE NEED A FORMAL PEACE TREATY?

A. Absolutely not. A peace treaty doesn't mean any more today than they have throughout history. What we need are structures in place that support peace and support progress. We need to reduce military risk and instabilities on both sides. We need actual things in place that support peace. We need more dialogue. We need more people interaction. We need more openness. We don't need a piece of paper.

Q. WHAT KIND OF FEEDBACK DID YOU GET ON THE DOCTRINAL SEMINAR THAT WAS HELD IN JANUARY?

A. All the comments were very positive. I think will see more of these things. It provides another open example of the spirit of cooperation that we are trying to foster.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY FUTURE JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES.

A. I think we'll see more exchange visits, more observers at exercises.. I don't see any joint exercises in the near future.

Q. WHAT DO YOU SEE FOR THE FUTURE OF CFE?

A. CFE II will follow immediately. There is too much political momentum behind it for CFE to stop. You can find no one that will say that we should not continue the arms control process.

Q. DO YOU SEE SECURITY AGREEMENTS COMING OUT OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS?

A. The size of the forces in Germany will be discussed. There are so many forces in East Germany - storage facilities are huge. There will be direct negotiations to get those out.

There is little to no threat from these forces, and the Soviets realize that. What the CFE process will do is allow the Soviets to retrench, reorganize, to get a handle on their economy. It will allow them to reduce some of the huge expenditures that they have been laying out for their military.

It will let them put some of their brain power into the economy and technologies that will support the future economy. The Soviet Union is not going to exist as we know it today. It's not going to be a credible power after the year 2000. They have got to reduce their military expenditures and refocus their efforts into the economy and nation building things. They cannot do it by spending 17 - 19% of their monies on defense. They will use the CFE process to help lower US presence and to lower other forces in Western Europe. It will also provide a greater assurance of security for the Soviet Union as they spend less money on defense. Those are things that can be excellent followon negotiation items. We can look at logistics support. You no longer have the large forward armies but they still have those support structures. So let's negotiate those things away. All of these things would increase the strategic warning time that we're all talking about.

Two plus four talks will focus on Soviet forces in East Germany.

Q. WHAT PROBLEMS DO YOU SEE FOR ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM BERLIN?

A. Once we have the 2 plus 4 agreement, there will be an immediate great reduction of military forces in Berlin. They will get in their trucks and get out and bands will play.

For a very specific limited time, a presence of "show the flag" troops will remain in Berlin. It will probably coincide with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany.

Q. ARE WE TALKING ABOUT CASCADING NATO WEAPONS TO EAST GERMANY?

A. No. The West Germans will provide the equipment. We're not talking about cascading like we talk in CFE. It would be too much of a threat to the Soviets and that is not the perception we want to present to the Soviets.

We are talking about an East German army of no more than 50,000 troops.

Q. NATO HAS RECEIVED SOME CRITICISM RECENTLY BECAUSE THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE MUCH RETHINKING OF NATO STRATEGY?

A. Yes, we are planning to do it. The difficulty is in the timing. Some feel that NATO has not done a good job of telling their story. This very topic is a prime agenda item for today's

NAC. There has been a considerable amount of work done on the NATO strategy. There has been great debate here on the need for a review of NATO strategy.

We haven't been more forthcoming because we do not have agreement among the 16 on how to go about it.

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A big concern in the US is that if you open up the strategy question, you then open up the nuclear question, and the continuum of deterrence and flexible response will be thrown out. Then the US would lose a great deal of its influence in NATO.

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There is work going on but it's quiet work. We have made a mistake by not being more open about this. Getting some political mileage out of the initiative.

Q. DO YOU SEE A FORMAL CHANGE TO MC 14/3?

A. You bet. I guarantee it. It's going to be dramatically different. I see a 14/4 - not a modified 14/3. Without a doubt. It's just a matter of when we can talk about it.

Q. WILL THE POLITICIANS WRITE THE NEW STRATEGY?

A. That would be greatly resisted by the MC and the IMS. There certainly has been talk about that. Part of the reason is because the darn military has been unable to come to consensus. Some on the political side have said that it's time to get on with it and they will do it.

We, the military, must take the lead. If we don't, we might end up with something we don't like. You must have a sound military strategy that political leadership can work above and make political arrangements. The military strategy must be built on a sound military basis.

END OF INTERVIEW

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